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Introduction
The final recommendation of the Advisory Committee and the deci-
sion to delete [Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code] was
based upon the belief that giving courts unqualified power to strike
down terms they might consider "unconscionable" could result in
the renegotiation of contracts in every case of disagreement with
the fairness of provisions the parties had accepted.1
When the trial judge announced his finding that Paramount Pic-
tures had imposed a contract with unconscionable terms upon noted
humorist, author, and syndicated columnist Art Buchwald and that
the court would reform the agreement to reach a just result, the lead
attorney for Paramount exclaimed, "Never before in the annals of
American jurisprudence has a judge taken it upon himself to remake
the parties' bargain."'2 That attorney was wrong. In California and
many other states, courts often engage in the practice of reforming
contracts based upon a determination that some part of the bargain
was unconscionable. 3 Such cases, however, usually involve consumers
rather than sophisticated business people.4 The Buchwald v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp. decision was shocking because the court found
that a party of Mr. Buchwald's stature, who had collaborated in the
venture with an experienced Hollywood producer and had been rep-
resented by two agents,5 had been taken advantage of through a com-
1. California State Bar Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 117, 135-36 (1962) (explaining the rationale for deleting
§ 2-302 from the Uniform Commercial Code as originally adopted in California).
2. John H. Richardson, Contract Unfair to Buchwald, Court Says: Ruling on Profits
from Murphy Film Shocks Paramount, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1990, at D1 (quoting Charles
Diamond, lead attorney for Paramount Pictures in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures). The
trial court opinions in the three phases of Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures are reprinted as
appendices in PIERCE O'DONNELL & DENNIS McDOUGAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION: THE
INSIDE STORY OF BUCHWALD V. PARAMOUNT PICFURES (1992) [hereinafter FATAL
SUBTRACTION].
3. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
5. Buchwald embarked upon his effort to sell his movie idea in collaboration with his
friend, Alain Bernheim, a movie producer. Bernheim had worked as an agent before go-
ing on to produce a series of Hollywood motion picture films. Buchwald was initially rep-
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monly used motion picture industry contract. Equally startling was
the court's stated intention to rewrite the compensation portion of the
agreement.
The decision in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures is not an anom-
aly in California. Indeed, Art Buchwald and the late music promoter
Bill Graham have more in common than just the attainment of consid-
erable status in the entertainment world. California state courts have
held that both businessmen were victimized by unconscionable bar-
gains that warranted judicial intervention and reformation of the con-
tracts.6 A critical analysis of these and other significant California
cases7 raises significant doubt about the soundness and consistency of
the unconscionability doctrine as applied by California state courts.
The lack of consistency is highlighted by the recent decision of an-
other California trial judge, sitting in the same courthouse as the judge
in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, that the very same contract used
in virtually identical circumstances was not unconscionable.8 While
differences of opinion among trial judges should be expected, in this
case the inconsistent results can be attributed to peculiarities of the
unconscionability law in California. 9
Perhaps capriciousness in the application of the doctrine of un-
conscionability by some courts should not come as a great surprise.
The incorporation of the unconscionability doctrine into the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in Section 2-3021o generated as much con-
troversy and discussion as any other section of the first Official Text of
resented by his own literary agent and Bernheim enlisted representation from the William
Morris Agency, one of the most prominent arts agencies in the country. See infra notes
358-362 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 233-293, 354-419 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 219-537 and accompanying text.
8. See ENr. L. REP., Sept. 1994, at 3 (summarizing and reprinting in entirety the trial
court decision in Batfilm Productions v. Warner Bros., Inc., Nos. BC051653 and BC051654
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994)). In brief, the case involved a contract negotiated by an
experienced motion picture producer with Warner Brothers that included the same stan-
dard contract provisions at issue in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures. See infra notes 420-
445 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 432-445 and accompanying text.
10. The unconscionability rule is embodied primarily in § 2-302 of the article on the
sale of goods. The Section reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may re-
fuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
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the U.C.C. 11 Although Section 2-302 applies only to contracts for the
sale of goods, courts have regularly used the Section to resolve issues
in other types of contracts. 12 Evidence of the broader influence of
Section 2-302 is found in Section 208 in the Second Restatement of
Contracts, which embodies the language of U.C.C. Section 2-302(1)
and proposes that the unconscionability doctrine be generally applied
to the law of contracts. 13
The commentators on Section 2-302 tend to be divided into two
camps. Supporters of Section 2-302 advocate that the Section satisfies
the legitimate need for guarding against overreaching and unfair con-
tracts in the modern marketplace where the use of standardized con-
tracts is widespread; detractors of Section 2-302 fear that granting
broad police power to courts to strike unfair clauses or contracts will
lead to inconsistent and unpredictable interference with contracting
parties.14
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
The unconscionability doctrine is also included or referred to in other code sections.
See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (concerning agreements for contract termination without notice);
§ 2-719(3) (regarding the enforceability of limitations on consequential damages); § 2A-
108 (concerning the lease of goods in general); §§ 2A-503(2) & (3) (regarding remedies in
lease agreements); § 1-205 cmt. 6 (concerning the possibility that a usage of trade may be
unconscionable); § 2-205 cmt. 4 (noting that the doctrine may apply to firm offers); § 2-303
cmt. 2 (noting that parties are free to allocate risks unless unconscionable); § 2-718 cmt. 1
(regarding the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses); §§ 4-401 cmt. 3 & 4-406 cmt. 3
(concerning regulations of bank fees).
11. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-37,
at 398 (3d ed. 1987); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 323-25 (2d ed. 1990).
12. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, § 9-39, at 403-04; FARNSWORTH, supra
note 11, § 4.28, at 325; JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96, at 489 (3d
ed. 1990); Richard J. Hunter, Unconscionability Revisited: A Comparative Approach, 68
N.D. L. REV. 145, 149-51 (1992).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979). The Reporter's Note to
§ 208 observes that while § 2-302 is literally inapplicable outside of sale of goods contracts,
it has proven very influential in non-sales cases. Id.
14. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967) (criticizing § 2-302); but see M.P. Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (rebutting Professor Left's analysis
and defending the Section). The early writings on § 2-302 also include: Robert Braucher,
The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 37 (1970) (writing in favor of a
more restrained application of § 2-302); William B. Davenport, Unconscionability and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 121 (1967) (arguing that § 2-302 is con-
sistent with prior common law and a useful device to allow courts to develop the uncon-
scionability doctrine); John A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 PA.
L. REv. 931 (1969) (declaring that § 2-302 is not "impossibly vague," while emphasizing the
need for courts to develop solid applications). Subsequent writings include: Frank P. Darr,
Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1819 (1994) (endorsing use of un-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
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Since the promulgation of Section 2-302, the fears of its detrac-
tors have proved to be largely unwarranted. Generally, the courts in
most states have shown restraint in examining contracts or clauses for
unconscionability.' 5 Notably, the first principal critic of Section 2-302,
Professor Arthur Leff, predicted in his early writings that "[t]he courts
will most likely adjust, entrusting the irritating aspects of the Section
with a smoothing nacre of more or less reasonable applications, or the
legislatures may act if things get out of hand. 1 6 Thus, while Professor
Leff was quite critical of Section 2-302 as drafted, he correctly pre-
dicted the tendency of the courts to restrain its application.17
The general comfort of courts and commentators with the appli-
cation of Section 2-302 over the years is reflected in the preliminary
report issued by the study group appointed to consider revising Arti-
cle 2.18 The study group determined that Section 2-302 did not need
conscionability doctrine to police for price fairness when the market fails to do so); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HAv. L. REv. 741 (1982) (sug-
gesting courts give expansive application to unconscionability); Richard A. Epstein, Un-
conscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (speaking in favor of a
restrictive use of unconscionability to police the bargaining process, but not as a limit on
substantive contract terms); Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between
Merchants, 40 Sw. LJ. 1065 (1986) (arguing that courts should be receptive to claims of
unconscionability by merchants). Other writings on unconscionability are cited throughout
this Article.
15. See A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative
Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany and the United States, 14 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.. 455, 498-99 (1992) (observing that despite the wide latitude given to
courts by § 2-302 "an undercurrent of caution runs through the decisions"); E. Allan Farns-
worth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980s: The Top Ten, 41 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 203, 222-25 (1990) (describing unconscionability and related doctrines as an area of
"arrested development"); Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the
Principle, 9 Loy. U. Cm-. L.J. 765, 767-68 (1978) (observing that courts have developed
principles and not decided unconscionability cases on ad hoc sense of justice).
16. Leff, supra note 14, at 558-59. For an instance of Leff's prediction coming true
and of a legislature undoing a court's determination of unconscionability, see Schmaltz v.
Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (S.D. 1988) (citing the 1986 South Dakota Session laws,
which countermanded an earlier South Dakota Supreme Court ruling of
unconscionability).
17. Some writers have argued that the courts should be less restrained in applying the
unconscionability doctrine. See e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 800 (suggesting extended
use of the unconscionability doctrine to reconstruct old norms and to add new ones that
limit the enforceability of bargains); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contrac4 and
Unconscionability, 35 Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 445, 450 (1994) (suggesting greater use of
substantive unconscionability as a limit on "unfair exchanges" to promote a sense of enti-
tlement among the disadvantaged).
18. The work on revision of Article 2 begins with the deliberations of a study group
appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code. The
study group issued a Preliminary Report in 1990 and thereafter a drafting committee was
appointed. The drafting committee submitted an initial draft for consideration in August
January 1995]
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revision and went so far as to recommend the elevation of Section 2-
302 to Article 1, which would make it applicable to all articles of the
U.C.C.19 While the preliminary study recommended that the Official
Comments to Section 2-302 be revised substantially to sharpen the
focus of procedural misconduct to be guarded against,20 the study
group also found that Section 2-302 had not proven to be the unruly
and fearsome creature that critics first anticipated.
A review of the unconscionability decisions in California, how-
ever, suggests that the fears of the Section's early detractors may have
come to fruition in that state. The course of Section 2-302 in Califor-
nia has veered away from the more general trends at its inception.
The California Legislature initially enacted Article 2 in 1962 without
adopting Section 2-302-one of only two states to do so.21 The deci-
sion in California to drop Section 2-302 was based on concern about
potentially excessive discretion that could be exercised by judges to
strike down entire contracts or clauses based on subjective, indetermi-
nate views of unfairness.22
Seventeen years passed, and other attempts at passage of an un-
conscionability statute failed, before Section 2-302 was adopted in
California in 1979 as part of consumer protection legislation predomi-
nately aimed at financial abuses within the home improvement indus-
1994 and expects to complete its work in August 1996. See Richard E. Speidel, Contract
Formation and Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1305, 1305-
06 (1994).
19. See Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) Article 2 Study Group, Preliminary Report
(pt. 3), at 1 (Mar. 1, 1990) (stating that a majority of the study group favored movement of
§ 2-302 from Article 2 to Article 1) [hereinafter Preliminary Report]. The Preliminary Re-
port is incorporated in a published appraisal conducted under the auspices of the American
Bar Association Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code. See Task Force of the
A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of
Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990,
Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 981 (1991).
20. Preliminary Report, supra note 19, at 2-3. The Report raises, among other issues
to be addressed in § 2-302 comment revisions, three key questions: (1) whether complete
disclosure can be outweighed by a lack of meaningful choice; (2) whether the test for un-
conscionability should be limited to the time of contracting or might include the induce-
ment and enforcement phases; and (3) whether § 2-302 should be more clearly aimed at
consumer rather than commercial contracts. Id.
21. California and North Carolina were the only two jurisdictions to omit § 2-302
when adopting the U.C.C. Section 2-302 was subsequently adopted in North Carolina in
1971. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.28, at 325 n.5.
22. See California State Bar Committee on the U.C.C., supra note 1, at 135-36 (em-
phasizing the Advisory Committee's concern about the courts' unqualified power to strike
down terms of a contract under § 2-302); infra notes 154-166.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
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try.23 Section 2-302 was adopted as Section 1670.5 of the California
Civil Code rather than as part of the Commercial Code,24 making the
Section applicable to all contracts rather than only to contracts for the
sale of goods.25
More significant than the unusual history of the adoption of Sec-
tion 2-302 in California, however, is the fact that California courts
have been both less restrained and more inconsistent than courts in
other jurisdictions in applying the unconscionability doctrine. As the
reported unconscionability cases in California have accumulated since
1979,26 the courts have exhibited some disturbing, if not alarming, ten-
dencies. First, California courts have displayed an undue sympathy
for claims of unconscionability by merchant or merchant-like parties27
when the thrust of the claim is that the victim-merchant suffered from
a lack of meaningful choice resulting from unequal bargaining
power.28 Second, the California courts have also shown an inclination
to assess substantive unconscionability on the basis of hindsight29 de-
spite the explicit provision in Section 2-302 that the terms of the con-
tract should be viewed at the time of formation. Third, the courts
have reformed contracts and granted remedies that raise questions
about application of the doctrine as a basis for affirmative relief rather
than the more generally accepted defensive use to render a clause or
contract unenforceable.30 And lastly, the courts have approached
"price-term" unconscionability cases in a manner that not only high-
lights the inherent difficulties in determining when a price is excessive,
but also takes the unorthodox and highly questionable approach of
23. See infra notes 154-171 and accompanying text.
24. For reasons of simplicity, § 1670.5 of the California Civil Code will be referred to
as § 2-302 throughout this Article.
25. See A&M Produce v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 123 n.12 (Ct. App. 1982)
(explaining that the unconscionability doctrine, as codified in California Civil Code
§ 1670.5, is applicable to all types of contracts).
26. A search of Westlaw's California case law data bases for opinions citing California
Civil Code § 1670.5 yielded a list of 26 published cases with 13 decided between 1981 and
1989 and 13 decided between 1990 and 1994. The search does not reflect all the California
unconscionability cases-for example, Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures is not reflected in
the list-but the search results do suggest increasing use of the doctrine in California
courts.
27. The term "merchant" will be used herein to identify parties generally possessing
experience or sophistication in business dealings rather than meaning sellers of wares, per
se. The intent is to draw a distinction between parties who should have substantial busi-
ness experience and consumers or "little persons" who are much less likely to have a high
degree of business experience or sophistication.
28. See infra notes 228-447 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 448-494 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 495-512 and accompanying text.
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judging unfairness based on the cumulative profits from many sepa-
rate transactions with many different parties.31 Ultimately, the Cali-
fornia cases suggest broader, constructive lessons about application of
the unconscionability doctrine.
This Article briefly describes the history and general construction
of unconscionability found in the United States. The legislative and
judicial history of the unconscionability doctrine in California, before
the adoption of Section 2-302 as California Civil Code Section 1670.5
in 1979, is reviewed. Then, unconscionability cases decided in Califor-
nia since the adoption of Section 2-302 are analyzed. The Article con-
cludes with suggestions about the lessons to be learned from the
application of the unconscionability doctrine in California.
Four principal suggestions are discussed. First, the courts should
be extremely conservative in granting relief to merchants on uncon-
scionability grounds when based on lack of meaningful choice because
of unequal bargaining power. Second, the courts should be especially
careful to base their assessments on the perspective of the parties at
the time the contract was formed. Third, the courts should abandon
the false distinction between offensive versus defensive use of the doc-
trine. Finally, the courts should use a carefully circumscribed ap-
proach to price-term unconscionability cases that focuses primarily on
excessive contract price versus market price disparity in individual
cases and not on vague notions of excessive profits.
I. General History and Construction of the
Unconscionability Doctrine
The history of unconscionability 32 and the general construction of
Section 2-30233 have been well documented by other commentators.
These topics will be reviewed briefly in this Article for the purpose of
identifying issues relevant to the main focus.
A. History of Unconscionability
The lineage of the unconscionability doctrine has been described
as obscure in part because the courts did not explain the concept with
31. See infra notes 513-537 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Dando B. Cellini & Barry L. Wertz, Comment, Unconscionable Contract
Provisions: A History of Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. Rv.
193 (1967); Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 757; Leff, supra note 14, at 485.
33. General reviews of unconscionability may be found in the leading contracts text-
books. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, §§ 9-37 to 9-38, at 397-409; FARNS-
WORTh, supra note 11, § 4.28, at 323-39; MURRAY, supra note 12, § 96, at 481-502.
[Vol. 46
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any specificity in its earliest common law usage.34 Comparisons have
been made with the older Roman law concept of laesio enormis, which
allowed for rescission of contracts because of inadequacy of the price
based on a moral precept that there should be fair exchange of val-
ues.35 Notably, the laesio enornis concept initially was well defined in
that it applied only to land sale contracts and had specific quantitative
limits; the price to be paid by the seller was required to be less than
half of the land's value.36 Thus, the doctrine didnot grant broad li-
cense to police for fairness. 3
7
Unconscionability in courts of equity was not specifically deline-
ated, but instead underscored the broad proposition that courts of eq-
uity would not enforce an unfair bargain if it would make the courts a
tool in achieving an unjust or unfair result.38 The initial status of eq-
34. See Spanogle, supra note 14, at 937-38 (discussing applications of unconscionabil-
ity found in both law and equity, but stating that no explicit rule was formulated);
Comment, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. REv.
843, 846 (1960) (noting that the vagueness of unconscionability in equity was reflective of
the flexible application given to such concepts).
35. See generally James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. Rnv. 1587 (1981)
(discussing concepts of price fairness reflected in laesio enormis, related civil code doc-
trines, and common law unconscionability). See also Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 15, at
474-75 (tracing French civil code concepts similar to unconscionability back to Roman Law
laesio enormis); Cellini & Wertz, supra note 32, at 193 (1967) (stating that the beginnings of
unconscionability go back to laesio enormis); Leff, supra note 14, at 539 (noting similarity
between equity unconscionability and laesio enormis statutes focus on uneven bargains).
But see Spanogle, supra note 14, at 951-52 (stating that there is no direct link between
laesio enormis and the unconscionability doctrine in the U.C.C. or common law).
36. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and Ger-
man Law, 11 TuL. L. REv. 345, 364 (1937).
37. Professor Dawson describes a virtual ebb and flow of the laesio enormis and simi-
lar civil law concepts coming into the first portion of this century with both France and
Germany tending toward restriction of the doctrine's limitation on freedom of contract
while still seeking ways to address the underlying concern with fair exchanges. Dawson,
supra note 36, at 370-76. More recent assessments indicate that the "German courts have
adopted a conservative approach, motivated by a desire to avoid uncertainty in the law."
Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 15. But see Gordley, supra note 35, at 1626-27 (suggesting a
more expansive policing against one-sided contracts in Germany). The French law of le-
sion has been described as reflecting some extensions of the just price concept in recent
times. See id. at 1625-26; Arthur Taylor von Mehren, The French Doctrine of Lesion in the
Sale of Immovable Property, 49 Tut. L. REv. 320, 323-27 (1975).
38. See Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. Rev.
253,254-55 (1991) (stating that equity operated on higher moral plane and would not assist
one party in taking unfair advantage); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About
Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
26-27 (1981) (equity courts grew because law courts failed to employ fairness principles). It
should be noted that the usefulness of equity decisions in interpreting § 2-302 has been
questioned because, among other things, the equity cases often involved real property
transactions dissimilar to sale of goods and other types of transactions and because equity
January 1995]
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uity courts, as exceptional in jurisdiction and manned by ecclesiastics,
explains the emphasis on fairness as a prerequisite to the equity
court's award of relief to a complaining party.39 An objectionable re-
sult might be unjust for a number of reasons according to an equity
court; an example would be when the bargain gave too much benefit
to one party at too great an expense or hardship to the other party.4°
In cases in which the exchange was unequal or a bad bargain had been
made, such facts were generally not enough to get relief, even in eq-
uity; the party seeking relief also had to show an element of unfairness
in the contracting process or a gross inequality in the exchange.
41
Before the promulgation of Section 2-302 and the beginning of its
influence, courts in law were largely deemed incapable of denying en-
forcement based on an absence of fairness in the exchange.42 The
courts of law, when determined to do so, were forced to find an indi-
rect way to deny enforcement to an unconscionable contract or
term.43 The Official Comments to Section 2-302 indicate that the Sec-
courts tended not to develop standards but judged individual cases. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, § 4.28, at 328; Leff, supra note 14, at 528-41. But see Hillman, supra, at 37-41
(arguing that equity decisions do assist in establishing standards for particular types of
conduct and for the discretion of the courts).
39. See Hillman, supra note 38, at 35-36.
40. The equity courts would refuse to grant an injunction or order specific enforce-
ment if the hardships outweighed the benefits, if the enforcement would be oppressive, or
if it would cause disproportionate hardship to the party against whom enforcement was
sought. See MURRAY, supra note 12, § 96, at 482; Note, Section 2-302 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: The Consequences of Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560
(1953).
41. See Contract Buyers League v. F&F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 227 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(construing Illinois law noting that mere excessive price is not sufficient for unconsciona-
bility in equity); Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1380-81 (Del. Ch. 1992) (inadequacy of
price must be coupled with inequitable or oppressive conduct); Smith v. Harrison, 325
N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1982) (imprudent bargain is not enough for relief in equity); FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 11, § 4.27, at 319-21 (stating that although mere inadequacy of consid-
eration was not grounds to withhold equitable relief, a contract that was unconscionable
would not be enforced in equity); Cellini & Wertz, supra note 32, at 198 (stating that unless
the inequality of consideration was extreme there must also be bargaining misconduct); but
see Hillman, supra note 38, at 36-37 (observing that not all equity decisions required both
uneven terms and unfair bargaining).
42. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128, at 188 (1952) (noting that courts at common law
did not create a rule against unconscionable bargains); FARNSWORTH, supra note 11,
§ 4.27, at 322-23 (noting that standards for fairness fashioned by courts of equity did not
preclude the enforcement of bargains at law); Sherwin, supra note 38, at 254-55 (equity had
extra layer of fairness defenses not applicable at law).
43. See CALAMAai & PERui.O, supra note 11, § 9-38, at 401 (courts of law resorted to
"imaginative flanking devices" to defeat unfair contracts); Spanogle, supra note 14, at 934
(courts denied enforcement of unfair contracts through "surreptitious" means).
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tion was created principally to give courts of law the explicit ability to
decline to enforce such contracts.44
Professor Leff's early writings on unconscionability provide a his-
tory of the drafting of Section 2-302 and note that the first appearance
of an unconscionability section was in the 1941 proposed draft of the
revised Uniform Sales Act.45 This Section concerned contract provi-
sions that varied from the Uniform Sales Act based on an express
agreement of the parties.46 Professor Leff underscored that the 1941
proposed section indicated that such bargained-for arrangements
should be enforced by the courts.47 The section was quickly with-
drawn by the drafting committee because the means of administration
were deemed inadequate.48
Between 1941 and 1948, the drafts of proposed Section 2-302
tended to focus on form contracts. Drafters of the Section expressed
concerns that standardized terms in form contracts did not reflect the
agreement of the parties and left much room for abuse.49 However,
by 1948, the Section was no longer limited in application to form con-
tracts; rather, it had expanded to cover the general contours of the
44. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1 begins:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past
such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by ma-
nipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the
clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract.
This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly on the unconscionabil-
ity of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as
to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of the general com-
mercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the making of the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
45. Leff, supra note 14, at 489-501.
46. Id. at 489.
47. See id. See also Spanogle, supra note 14, at 942 (noting that the original intent was
"to insulate dickered terms whether fair or not").
48. Leff, supra note 14, at 491-92.
49. See id. at 491-95; Cellini & Wertz, supra note 32, at 199-200.
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present-day Section 2-302.50 After 1948 there were no material
changes in the scope of the Section.5'
The primary reason for the creation of Section 2-302 is clearly
stated in the first Official Comment of the U.C.C.52 The drafters were
convinced that the courts were policing on grounds of unconscionabil-
ity and that such policing would achieve greater consistency if done
explicitly rather than through indirect means. 53 In most instances, the
drafters have largely been proven correct. A majority of courts have
been cautious in their application of the unconscionability doctrine
and from these decisions one can identify a framework of the doctrine
as generally construed.
B. Prevailing Trends in Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine
Assessments of Section 2-302 usually begin with the observation
that the Section does not contain a definition of unconscionability.
The critics of the Section have cited the lack of a definition as its ma-
jor failing.54 On the other hand, supporters of Section 2-302 assert
that the lack of a precise definition reflects the wisdom that the un-
conscionability doctrine defies such a description.5 5 Thus, the lack of
50. Leff, supra note 14, at 494 (citing 1948 draft § 2-302):
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court finds the contract to be unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce
the contract or strike any unconscionable clauses and enforce the rest of the con-
tract or substitute for the stricken clause such provisions as would be implied
under this Act if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) A contract not unconscionable in its entirety but containing an unconsciona-
ble clause, whether a form clause or not, may be enforced with any such clause
stricken.
51. By the appearance of the 1957 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code,
§ 2-302 was changed to move the remedial options to subsection (1) and to add a new
subsection (2) concerning the need for an evidentiary hearing; the requirement that the
contract be viewed at the time of contracting was also added. See infra notes 118-121 and
accompanying text.
52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53. Professor Karl Llewellyn's relevant and often cited quote is "[c]overt tools are
never reliable tools." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALs 365 (1960) (quoting Karl Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in
English and Continental Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700,703 (1939)) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADrrION].
54. See MURRAY, supra note 12, § 96, at 486-89 (§ 2-302 fails to set forth a workable
statement of unconscionability); Leff, supra note 14, at 487-88 (describing the text as hav-
ing "amorphous intelligibility" and the comments as irrelevant).
55. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 304 (noting that the strength of the unconscio-
nability doctrine is its flexibility); Gerald T. McLaughlin, Unconscionability and Impracti-
cability: Reflections on Two UC. C. Indeterminacy Principles, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
[Vol. 46
HeinOnline -- 46 Hastings L.J. 470 1994-1995
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
a specific definition arguably gives courts the necessary room to ad-
dress problems the exact contours of which have yet to be defined.5 6
Notwithstanding the debate over whether Section 2-302 can or
should precisely define unconscionability, there are definitions of the
term that are frequently used by the courts to identify the essence of
the doctrine. The first Official Comment to Section 2-302 states that
the principal purpose of the doctrine is "the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise" and that "[t]he basic test is whether, in the light
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case, the clauses are so one-sided as to be un-
conscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the mak-
ing of the contract. '57 The Official Comment directs the courts to
engage in weighing and balancing, which suggests that a contract is
not unenforceable merely because of some imbalance in terms or bar-
gaining power, but that the unfairness of the terms must reach an ex-
treme or alarming level.
Definitions of unconscionability created by the courts are consis-
tent with the Official Comment. The phrasing adopted by the United
States Supreme Court is often cited: an unconscionable contract is
one "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make
on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other. '58 To meet the court's definition of unconscionability, the chal-
lenged bargain must be distinctly beyond the permissible range of ad-
vantage allowed to one of the parties so that the bargain shocks the
conscience of the court.
In addition to the definitions going to the essence of unconsciona-
bility, a general survey of cases and commentary relating to Section 2-
302 yields a consensus on construing the Section: (1) Section 2-302 is
generally deemed to require a showing of combined procedural and
L.J. 439, 444 n.26 (1992) (stating that drafters never intended to define unconscionability
and purposefully left the term indeterminate).
56. See Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 759-61 (§ 2-302 grants to courts the room for
reasoned and creative application of the unconscionability doctrine). The chief drafter of
Article 2, Professor Karl Llewellyn, asserted that "an approach by statute [is] dubious,
uncertain and likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient and spotty in scope."
LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRPA rnON, supra note 53, at 370.
57. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
58. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)). A revealing discussion of Earl of Chesterfield v.
Janssen and two notable English cases that preceded it can be found in Davenport, supra
note 14, at 124-26. Davenport emphasizes that the earlier cases involved not only grossly
uneven exchanges, but also one party taking advantage of the other's lack of sophistica-
tion. Id.
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substantive unconscionability; 59 (2) courts are more receptive to con-
sumer or nonmerchant claims of unconscionability than to claims by
merchants; 60 (3) unconscionability should exist at the time that the
contract was made for the doctrine to be applied;61 (4) courts gener-
ally have taken the position that unconscionability can be used only as
a defense against enforcement and not as a basis for affirmative recov-
ery;62 and (5) courts have used the doctrine to police price terms, but
not without some uneasiness.63
(1) Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability
Professor Leff provided the general framework for the construc-
tion of Section 2-302 when he analyzed unconscionability as having
two separable elements: procedural and substantive. 64 Substantive
unconscionability refers to the actual terms of the agreement, while
procedural unconscionability pertains to the bargaining process. Most
successful claims involve a combination of procedural and substantive
unconscionability, 65 but it is debatable whether both elements must be
present.66 Some courts have also indicated that a sliding scale applies:
59. See infra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 139-153 and accompanying text.
64. See Left, supra note 14, at 487. Some writers have questioned whether the distinc-
tion between substantive and procedural unconscionability is helpful in analyzing the doc-
trine. See Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty
Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 199, 216 (1985) (stating that the framework is helpful,
while noting writers who have criticized the substantive and procedural unconscionability
dichotomy). The courts continue to utilize the substantive and procedural unconscionabil-
ity framework. See, e.g., WXON-TV, Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F. Supp. 1261, 1264
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (construing Michigan law to require substantive and procedural uncon-
scionability); Master Lease Corp. v. Manhattan Limousine, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d 952 (App.
Div. 1992) (construing New York law to require substantive and procedural unconsciona-
bility); Rite Color Chem. Co. v. Velvet Textile Co., 411 S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that both substantive and procedural unconscionability are required); Col-
lins v. Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that a "quantum" of both substantive and procedural unconscionability is required under
Ohio law).
65. See Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condo., Inc., 398 So. 2d 865, 867-69 (Fla. Ct. App.
1981) (observing virtual unanimity among authorities that both procedural and substantive
elements must coalesce to establish unconscionability); Hunter, supra note 12, at 169 (stat-
ing that § 2-302 cases require both substantive and procedural unconscionability as practi-
cal matter); Mallor, supra note 14, at 1073 (noting that almost all findings of
unconscionability involve both substantive and procedural unconscionability).
66. A number of courts and commentators have recognized that one element of un-
conscionability standing alone may render a contract unenforceable in rare or exceptional
cases. See Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. Ct. App.
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for example, a contract with extraordinarily oppressive substantive
terms will require less in the way of procedural unconscionability. 67
The question whether both elements are required is particularly rele-
vant to claims of unconscionability that focus on the price term.
68
Substantive unconscionability looks to the oppressiveness or one-
sided nature of the transaction and simply restates the basic require-
ment that the substantive terms must be unreasonably favorable to
one party or unduly burdensome to the other.69 The types of con-
tracts or terms most often subjected to the test of unconscionability
include excessive price terms, termination-at-will clauses, add-on se-
curity clauses, limitations on damages for breach, and limitations on
periods for filing claims.70 In determining whether such terms were
unconscionable, one court pointed out that the mere presence of some
imbalance was not enough to render the contract unconscionable be-
cause contracts do not necessarily grant identical rights to the par-
1988) (suggesting that an "outrageous" substantive provision alone may be enough to es-
tablish unconscionability); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co.,
706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) (finding that gross disparity in terms can support finding
of unconscionability and that unfair surprise may be enough in rare case); JAMES WHITE &
ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7, at 199-200 (3d ed. 1988) (assert-
ing that excessive price term alone should suffice to make contract unconscionable); Eisen-
berg, supra note 14, at 752 (observing that there is a developing trend that would accept
substantive unconscionability alone). But see Communications Maintenance, Inc. v. Mo-
torola, Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1209 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that Indiana courts require both
substantive and procedural defects); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 696 (S.D.
Fla. 1979) (finding that neither substantive nor procedural element alone is enough to
make contract unconscionable); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412
N.W.2d 719, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding either procedural or substantive element
alone is not enough to establish unconscionability); Rite Color Chem. Co. v. Velvet Textile
Co., 411 S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that both substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability are required); Epstein, supra note 14, at 315 (stating that substan-
tive policing "serves only to undercut the private right of contract in a manner that is apt to
do more social harm than good"). See also Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231,233 (Mass.
1992) (finding that any difference of opinion on the requirement of both elements may not
be altogether significant in that the presence of very unfair terms may be taken to reflect
inherent procedural unconscionability).
67. See Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379, 383 (Alaska 1986) (quoting 15 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTs § 1736A, at 226-27 (Jaeger ed. 1972)); Master Lease
Corp. v. Manhattan Limousine, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (App. Div. 1992).
68. See infra notes 146-153 and accompanying text.
69. See Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, 540 So. 2d 713, 716 (Ala. 1989) (unconsciona-
bility requires terms that are unreasonably favorable to one party); Martin Rispens & Son
v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Ind. 1993) (substantive unconscionability
refers to oppressively one-sided or harsh terms); Phillips, supra note 64, at 216 (substantive
unconscionability involves terms that impose excessive burdens or unfairly benefit).
70. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.28, at 328-31; Epstein, supra note 14, at 305-
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ties.71 Other courts have noted that relief cannot be had merely
because a party has made a bad bargain. 72 Rather, the level of unfair-
ness must be such that it "affronts the sense of decency. ' 73
Professor Leff also emphasized the fact that the statement in the
Official Comments to Section 2-302 that its goal is "prevention of op-
pression and unfair surprise" suggests that procedural unconscionabil-
ity may take two different forms: first, "unfair surprise," resulting
from misleading bargaining conduct, and second, "oppression" (in the
absence of unfair surprise) resulting from inequality of bargaining
power.74 Some courts have highlighted the difference between the
two forms of procedural unconscionability as involving a "lack of
knowledge" or a "lack of voluntariness. 75 Procedural unconsciona-
bility characterized by surprise or lack of knowledge focuses on terms
that are deceptively hidden in a mass of contract language, the object
of other concealment, or imposed in circumstances involving haste or
high pressure tactics so that they are not likely to be read or under-
stood.76 Surprise may also be found in terms that are so unintelligible
that they deny comprehension even by the party who discovers
71. Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 736 P.2d 460, 462 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).
72. Adams v. John Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 358 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Master Lease
Corp. v. Manhattan Limousine, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (App. Div. 1992).
73. Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884,892 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting Gimbel Bros., Inc.
v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Civ. Ct. 1970)), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984); see also
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983) (stating that terms must be so
one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise); Nelson v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177, 180
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that substantive unconscionability involves terms that are
"one-sided," "overly harsh," "shocking to the conscience," "monstrously harsh," or "ex-
ceedingly calloused.")
74. Leff, supra note 14, at 499-500. See also Spanogle, supra note 14, at 943 (stating
that unfair surprise implies deception and that oppression implies compulsion from lack of
opportunity to determine terms).
75. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986)
(quoting Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-10 (S.D. Miss. 1979)).
76. See Croce v. Kumit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (in considering proce-
dural unconscionability, court looked for elements of haste and high pressure tactics);
Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-10 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (noting lack of
opportunity to study terms as demonstrating lack of knowledge). See also MURRAY, supra
note 12, § 96, at 496-97 (observing that high pressure tactics and language barriers under-
mine consent).
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them.77 This form of procedural unconscionability has antecedents in
the policing doctrines of duress, misrepresentation, and mistake.78
Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson79 offers a compel-
ling example of procedural unconscionability by unfair surprise. Joan
Rawlinson challenged a confessed judgment note on the grounds that
her signature had been obtained through fraud and duress.80 The
judgment note was for an open amount and was one of two presented
on behalf of her husband's former employer as a means of the hus-
band avoiding prosecution for embezzlement.81 When the amount of
the note was later determined by the employer to be over $200,000,
Ms. Rawlinson challenged the validity of her assent.82 The appellate
court found, in addition to fraud and duress, that the elements of un-
conscionability were present in that Ms. Rawlinson was asked to co-
sign the confessed judgment without advance notice, she was
discouraged from consulting an attorney, her husband and the em-
ployer's agent made' misleading representations about her potential
liability under the notes, and she was in an emotionally unsettled state
due to the recent discovery of her husband's crime and loss of employ-
ment.8 3 The meeting in which Ms. Rawlinson learned of the judgment
notes and was asked to sign them took a total of thirty to forty-five
minutes.84 Because of flaws in the bargaining process, the court con-
cluded that Ms. Rawlinson did not understand her potential liability
under the note that she signed.85
77. See Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109-10 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (not-
ing that lack of knowledge may come from use of fine print, complex language, or lack of
sophistication); Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903,906-07 (Kan. 1976) (iden-
tifying factors that included, inter alia, use of preprinted contract with inconspicuous terms,
complex phrasing, or deceptive language). See also Spanogle, supra note 14, at 954 (find-
ing unfair surprise in deceptive or unduly technical language).
78. See Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 763-65; Epstein, supra note 14, at 295.
79. 491 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
80. Id. at 139-40.
81. Id. at 140. The first note was for $160,000, which the husband was able to satisfy
immediately. The second note was for any amount above $160,000 that the company might
later determine that the husband had taken. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 147. Ms. Rawlinson had also suffered a recent miscarriage and her husband
had raised the possibility of divorce once she learned of his criminal conduct. Id. at 139-40.
84. Id. at 139-40, 147.
85. Id. at 147. Another example is the classic case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960), which involved a question of manufacturer liability for
harm resulting from the sale of a defective automobile. Id at 73. The clause limiting the
automobile manufacturer's liability for breach of warranty was placed inconspicuously in
the contract so that the buyer was unlikely to find the clause in the ordinary course of a
purchase. Id. at 92. The limitation on liability was also phrased such that, even if found, it
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The other form of procedural misconduct, based on oppression or
lack of voluntariness, is a departure from prior policing doctrines and
is conceptually more difficult to apply.8 6 Application of Section 2-302
to this form of procedural unconscionability is based on the idea that
even when the party with less bargaining power is fully cognizable of
and understands a term, that party may have no choice but to accept
the provision although the circumstances do not prove actual duress.
The stronger party's ability to dictate the contract terms may result
not only from a gross advantage in financial size, but also from imme-
diate exigencies. 87 A caveat in the Official Comments to Section 2-
302 states that the Section is not designed to disturb allocation of risk
because of advantage in bargaining power.88 Thus, the fact that there
is some imbalance in bargaining power should not inevitably lead to a
finding of procedural unconscionability. 89 The absence of negotiation
is also not an absolute indication of unfair advantage by the stronger
party.90 Rather, the bargaining imbalance must reach such an ex-
denied comprehension by most persons. Id. Henningsen was actually decided on public
policy grounds before the U.C.C. was adopted into New Jersey law. The court cited to the
proposed § 2-302, mistyped as § 202, in its opinion. Id. at 95.
86. See Leff, supra note 14, at 500-01 (stating that the use of the term "oppression"
probably reflects the desire of drafters to outlaw overly harsh terms that would be depar-
ture from prior law even when fully bargained for by the parties); Spanogle, supra note 14,
at 944 (noting that oppression is harder to visualize than unfair surprise).
87. See Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (observing that bargaining power is a function of market forces as well as size), affd,
676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412
N.W.2d 719, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that defendant's other contractual obliga-
tions gave him little bargaining power with the plaintiff); Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 767
(bargains between apparent equals may be "lopsided" because of the particular circum-
stances around the contract).
88. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
89. See American Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335, 1339
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (mere exercise of bargaining advantage is not enough for unconscionabil-
ity); Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 457 N.E.2d 1226, 1232 (Ill. 1983) (mere dis-
parity in bargaining power is not enough for unconscionability); Witmer v. Exxon Corp.,
434 A.2d 1222, 1228 (Pa. 1981) (simple disparity in bargaining power will not make con-
tract unconscionable); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, § 9-40, at 407-08 (superior
bargaining power is not enough in itself for finding of unconscionability).
90. See Ronwin v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 807 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. Neb.
1992) (mere fact that contract is adhesive and not negotiable does not prove unconsciona-
bility); Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(negotiation is not necessary between experienced parties to avoid unconscionability); Nel-
son v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177, 181 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (fact that contract was non-
negotiable did not prove procedural unconscionability when party could have declined the
services of heir location company).
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treme level that it leaves the weaker party virtually without choice and
results in oppressive terms.91
The Utah Supreme Court observed in a recent opinion that, in
the landmark case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,92 the
D.C. Circuit "recharacterized" procedural unconscionability as involv-
ing an "absence of meaningful choice. '93 While the Williams formula-
tion has gone on to become probably the most often-cited definition
of unconscionability,94 the Williams language has the potential to
transform unconscionability standards in a manner that would further
obfuscate the already vague concept of procedural unconscionability
through oppression. Notably, the facts supporting the claim of uncon-
scionability in Williams related in large part to the surprise element of
unconscionability. The court deemed the add-on clause in question to
be written in such language that the average person probably would
have found it unintelligible in the unlikely event that the clause was
actually discovered and read.95 But the Williams opinion also suggests
procedural unconscionability based on a lack of meaningful choice, in
that the plaintiff's lack of economic resources meant that she had little
choice but to purchase household goods from the defendant or some
other similar seller who operated in the economically depressed area
and sold goods on presumably unfair terms.
96
91. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting R-
STATEMENT (ScoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 208 cmt. d (1979)) (gross inequality of bargainiig
power and unreasonably one-sided terms will support finding of unconscionability); OMP
v. Security Pacific Business Fin., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 239, 249 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (unconscio-
nability not present in absence of grossly unequal bargaining power and unduly oppressive
terms); Avildsen v. Prystay, 574 N.Y.S.2d 535, 535-36 (App. Div. 1991) (egregiously op-
pressive term emanating from gross inequality in bargaining power will support finding of
unconscionability), appeal dismissed, 588 N.E2d 91 (N.Y. 1992).
92. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
93. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028,
1042 (Utah 1985) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965)).
94. See MuRRAY, supra note 12, at 490.
95. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
96. The following is a more complete statement from the majority opinion in
Williams:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of mean-
ingful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice is
present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration of all the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner in which
the contract was entered is also relevant to the consideration. Did each party to
the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms
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A better example of procedural unconscionability through lack of
meaningful choice is found in the equally well-known case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,97 which involved a harsh warranty pro-
vision in an automobile purchase contract. On the facts of
Henningsen, the argument for lack of meaningful choice is quite per-
suasive because of the practical importance of automobiles in society
and the fact that the same unconscionable warranty provisions were
used by the automakers association that accounted for most automo-
bile sales in the United States.98 A small number of other cases can be
identified with actual or near monopolies or oligopolies in which one
party holds a substantial bargaining advantage and the option of de-
clining the transaction is arguably not reasonable. 99 Although the ar-
gument that the buyer in Williams had limited choices seems not only
to draw on the equities of the case, but also probably reflects the
likely reality of the consumer's choices, the case is better viewed as
involving unfair surprise. Moreover, extension of the reasoning may
prove troublesome because of the difficulties in determining when al-
ternative sources are sufficient and when the party has a meaningful
alternative in simply declining the transaction. 100
hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices.... But
when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a com-
mercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent,
was ever given to all the terms.
350 F.2d at 449 (citations omitted).
97. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
98. Id. at 87.
99. See Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Co., 809 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1991) (discussing contract between radio and only news service available in geo-
graphical area); Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 693-94 (Mich. Ct. App.
1969) (finding that customer had no realistic alternative to yellow page advertising in hold-
ing clause limiting liability of telephone company unconscionable); Art's Flower Shop v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 413 S.E.2d 670, 675 (W. Va. 1991) (finding that telephone
company had monopoly on yellow pages directory and that no comparable alternative ex-
isted in determining that limitation on liability was unconscionable); but see WXON-TV,
Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (limitation on liability
in contract was not unconscionable even though there were only two sources of ratings
information services available to television station, especially because customer had gone
without ratings services in the past); Wille v. Southeastern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 911
(Kan. 1976) (finding that limitation of liability by telephone company was not unconscion-
able); Vasilis v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 598 A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (denying claim
of unconscionability, noting that yellow page advertisements are outside the realm of nec-
essary services and therefore subject to private contract arrangements between commercial
parties).
100. See Phoenix Leasing v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (D. Nev.
1994) (assuming that no other lender was available, borrower of funds to start up company
still could have declined loan if terms were not acceptable); Citizens Ins. Co. of America v.
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The early debate on Section 2-302 focused significant attention
on whether a term could be unconscionable even though it was clearly
disclosed by the stronger party and understood by the weaker party
before assenting. 01 Although a number of courts and commentators
have accepted the proposition that oppression or the 'absence of
meaningful choice may provide a basis for procedural unconscionabil-
ity in exceptional cases even when the objectionable term is fully dis-
closed,1°2 this form of procedural unconscionability remains
inherently more suspect than one based on a finding of unfair sur-
prise. When a merchant seeks a determination of unconscionability
based on a lack of meaningful choice, the underpinnings for proce-
dural unconscionability are even more dubious.
(2) Protecting Consumers Rather than Merchants
A consensus exists among courts and commentators that Section
2-302 is more likely to be available to consumers than to merchants. 0 3
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 133, 145 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (even when goods or
services are available from only one source, doing without may be a reasonable alterna-
tive); Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 673, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (non-
resident purchasers of water from city were free to decline service if they deemed price to
be too high). See also RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 115-16
(4th ed. 1992) (observing that the mere fact that a product is not available from other
sources "does not make it a necessity of life" and more generally indicating doubt
"whether the concept of unequal bargaining power is fruitful, or even meaningful");
WHrrE_ & SummEns, supra note 66, § 4-5, at 191 (expressing concern that courts should not
"be carried away" applying unequal bargaining concept to sophisticated parties).
101. The Leff-Ellinghaus debate focused in part on this question of whether a higher
level of bargaining disclosure would at some point "insulate" the bargain from a challenge
on the grounds of unconscionability. See Leff, supra note 14, at 489; Ellinghaus, supra note
14, at 762. Professor Epstein later reached the conclusion that there should be a level of
bargaining that would insulate the contract or term from a charge of unconscionability.
Epstein, supra note 14, at 303-04.
102. See Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Co., 809 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1991) (finding procedural unconscionability through lack of choice when radio
station had only one news service available); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch
& Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985) (meaningful choice may be negated by
gross disparity in bargaining power); Jeffrey C. Fort, Understanding Unconscionability: De-
fining the Principle, 9 Loy. U. Ct. L.J. 765, 794-95 (1978) (citing number of cases recog-
nizing lack of choice as a form of procedural unconscionability, but indicating that they
also involve either lack of knowledge or items of necessity such as housing or transporta-
tion); Mallor, supra note 14, at 1078-80 (describing cases in which courts have found un-
conscionability despite apparently full disclosure of terms).
103. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (observ-
ing that the unconscionability doctrine is most frequently used to shield disadvantaged and
uneducated consumers from overreaching merchants); Layne v. Garner, 612 S.2d 404, 408
(Ala. 1992) (noting that unconscionability is an extraordinary remedy usually available to
the unsophisticated and uneducated and not available to business people); FAR SwoRTH,
supra note 11, § 4.28, at 330-32 (stating that most unconscionability cases involve consum-
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The equitable roots of unconscionability reflect a traditional concern
for relatively weaker parties that are more likely to be taken advan-
tage of in the bargaining process.10 4 Although some early drafts of
Section 2-302 excluded merchants from its protection, 0 5 the text of
the Section does not limit its application to nonmerchants, and several
cases cited in the Official Comments involve transactions between
merchants. 0 6 Moreover, U.C.C. provisions other than Section 2-302
contemplate the possible application of the unconscionability doctrine
in favor of merchants. 10 7
Despite the ability of courts to apply Section 2-302 to merchants,
they have been reluctant to apply the Section in favor of merchants or
other sophisticated parties. 0 8 The courts occasionally treat some
merchants essentially as quasi-consumers based on a lack of business
experience, lower educational level, or other similar disadvantage rel-
ative to the other party. 0 9 The basis for applying the doctrine in favor
ers); Mallor, supra note 14, at 1066 (stating that consumers have most frequently benefited
from the unconscionability doctrine).
104. Professor Leff notes that equity cases repeatedly involved parties such as the old,
the young, and the sick who might have been taken advantage of in the bargaining process.
Leff, supra note 14, at 528-38.
105. See Leff, supra note 14, at 492-93 (noting that under the 1943 draft, merchants
could not invoke the unconscionability defense if they had the opportunity to read the
document).
106. In the Preliminary Report on possible revisions of § 2-302, the study group notes
that courts have restrained themselves, "particularly in commercial disputes," by avoiding
the rewriting of substantive terms. Preliminary Report, supra note 19, pt. 3, at 2-3. The
study group, however, also disfavored the proposal that a distinction be made in § 2-302
between consumers and merchants. Id.
107. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 cmt.4 (1990) (stating that unconscionability doctrine may
serve as limit on enforceability of firm offers by merchants); § 2-719(3) (indicating that
consequential damage limitations may be unconscionable in nonconsumer transactions).
108. See, e.g., Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 973 F.2d 988, 996-97 (5th Cir.
1992) (reflecting disinclination to find unconscionability in limitation on liability agreed to
by "highly sophisticated business entities"); Geldermann & Co. v. Lane Processing, 527
F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that liquidation provision was not unconscionable
because it was common to the commercial future trading arena); but see Johnson v. Mobil
Oil Co., 415 F. Supp. 264, 265-67 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (reviewing findings of unconscionabil-
ity in merchant cases); FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 4.28, at 330-31 (noting that § 2-302
has been used to favor some merchants including franchisees); Mallor, supra note 14 (as-
serting that there is a growing trend of applying unconscionability in merchant cases).
109. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 265-67 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (ob-
serving that retailer dealer had less than eighth-grade education, was practically illiterate,
signed the contract while busily engaged with service station, and did not discuss any term
other than amount of rent); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (find-
ing that lessee had less than high school education, limited business experience, did not
read lease or have it explained, and dealt with much larger lessor which presented a take-
it-or-leave-it lease). See also Mallor, supra note 14, at 1080-84 (discussing cases involving
unsophisticated merchants).
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of such quasi-consumers is that they are more likely to be taken ad-
vantage of by either surprise or gross inequality in bargaining power
than the sophisticated merchant. 10 Even when appellate courts up-
hold trial court findings of unconscionability in the unsophisticated
merchant cases, they frequently express reservations.",
While courts on rare occasions grant relief to merchants who are
not quasi-consumers, such decisions are inherently suspect with regard
to the presence of procedural unconscionability." 2 The courts have
stated that there is a presumption against finding unconscionability in
contracts between merchants." 3 The sophisticated business entity is
deemed more likely to guard against hidden terms in a contract and is
held responsible for understanding the terms of the contract." 4 The
sophisticated business entity is more likely not only to have the bene-
fit of counsel," 5 but also to have alternatives and to be able to bargain
effectively for balanced terms." 6 For these reasons, courts have been
reluctant to find that a merchant has been taken advantage of through
110. See MuRRAY, supra note 12, § 96, at 499. Compare John Deere Leasing Co. v.
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D. Kan. 1986) (suggesting that "sole proprietors" such
as farmers may be treated as consumers) with Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061,
1066 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (refuting attempt of sole shareholder of corporation to em-
phasize individual rather than corporate status in claiming unconscionability).
111. See, eg., Associated Press v. Southern Arkansas Radio Co., 809 S.W.2d 695, 697
(Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (cases should not be judged from hindsight, but trial court determina-
tion could not be said to be clearly erroneous); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont
Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W2d 719, 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (describing case as "admittedly
close," but leaving trial court finding of fact undisturbed); Gianni Sport Ltd. v. Gantos,
Inc., 391 N.W.2d 760,762-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (court stating that it could not conclude
that trial court finding was clearly erroneous).
112. See WarrE & SuMmERs, supra note 66, § 4-2, at 184 (presumably few merchants
are subject to gross advantage-taking required under § 2-302); Mallor, supra note 14, § 96,
at 498-99 (difficult for true merchants to show unfair surprise or inferior bargaining
position).
113. See, e.g., WXON-TV, Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (E.D.
Mich. 1990) (unconscionability rarely found); Construction Associates v. Fargo Water
Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237,242 (N.D. 1989) (showing general skepticism of unconsciona-
bility claims in purely commercial contracts).
114. See United States v. Bedford Associates, 657 F.2d 1300, 1314 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 914 (1982); Dixon Contracting, Inc. v. Amsted Indus., Inc., No. Civ. A. 91-
0060-L, 1992 WL 521772 (W.D. Va. Sept. 15, 1992). Cf. Construction Assocs. v. Fargo
Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237, 243 (N.D. 1989) (finding that term limiting remedies
for breach was unconscionable when it was embodied in manual intended for field worker
rather than in documents intended for corporate officers).
115. See Colonial Life Ins. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 241-42
(D.N.H. 1993); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 635
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
116. See Golden Reward Mining Co. v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 772 F. Supp. 1118, 1123
(D.S.D. 1991) (applying South Dakota law).
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unconscionability. 117 The cases from California discussed below indi-
cate a pattern of decisions that vary from the norm and raise questions
about the courts finding unconscionability between merchants.
(3) Unconscionability Judged at the Time Contract Was Made
When Section 2-302 began to take its present shape in 1948, it did
not contain the explicit requirement that the contract be examined for
unconscionable terms under the circumstances existing at time the
contract was formed.118 A proposal to add the time limitation arose
after the first official text was carefully studied. The proposal was in-
cluded in the 1955 proposals for amendment to the U.C.C.119 Sup-
porters of the amendment reasoned that the proposed change would
emphasize to courts assessing unconscionability that the courts should
not apply hindsight, but instead should consider the issue as of the
time the contract was formed.120 Section 2-302, with the new time
limitation, took its present form in 1957.121
Notable in light of the change to Section 2-302, the equity ante-
cedents to unconscionability might cause denial of enforcement of a
contract based on unfairness in formation, performance, or enforce-
ment.122 Nevertheless, the drafters of Article 2 specifically rejected a
proposal arising from the New York study of the U.C.C. that Section
2-302 be altered to allow courts to refuse enforcement based on a
117. See Three D Dep'ts, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., No. 90-2540, 1991 WL 151903, at *3
(7th Cir. Apr. 15, 1991); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of the First Church
of Deliverance, 365 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977) (adopting the reasoning of other
courts and refusing to apply unconscionability to rewrite the terms of a negotiated contract
between business people); K&C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390, 393 (Pa.
1970).
118. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The first official text of § 2-302 in 1952
did not contain the language on time perspective. The 1952 version read:
(1) If the law court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to be uncon-
scionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable
clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the court may afford the parties an opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 final text (Nov. 1952), reprinted in THm KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, § J,
Uniform Commercial Code, Part XIV (1)(a) [hereinafter THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS].
119. See THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 118, § J, Part XVII (1)(a).
120. See id. at § J, Part XIX(1)(a). See also Leff, supra note 14, at 540-41 n.236 (noting
that "hindsight" perspective was firmly rejected by the drafters).
121. See THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 118, § J, Part XIX(1)(a). See also
id. at Part XIV (2)(b).
122. See CALAMARI & PERiLLO, supra note 11, at 399-400; Sherwin, supra note 38, at
254-57.
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harsh result of contract performance. 23 Consistent with this drafting
history, the courts routinely emphasize that, in assessing unconsciona-
bility, they must adopt the perspective of the parties at the time the
contract was made 124 and that the burden of proof is on the party
making the claim of unconscionability. 125
The requirement that the contract be assessed from the time of
making may pose some subtle difficulties. In a classic case involving
the price of cotton, the court stated that, in order to find unconsciona-
bility, the contract price must be exorbitant based on a price disparity
existing at the time of contracting and that there was no need for the
court to consider how the price of cotton may have moved after the
execution of the contract. 26 When events occurring after the forma-
tion of the contract have allegedly made the enforcement of the con-
tract one-sided or unfair, unconscionability is irrelevant and other
doctrines, such as impracticability or the implied duty of good faith,
may be applicable. 2 7 On the other hand, if there is a claim that one
party possessed information of an impending change in the market at
123. See THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS, supra note 118, § J, Part XIV (2)(b).
124. See Boston Helicopter Charter, Inc. v. Augusta Aviation Corp., 767 F. Supp. 363,
375 (D. Mass. 1991) (stating relevant circumstances are those at time of making, not as
they later developed); Avildsen v. Prystay, 574 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (App. Div. 1991) (stating
that other unconscionability cases have looked at fairness from point at which it was
formed), appeal dismissed, 588 N.E.2d 91 (N.Y. 1992); Best v. United States Nat'l Bank,
739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987) (unconscionability is legal issue that must be assessed as of
time of formation); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d
1028, 1043-44 (Utah 1985) (observing that judging contracts in hindsight would be inappro-
priate given that many contracts contain speculative elements that allocate risks based on
possibility that circumstances may change in future).
125. See Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 203 n.4 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting
that under Texas law the party raising unconscionabiity has the burden of proof); Colonial
Life Ins. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 241 (D.N.H. 1993) (stating that
buyer must show that there was an issue of fact); Rotwein v. General Accident Group, 247
A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (stating that under New Jersey law the buyer
must prove unconscionability); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1067 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (noting that party raising defense bears the burden of proof).
126. J.L. McEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Cotton Co., 511 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ark. 1974).
For a survey of similar cases, see Darr, supra note 14, at 1821 n.11.
127. See McLaughlin, supra note 55, at 441 nn.9-10; Glopak Corp. v. United States, 851
F.2d 334, 338 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that the price adjustment clause that caused seller's
price and profit to be reduced must be judged from the time contract was made and should
not be judged by the manner in which the adjustment clause actually applied); Don King
Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 778, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that subsequent
performance under contract may constitute breach of duty of good faith, but has no bear-
ing on unconscionability at time contract was made). See also Margaret N. Kniffin, A
Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability: Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 NORE
DAME L. REv. 247 (1988) (discussing the impact of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRAcrs § 351(3) on the ability to recover disproportionately large contract damages).
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the time of formation of the contract, such a claim may appropriately
be reviewed under Section 2-302, but only to the extent that it affected
the fairness of the contract at the time it was made. The court should
properly view the contract from the time of making, with the range of
possible eventualities in mind, including the one that came to fruition,
and ask whether the provision was so unfair at the time of execution
that it would shock the conscience of the court.128 California courts
have shown a tendency to judge contracts in hindsight to determine
unconscionability-an approach that is inconsistent with the clear dic-
tates of Section 2-302.
(4) Reformation and Defensive Use of Unconscionability
The text of Section 2-302 provides that where unconscionability is
found, the courts may refuse to enforce the entire contract or may
strike or limit a particular term.' 29 An early draft of Section 2-302
expressly permitted courts to reform contracts for the parties, 30 but
the final draft failed to include that provision. The options of striking
a clause or limiting its effect, however, necessarily grant the courts, at
a minimum, a limited ability to reform the contract. Courts have exer-
cised the power to remake bargains by reducing the price, requiring
cause for one party's termination, increasing a duration term, or re-
ducing an interest rate.' 31
Based on an unduly restrictive reading of Section 2-302, some
courts have taken the view that the Section can be used only in a de-
fensive posture by a party fending off an action for breach and not as a
basis for affirmative recovery. 3 2 A few courts, however, have recog-
128. See Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 802-03. The court in Adams v. John Deere Co.,
774 P.2d 355 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) was faced with a claim by a dealer for John Deere
products that a provision excluding any claim for lost profits upon termination of the con-
tract was unconscionable. The dealer had been terminated in accordance with a provision
in the contract allowing termination with 180 days notice. Id. at 356-57. The court stated
emphatically that any claim of breach was independent of the question whether the "no
lost profits" clause was unconscionable at the time the contract was made. Id. at 362.
Accord Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043-
44 (Utah 1985) (finding subsequent conduct relevant to breach, but not to
unconscionability).
129. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
130. See Hunter, supra note 12, at 151-53.
131. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11, at 405; FARNSWORTH, supra note 11,
§ 4.28, at 327; Hunter, supra note 12. at 151-53 nn.38-42.
132. See Cowin Equip. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d 1581, 1582 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that damages are not available for an unconscionable contract); Bennett v.
Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689,700 (S.D. Fla 1979) (stating that unconscionability cannot
be utilized to obtain affirmative recovery of money damages), appeal dismissed, 629 F.2d
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nized that the doctrine may be properly used as a basis for granting
affirmative relief to a party either through restitution or by enforcing
other provisions of the contract.133 Indeed, the distinction between
defensive use and offensive use of the doctrine often becomes attenu-
ated. When a party attempts to obtain a refund of a deposit paid by
seeking to strike the clause prohibiting the refund, the net effect of
finding unconscionability is that the party asserting it is allowed to
gain an affirmative recovery.'3 Further, when a party sues for dam-
ages and faces a barrier in the form of a contract term that is chal-
lenged as unconscionable, then the finding that such a term is
unconscionable would obviously open the way for an action for dam-
ages.' 35 The one legitimate concern underlying the approach that bars
affirmative use of the doctrine is the fact that the presence of uncon-
scionable terms does not in itself serve as a basis for a remedy. 36
The distinction between defensive and offensive use is illogical
and should be discarded because it may well result in only one of two
similarly situated parties being unable to make use of the unconscio-
393 (5th Cir. 1980); Super Glue Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 517 N.Y.S.2d 764,766 (App.
Div. 1987); Wallace v. National Commerce Bancorporation, 1993 WL 44600, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1993) (dismissing claim of unconscionability on ground that the doctrine
may not be used to obtain affirmative relief); Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 714 P.2d
1049, 1055-56 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding no affirmative relief for unconscionability, not
even in restitution for unconscionable fees paid; court reformed contract to excuse addi-
tional payments by purchaser), affd, 739 P.2d 554 (Or. 1987).
133. See Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d 975, 978 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting
that § 2-302 allows the court to enforce the remainder of agreement without the uncon-
scionable term); Ahem v. Knecht, 563 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming lower
court decision that awarded plaintiff restitutionary damages). See also Wi-rr & SUM-
mERs, supra note 66, § 4-8, at 204 (recognizing possibility of restitutionary recovery).
134. Various commentators have recognized this difference. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 11, § 4.28, at 327 n.21 (noting difference between recognizing a cause of action based
on the fact that the contract or term is unconscionable as opposed to striking a clause and
enforcing the remainder of the contract in a manner which grants affirmative relief);
WI & SuMMERs, supra note 66, § 4-8, at 204 (stating that restitutionary recovery is an
appropriate remedy when the benefit has been transferred pursuant to a clause later found
to be unconscionable).
135. See Langemeier v. National Oats Co., 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that
§ 2-302 allows the court to enforce the remainder of the agreement without the uncon-
scionable term); Master Lease Corp. v. Manhattan Limousine, Ltd., 580 N.Y.S.2d 952, 953
(App. Div. 1992) (showing that a successful finding that warranty clause was unconsciona-
ble could then enable defendants to recover money damages on their counterclaim for
breach of warranty).
136. See WHr= & SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 4-8, at 203-04 (acknowledging that § 2-
302 provides no remedy for unconscionability, but arguing that punitive damage should be
allowed because of quasi-fraud nature).
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nability doctrine. 137 For example, if two parties purchase appliances
from door-to-door salespersons for outrageously and indefensibly ex-
orbitant prices as a result of sharp dealing, the party who purchases on
credit can refuse to pay and then use the unconscionability doctrine
defensively to fend off a claim by the seller for payment. 38 The party
who has cash and is able to pay on delivery cannot use unconsciona-
bility to obtain a partial refund of the price or to rescind the transac-
tion altogether under the approach that blindly denies affirmative
relief on a claim of unconscionability.
(5) Policing the Price Term
Another debated aspect of Section 2-302 focuses on how the Sec-
tion can be used to police against excessive price terms in contracts.
Two related issues arise in the course of this debate. The first question
concerns how courts determine when a price is sufficiently excessive
to be deemed substantively unconscionable. The second issue is
whether a finding of unconscionability can be based on an excessive
price term alone when there is no showing of procedural
unconscionability.
The price term may be alleged to be substantively unconscionable
either because the contract price is much higher than the normal mar-
ket price for a similar purchase or because the contract price greatly
exceeds the seller's cost. 39 The latter approach, which focuses on the
seller's profit margin, essentially embraces the idea that the seller may
make too much profit or that the price may be too high as measured
in an absolute manner. While there are commentators and a few
courts who seem to accept this approach, 40 it conflicts with basic eco-
137. See McLaughlin, supra note 55, at 44-43 (citing anomalous results from the no-
offensive-use approach and questioning whether the drafters of the Section intended to
limit the remedy to defensive use).
138. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (court re-
formed contract to excuse additional payments by purchaser); Frostifresh Corp. v. Rey-
noso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). Cf. Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 380
N.Y.S.2d 532, 541-43 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (restitution not available under § 2-302 to buyer who
had already paid $49,000 under unconscionable contract because § 2-302 makes no provi-
sions for damages).
139. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 512-13 (Cal. 1985) (noting the
costs and market price factors in more complex assessment of price fairness); WHrrE &
SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 4-5, at 191 (noting alternative means of measuring for excessive
price); Darr, supra note 14, at 1840 (noting alternative means of assessing fairness).
140. See Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 673, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(excessive high price may constitute unconscionable provision under § 2-302); Eisenberg,
supra note 14, at 752-53 (interpreting a number of cases to have held or indicated that
excessive price alone may lead to determination of unconscionability); Ellinghaus, supra
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nomic assumptions that the marketplace should be sufficient to regu-
late prices141 and also presumes that the courts have the capability to
regulate prices effectively in those circumstances in which market con-
trols do not work.142
The alternative approach of determining excessive price by mea-
suring the contract price against the market price (the "contract price-
market price" approach) lends itself to more consistent application as
a number of courts have recognized. 143 Under this approach, the rea-
sonableness of the seller's markup may properly serve as a secondary
test in situations when either a contract price that exceeds the market
price is justified by additional costs or there is no market price with
which to make a comparison. 44 The inherent difficulty in either ap-
proach of policing for excessive prices is the difficulty of determining
at what point the price becomes unconscionable.
45
note 14, at 790 (stating that courts' acceptance of a large but imprecise disparity between
value and price as a species of unconscionability is a "matter for rejoicing").
141. See Darr, supra note 14, at 1823, 1833-34 (stating traditional view of competitive
market is that buyers will set price, but noting that lack of information will cause process to
fail).
142. Professor Leff offered an interesting analysis of what was probably the earliest
price-term unconscionability case, American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201
A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964), noting that the court miscalculated the seller's cost and failed to
evaluate the rate of interest realized by the seller. Leff, supra note 14, at 549-51. See also
Ellinghaus, supra note 14, at 793 (agreeing with Professor Leff that the early price cases
lacked a sophisticated approach to determining whether a price was unconscionable);
Darr, supra note 14, at 1826 (noting that reluctance of courts to judge fairness of exchange
stems from both respect for value assigned by parties and inherent difficulty in courts as-
sessing value).
143. See Bradford v. Plain Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1976)
(holding that amount of profit made by purchaser not relevant to claim of price term un-
conscionability); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 696-98 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (as-
serting that price-value disparity is irrelevant and asserting that only contract price-market
price disparity serves as a basis for unconscionability); Iamartino v. Avallone, 477 A.2d
124, 125-26 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (interest rate of 37% to 45% was high but not uncon-
scionable when measured against relevant market rate); Remco Enters. v. Houston, 677
P.2d 567, 572-73 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that comparison to market price and not
percentage of seller's mark up was relevant to question of excessive price).
144. WHrr & SuMMERs, supra note 66, § 4-5, at 193-94 (noting seller should have
chance to show higher than market prices are justifiable).
145. An excellent example of the difficulty in assessing when a price becomes uncon-
scionable is found in Nelson v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), in which
plaintiff operated an heir location business and contracted with defendant for a finder's fee
of 50% of $50,000 inheritance of which she was otherwise unaware. The defendant signed
the contract in her home and was advised by her husband-real estate broker and son-
attorney before signing. The court deemed that agreeing to pay half of the inheritance was
not irrational. The court also was persuaded that she could have declined the contract and
sought to uncover inheritance on her own in holding that the contract was not unconscion-
able. Id. at 770-71. See also Darr, supra note 14, at 1826 (noting difficulty of courts assess-
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Assuming that a price is found to be substantively unconscionable
through an appropriate method, then the second question is whether
procedural unconscionability exists. A finding of procedural uncon-
scionability through unfair surprise is unlikely due to the inherently
obvious nature of the price term and its importance to any transac-
tion.146 Unfair surprise is not impossible to find, however, because the
price may be presented in a deceptive fashion or the buyer may lack
information that reveals the excessive nature of the price at the time
of contracting. 47 Procedural unconscionability may also be present in
excessive price cases through oppression under exceptional circum-
stances in which a true lack of alternatives can be established. 148 The
most compelling case for lack of meaningful choice would be in a case
of necessity when goods or services were required for the well-being
of an individual or the continued existence of a business. 149
ing value in measuring fairness of exchange); Epstein, supra note 14, at 306 n.32
(highlighting difficulty of knowing what is a just term of fair price).
146. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 329; Darr, supra note 14, at 1822, 1833; Spa-
nogle, supra note 14, at 951.
147. See Davis v. Kolb, 563 S.W.2d 438,438-39 (Ark. 1978) (contract to sell timber with
market value of $50,000 for contract price of $20,000 was unconscionable when buyer had
misled seller about value of the timber and his knowledge of the subject); Waters v. Min
Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231,234 (Mass. 1992) (finding agreement to sell annuity for contract price
of $50,000 when it had cash value of $189,000 and guaranteed value of $694,000 over 25
years was unconscionable when agent for buyer unduly influenced seller and advised her to
sell under contract that would give financial benefit to agent); Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries,
Ltd., 380 N.Y.S.2d 532, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (contract to sell art objects for $67,000 that had
retail value of approximately $15,000 was unconscionable when sales took place in buyers'
home under unusual circumstances and seller misrepresented value to uninformed buyers).
See also Darr, supra note 14, at 1848 (noting lack of information as crucial impediment to
market policing price fairness); Gordley, supra note 35, at 1619 (observing that a party may
not be able to use the market to protect against price unfairness because of ignorance or
necessity).
148. See, e.g., Kelly v. Widner, 771 P.2d 142 (Mont. 1989) (finding accident release
agreement unconscionable when injured party had only ninth-grade education, was impov-
erished and unable to work because of accident, and was without counsel, and when multi-
ple insurance agents obtained her signature when nature of injuries were still substantially
uncertain and settlement barely covered expenses to date); but see Spanogle, supra note 14,
at 951 (observing that "absent a monopoly situation, a refusal to bargain is thought
justifiable").
149. See, e.g., Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Del. Ch. 1992) (transfer of house
with $12,000 in equity value by unsophisticated owner in exchange for payment of $1900 to
avoid foreclosure amounted to unconscionable contract); Howard v. Diolosa, 574 A.2d
995, 998-1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (finding that the sale of home with fair
market value of $150,000-$200,000 for contract price of $25,000 was unconscionable when
sellers had been turned down by four institutional lenders and were in desperate need of
cash to pay creditors). See also Dawson, supra note 36, at 369-70 (observing under Ger-
man law in order for economic necessity to provide a basis for excuse from a contract, the
necessity must be so severe as to threaten the economic existence of the weaker party as
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Because unfair surprise concerning price is unlikely and oppres-
sion through lack of meaningful choice is dubious, the question arises
whether excessive price alone is enough to render the contract uncon-
scionable. For years, the courts have found excessive price to be at
least a primary ground for unconscionability, 150 and some commenta-
tors have found support in the court decisions for the position that
unconscionability in the price term alone is enough to reform the con-
tract.' 5 ' A closer examination of those cases reveals that the purchas-
ers were almost certainly unaware of the exorbitant nature of the
price even if they were aware of the total dollar amount. 152 Moreover,
a finding of unconscionability based solely on an excessive price when
the buyer knowingly chose to enter into the contract would be incor-
rect by almost certainly pushing Section 2-302 beyond the use contem-
plated by various state legislatures when they adopted Article 2.153
The question still remains open to debate.
opposed to pursuing the prospect of economic gain); Spanogle, supra note 14, at 955 (not-
ing that a stronger case is made if the contract concerns a necessity rather than a luxury or
involves quasi-public service needs).
150. See generally Darr, supra note 14, at 1850 (surveying 44 reported cases involving
claims of price unconscionability). See also American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacI-
ver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964); James v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Frostifresh Corp. V. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
151. See WirnF & SuMMERs, supra note 66, §4-8, at 200 (asserting that excessive price
alone should be enough to show unconscionability); Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 753 (inter-
preting number of cases as holding or indicating that unfair price alone is enough.to render
contract unconscionable); Spanogle, supra note 14, at 952 (concluding that excessive price
alone may be enough based on older equity decisions); but see Darr, supra note 14, at 1840-
41 (proposing that price unconscionability be found only when (1) the price is excessive,
(2) the contracting process is flawed, and (3) the market is such that it is not subject to self-
correction); Gordley, supra note 35, at 1627-37 (suggesting generally that mere price term
disparity is enough, but stating that "if courts are not to cause more inequalities than they
cure, they should confine relief to cases where the price is clearly disproportionate and the
disadvantaged party is badly hurt and less able to protect himself").
152. See Hertz Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708-09 (App. Div. 1987)
(noting that excessive prices have usually been accompanied by fraud, deception, and coer-
cion); MuRRAY, supra note 12, at 498; Dan, supra note 14, at 1843-45 (surveying 44 price
unconscionability cases and finding that only 2 of 19 successful claims reflected finding of
unconscionability without some additional process flaw).
153. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 294 (advocating that the purpose of unconscionabil-
ity is not allow to courts to act as roving commissions to set aside agreements on subjective
bases); Leff, supra note 14, at 548-49 (expressing doubt that the state legislatures would
have knowingly adopted a commercial law statute that authorized courts to engage in ad
hoc policing of price terms).
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l. The History of the Unconscionability Doctrine in
California
A. Legislative History
The adoption of the U.C.C. by a state is always a matter of legis-
lative action and the legislative history is illustrative in guiding courts
that are applying a provision such as Section 2-302, enacted in Califor-
nia as Civil Code Section 1670.5. Long before Section 2-302 was
adopted as part of a consumer protection bill, the California Legisla-
ture declined to adopt the Section as part of the Commercial Code
after extensive debate. Advocates of the Section urged its adoption
on the grounds that it merely restated or properly extended existing
California law giving courts the power to apply equitable remedies. 154
Other groups advocated eliminating the Section altogether 55 or modi-
fying it in a significant way.156 Ultimately, the Section was omitted
from the proposed Commercial Code because of concerns that it
would give the courts too much power to second-guess the parties
under the guise of policing against "unfair" bargains. 157
A second reason for declining to adopt Section 2-302 was the
view that the common law in California was already well developed
enough to guard against unfair contracts. 158 Specifically, the courts
were deemed to have the explicit power to refuse enforcement of
grossly unfair bargains under equity doctrines and to have achieved
similar results at law by construing contract language. 159 Further, Cal-
ifornia courts also had developed rules concerning adhesion contracts
that worked to protect parties from unfair bargains.16 Arguing along
154. See California Annotations to the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code submitted
by the California Commission on Uniform State Laws, reprinted in Senate Fact Finding
Committee on Judiciary, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 41-42 (1961) [hereinafter SIxrT PROGRESS REPORT].
155. See id. at 340 (detailing Analysis and Interim Report of the State Bar of
California).
156. See id. at 455-57 (Report of Professors Harold Marsh, Jr., and William D. War-
ren). The California Bankers Committee proposed that the Section be amended to substi-
tute the term "good faith" for unconscionability. Professors Marsh and Warren proposed
altering the language of § 2-302 to exclude contracts between merchants and to further
limit application to parties who had prepared form contracts.
157. See California State Bar Committee on the U.C.C., supra note 1 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 154, at 456 (Report of Professors Har-
old Marsh, Jr., and William D. Warren) (stating that California courts have historically
used their equitable powers to avoid the enforcement of harsh bargains).
159. See Peter D. Roos, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: Alive and Well in Califor-
nia, 9 CAL. W. L. REv. 100, 102-08 (1972).
160. See infra notes 189-217 and accompanying text.
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the same lines as the chief drafter of the Uniform Commercial
Code,161 some of the California debaters contended that it would be
preferable to allow the courts to engage in open policing of allegedly
unconscionable contracts rather than "by indirection, if not subter-
fuge."' 62 Their position was buttressed by the argument that expan-
sion of judicial policing power was justified by the proliferation of
form contracts in the marketplace. 163 Ultimately, however, the
greater concern was that the novelty in the law would make it difficult
to predict how great a change would be made in California law' 64 and
that the courts might engage in judicial overreaching, such as by refus-
ing to enforce a clause or contract even though it "had been thor-
oughly negotiated by the parties.' 65 Thus, the California Legislature
decided in 1962 to omit Section 2-302 the Uniform Commercial Code
as adopted.
Additional attempts between 1972 and 1976 to add an unconscio-
nability statute to California law, specifically aimed at consumer pro-
tection, also failed.166 The last unsuccessful legislation provided that
the courts might consider a number of factors similar to those found in
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as pertinent to the issue of un-
conscionability, including taking advantage of the lack of knowledge,
ability, experience or capacity of a consumer, knowledge of the inabil-
ity of the consumer to receive benefits properly anticipated from the
goods or services involved, gross disparity between the price of goods
or services and their value, or knowledge that there is no reasonable
probability of payment in full of the obligation by the consumer. 16
7
161. See supra note 53.
162. SL'r= PROGRESS REPoRT, supra note 154, at 457 (Report of Professors Harold
Marsh, Jr., and William D. Warren).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 456.
165. Id. at 457.
166. Assembly Bill 4306 was introduced by Assemblyman Sieroty on March 29, 1976.
'The bill proposed that a § 1663 be added to the Civil Code that would have read:
(a) With respect to any consumer transaction, if the court as a matter of law finds
that any aspect of the transaction, any conduct directed against the consumer by a
party to the transaction, or any result of the transaction is unconscionable, the
court shall, in addition to any other remedy provided for by law, either refuse to
enforce the transaction against the consumer, or so limit application of any un-
conscionable aspect or conduct to avoid any unconscionable result.
A.B. 4306, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (on fie with author). See also Charles H. Hurd & Phillip L.
Bush, Unconscionability in California: A Matter of Conscience for California Consumers,
25 HASTNGs L:J. 1, 2 n.5 (1973) (indicating similar bills were proposed and failed in 1972
and 1973).
167. A.B. 4306, supra note 166.
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The proposed bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
where it died without further action. 68
After the failed attempts, the California Legislature finally
adopted the verbatim language of Section 2-302 in 1979 as part of As-
sembly Bill 510, a consumer protection bill principally aimed at abuses
in the home improvement industry. The bill targeted transactions in
which consumers were extended credit secured by a lien on their
homes and then suffered foreclosure when they defaulted.169 The leg-
islature enacted Section 2-302, not as part of the California Commer-
cial Code, but as Section 1670.5 of the Civil Code, making
unconscionability applicable to all contracts in California and not just
those for the sale of goods. The legislature subsequently adopted the
Official Comments to Section 2-302 as an aid to interpreting Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 1670.5.170
While Assembly Bill 510 clearly emphasized consumer protection
from unscrupulous practices in the home improvement industry, pro-
ponents acknowledged that the adoption of Section 2-302 would have
a broader impact.17' The legislative history of Section 2-302 in Cali-
168. A.B. 4306, Assembly Final History at 2209 (on file with author).
169. The digest of Assembly Bill 510 (A.B. 510) stated:
A.B. 510 is one of several bills in the Senate and the Assembly designed to curb
abuses by door-to-door salesmen of home improvement goods or services which
have resulted in the non-judicial foreclosure sale of homes when homeowners
defaulted on payments.... Proponents state that most of the victims in these
"equity rip-off" schemes are the elderly and the poor.... The contract would be
secured by a trust deed and would require payments too large for the homeowner
to handle over and above his other obligations. At the first instance of default...
the trust deed would be sold to another company who would then foreclose on
the home ....
J. Fenton, Digest of A.B. 510, Aug. 30, 1979 (on file with author). The Enrolled Bill Re-
port of the Legal Affairs Secretary indicated that to curb unscrupulous business people
from taking advantage of unsophisticated homeowners, A.B. 510: (1) adopts the U.C.C.
provision on unconscionable contracts, (2) prohibits financial institutions from misconduct
through reassigning loan contracts back to the original lender, and (3) requires more notice
and publication of foreclosure sales. Report on Enrolled Bill A.B. 510 from J. Anthony
Kline, Legal Affairs Secretary to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California (Sept. 10,
1979) (on file with author). The Enrolled Bill Report of the Department of Consumer
Affairs also cited the particular emphasis of A.B. 510 on consumer home improvement
contracts as well as protecting consumers more broadly. Report on Enrolled Bill A.B. 510
from Department of Consumer Affairs, State & Consumer Services Agency to Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., Governor of California (on file with author).
170. Assembly Journal 9230-31 (Sept. 5, 1979); Senate Journal 7091 (Sept. 4, 1979).
171. Letter from Assemblyman Jack R. Fenton, Chairman, Assembly Judiciary Com-
mittee, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California (Sept. 13, 1979). The letter
stated that the bill would resolve the problem because it makes "all unconscionable con-
tracts voidable and also provides that unconscionable provisions in a consumer contract
are unlawful. This is designed to protect the uninformed consumer who enters into a pa-
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fornia clearly evidences that the statutory enactment of the unconscio-
nability doctrine was aimed primarily at consumers involved in
situations in which they might be victims of unscrupulous merchants.
Although references to the general application of Section 2-302 to all
contracts may also be found in the legislative history, Assembly Bill
510 passed where two other attempts had failed, largely on the basis of
the legislature's imperative to curb abuses in the home improvement
industry. Given the consumer protection impetus behind the bill, the
question is whether the same legislators who voted to adopt Section 2-
302 would have acted differently if they had foreseen the application
of the doctrine to many of the non-consumer cases in California since
1979.
B. California Common Law Predecessors to Section 2-302
A number of cases predating the 1979 adoption of Section 2-302
in California reveal the willingness of courts to police contracts for
unfairness in two types of situations. The earlier type of cases applied
the general principle of equity that courts, usually in cases involving
consumers, will not enforce contracts that are extremely one-sided or
that suggest bargaining misconduct.172 The later, second category of
cases primarily involved consumers challenging adhesion contracts re-
lating to necessities. Both categories of cases are illustrative in under-
standing and criticizing the current practices of the California courts
in unconscionability cases.
State Finance Co. v. Smith173 and Jacklich v. Baer"74 typify the
early cases in which courts refused to enforce contracts based solely
tently unreasonable contract with an opportunity to void the agreement and seek legal
remedies against the unscrupulous seller." Similarly, the Assembly Hearing Digest of A.B.
510 also identified the broad application of the proposed unconscionability statute while
still emphasizing the consumer protection aspects of the bill. T. Carroll, Digest of A.B.
510, Apr. 18, 1979 (on file with author). The inclusion of the unconscionability doctrine, as
embodied in § 2-302, in legislation aimed at abusive practices in foreclosures on consum-
ers' homes was questionable enough procedurally to draw the attention of the Legislative
Counsel of California. In his letter to the Governor about the bill, the Legislative Counsel
focused on the fact that the title of the bill listed "property" as its subject matter without
reference to the unconscionability provision. After discussing the California constitutional
requirement that every act embrace but one subject expressed in the title, the Legislative
Counsel went on to conclude that § 2-302 was "reasonably germane and promotive" of the
declared purpose of the bill to preserve the rights of homeowners and consumers from
fraudulent and deceptive sales practices and to prevent the unjust forfeiture of homes.
Letter from Bion M. Gregory, Legislative Counsel of California, to Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,
Governor of California (Sept. 14, 1979).
172. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
173. 112 P.2d 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
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on the inequity of the bargain. In Smith the unsophisticated defend-
ant sought a $70 loan but received it only after agreeing to purchase a
worthless truck for about $300.175 The transaction took place in Janu-
ary 1937, and the defendant defaulted on the loan about six months
later. The plaintiff sued for a deficiency of $250 after repossession and
sale of the collateral. 176 The court cited the fundamental precept that
mere inadequacy of consideration will not render a contract unen-
forceable, but that an inequality so gross as to shock the conscience of
the court may amount to proof of fraud, oppression, or undue influ-
ence. 177 In addition, the court found other evidence that the quality of
the truck had been misrepresented by the finance company's agent.178
The court refused to enforce the loan agreement because it was "ineq-
uitable and unconscionable."'1
79
The decision in Jacklich v. Baer was based on similar reasoning,
even though the facts were not quite as clear. Professional boxer Max
Baer entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs that promised them
a share of his winnings for a five-year period in apparent satisfaction
of a debt of $13,500 he owed them.' 80 The contract also contained an
option for the plaintiffs to renew their right to a share of Baer's earn-
ings for an additional five-year period for $5.181 The plaintiffs re-
ceived payments totaling almost $33,000 by the end of the first five-
year period and sought to enforce the option to renew for $5.182 The
court offered two reasons for refusing to enforce the option. First,
accepting the trial court's interpretation of the contract, the court con-
strued the contract as allowing for exercise of the option only if the
initial debt had not been repaid during the first five-year period.
183
Alternatively, the court reasoned that it would be unconscionable to
174. 135 P.2d 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
175. 112 P.2d at 902-03. The defendant debtor needed the $70 to pay the fees on his
existing truck. The second truck was valuable only as scrap and, in fact, was towed to the
defendant's home. Id.
176. Id. at 902. The defendant gave both his preexisting truck and the newly acquired
truck as collateral for the loan. Both trucks were repossessed and sold. Id. at 902.
177. Id. at 903.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 904.
180. 135 P.2d at 180-81. The contract also served as a mutual release of an earlier
contract that called for the plaintiffs to act essentially as Baer's personal managers, but not
boxing contests managers, and to pay or loan $15,000 to Baer. In return, the plaintiffs were
to receive a share of Baer's winnings and the right to become his boxing contest managers
if the other managers did not continue. Id. at 180.
181. Id. at 180.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 182-84.
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enforce the contract granting the plaintiffs the right to continue to re-
ceive a share of the defendant's earnings without any reciprocal
consideration. 184
The motivation of the parties for entering into the apparently
one-sided option agreement was not clear. Perhaps the contract was a
legitimate business arrangement, or, more likely, it was another one of
many cases of agents taking financial advantage of unwitting profes-
sional athletes. 185 The court held that the contract, as characterized
by the plaintiffs, would be harsh and oppressive and could not be en-
forced without an affirmative showing of business justification. 186 The
plaintiffs did not produce a convincing justification, and thus the con-
tract was characterized as grossly one-sided. The court was also prob-
ably influenced by the apparent lack of sophistication of the boxer and
by the manner in which events unfolded. To the extent that the court
considered events that occurred after the contract was formed, the
time perspective used was appropriate because the decision was based
on principles of equity that existed prior to the adoption of Section 2-
302 and that allowed hindsight judgment.187 Moreover, the decisions
in both Jacklich v. Baer and State Finance Co. v. Smith rested on prin-
ciples of interpretation or apparent fraud in addition to concerns
about imbalance in the exchange. Similar factors are found at play in
the early adhesion cases.
Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.l 88 was an early case involving an
adhesion contract and is often cited as embodying the judicially-devel-
oped principle of unconscionability in California. Steven involved a
184. Id. at 183-84.
185. The case held undertones of a battle between two parties competing for the right
to manage the one-time heavyweight champion. The original contract between Baer and
the plaintiffs provided that the plaintiffs "would use their best efforts to 'secure the faithful
performance"' by Baer's preexisting managers. Id. at 180. Ancil Hoffman, Baer's man-
ager, who provided key testimony and other evidence for Baer in the Jacklich case and
prevailed over the plaintiffs in the contest to manage Baer's career, provided well for
Baer's future despite the boxer's tendency to waste his earnings. See Art Rosenbaum, Max
Baer Was the Reluctant Boxing Champ, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 17,1988, at D4. Baer was known
to say, "I got an annuity that's going to pay me $2,200 a month. I don't know what an
annuity is, but I sure as hell know what $2,200 is." Tmothy F. Comstock, Reminiscence: A
Hard Hitter in the Ring, Max Baer Was A Real Softie Around Children, SPORTS ILLUs-
TRATED, Oct. 15, 1984, at 116, 124. In addition to being a successful boxing manager, Ancil
Hoffman was also a well-regarded Sacramento County supervisor for whom a city park is
named. Bill Conlin, Ancil Hoffman: Gone for 12 Years But Not Forgotten, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Aug. 7, 1988, at C2.
186. 135 P.2d at 183-84.
187. See discussion of equity and unconscionability supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
188. 377 P.2d 284 (Cal. 1962).
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consumer in a position where the merchant took advantage of extenu-
ating circumstances. In Steven the decedent-insured purchased an air-
plane life insurance policy from a vending machine shortly before he
began a flight and, in accordance with the instructions, mailed the doc-
ument to his wife, the designated beneficiary, before departing.189 A
flight segment on his return trip was cancelled by the carrier because
of unexpected events, and an agent for the planned carrier assisted the
decedent in finding an air taxi that he boarded with fellow travelers in
an attempt to reach a connecting flight home.190 The air taxi suffered
a fatal crash.' 9' The insurance company denied coverage because the
policy contained a label across the top of the document and other
terms providing that it did not cover "Travel on Other Than Sched-
uled Air Carriers."'1 92 The trial court held in favor of the defendant
insurance company, and the decedent's wife appealed.
193
The majority of the California Supreme Court was persuaded
that the limitation on coverage should not be enforced and that the
plaintiff should recover on the policy for two reasons. First, the ma-
jority found that the policy was ambiguous as to which flights were
covered and that the ambiguity should be resolved against the drafter
of the policy.194 Second, the majority reasoned that the decedent, as a
"layman," could reasonably expect that the flight insurance would
cover the entire trip, including the emergency substitute flight, unless
such flights were clearly excluded by the standardized contract.195 In
reaching its decision, the majority emphasized the circumstances of
obtaining the policy: the contract was adhesive in that it was com-
pletely without the possibility for negotiation; 96 the usual time and
manner of purchase and the instructions to mail the policy to the ben-
eficiary would effectively prevent the insured from reading the pol-
icy;197 even if the policy had been read by the decedent it would have
been difficult for him to understand that the air taxi service was not
included because it did not fit squarely into the defined categories of
189. Id. at 286, 294.
190. Id. at 286-87.
191. Id. at 287.
192. Id. at 286-88.
193. Id. at 287-88.
194. Id. at 288, 297-98. The policy used unclear terms such as "scheduled" and "non-
scheduled carriers" and even extended policy coverage to certain types of land transporta-
tion substituted for flights but never discussed emergency substitute flights. Id. at 289-90.
195. Id. at 288-89.
196. Id. at 297-98.
197. Id. at 294.
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ffights; 198 and the agent for the scheduled air carrier facilitated the
substitute air taxi fight.199
In concluding its opinion in Steven, the majority quoted Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.200 for the proposition that among the
court's tasks is the obligation "'to protect the ordinary man' from
being taken advantage of through standardized adhesion contracts im-
posed by the stronger party regarding "'services of a public or quasi-
public nature."' 20 1 Further, as in the Henningsen case, the circum-
stances indicated that the decedent was unlikely to find the objection-
able provision or understand it if found. The reasoning used in the
Steven opinion was also used in cases cited as precursors to the adop-
tion of the unconscionability doctrine.2°2 The practices of the Califor-
nia courts even before adoption of Section 2-302, however, were not
always well-disciplined, and anomalous decisions can be found, as in
the cases discussed below.
Foreshadowing the capriciousness that could occur under the li-
cense of Section 2-302 was the decision in yet another insurance case
focusing on the reasonable expectations of a consumer, Smith v. West-
land Life Insurance Co. 20 3 The consumer applied for a life insurance
policy and submitted the first month's premium.2°4 The company
gave the applicant a conditional receipt, known as a "binder," which
under California law created a temporary insurance policy subject to
termination upon an unfavorable review of the application by the
company.205 The insurance company could avoid providing tempo-
rary coverage under the binder only by using clear and unequivocal
198. Id. at 290-92.
199. IL at 290.
200. 161 A.2d 69, 92, 94 (N.J. 1960). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
201. Steven, 377 P.2d at 297 (quoting Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 92-94.
202. See Tfnkl v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (refusing
to enforce a waiver agreement executed by a patient upon admission to a hospital on the
basis that the agreement was an adhesion contract that ran contrary to statutory public
policy); Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 268 P.2d 1041, 1046-49 (Cal. 1954) (refusing to en-
force a disclaimer of warranty to the extent that it conflicted with the implied warranty of
merchantability, noting that disclaimers would be construed against the seller); Muelder v.
Western Greyhound Lines, 87 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1970) (refusing to enforce a con-
tract clause limiting liability for a lost package when the grossly negligent carrier did not
give notice of the limitation to the plaintiff shipper).
203. 539 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1975).
204. I. at 435.
205. Id. at 435, 437. The court found: (1) that the conditional receipts created an am-
biguity about coverage that should be resolved in favor of the applicant and (2) that when
payment is made with the application, the reasonable expectation of the applicant is that
coverage will be effective immediately. Id. at 440-41.
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language to the contrary and by calling that language to the attention
of the applicant.206 The insurance company responded to the appli-
cant within a month of the application, proposing that the requested
policy be issued, but only after increasing the premium and omitting
coverage for accidental death benefits based on the hazardous nature
of the applicant's work as a railroad laborer.207 The applicant refused
the modified policy.208 A second agent for the insurance company
met with the applicant and presented the proposed amended policy
for a second time, and the applicant refused again, so the agent in-
formed the applicant that his premium payment would be refunded.
209
The next day, the insured died in an automobile accident.210 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the temporary policy continued to be
effective until the insurance company gave unequivocal notice and a
refund of any premium paid, based on the view that the applicant
would reasonably expect coverage until formally notified of rejection
and that it would be unconscionable to allow the insurance company
to hold premiums without providing such coverage.
211
The case was decided by a 4-3 vote, and the dissent took issue
with both the majority's opinion and the new ruling requiring an ac-
tual refund of the premium to trigger termination of the implied tem-
porary policy.212 The dissent asserted simply, but cogently, that the
unequivocal rejection of the application by the agent, along with a
promise that the premium would be returned, refuted any reasonable
expectation by the applicant that he was covered by the requested
policy.2 13 The dissent also noted that earlier cases established that re-
turn of the premium was not a prerequisite to cancellation of express
insurance coverage and that no public policy concerns required such
return before termination of the implied temporary policy.
2 14
The dissent can be interpreted to disagree with the view that
holding premiums after cancellation was unconscionable conduct by
the insurance company. Even the majority indicated that, as long as
clear and unequivocal notice is given, the insurance company could
avoid providing temporary coverage despite receiving and holding
206. Id. at 441.
207. Id. at 435-36.
208. Id. at 436.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 439-40.
212. Id. at 444-46 (Clark, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 444 (Clark, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
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premium payments pending review of the application.215 Temporarily
holding a premium while evaluating an application is a fair exchange
for the cost of the evaluation and, in cases of rejection of the applica-
tion, compensates for the expense in refunding the premium. The ma-
jority's decision certainly favored the "little person," a widowed
insurance beneficiary. It is debatable, however, whether the contract
shocked the conscience of the court by its terms, or whether the court
was overly influenced by the manner in which events actually un-
folded.216 A review of California decisions after 1979 reveals similar
reasoning in which the explicit grant of authority to police for uncon-
scionability perhaps encouraged the courts to exceed their authority
and to disturb the parties' bargains based on the court's hindsight
judgment.21 7
m. Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine in
California After the Enactment of Section 2-302
Despite the state legislature's decision not to adopt the Section in
1962, the California courts have declared that Section 2-302 is compa-
rable to the state's judicially-developed doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity.2 18 One would expect unconscionability decisions in California
since 1979 to be relatively consistent with decisions in other jurisdic-
tions that had already enacted Section 2-302; and, in a number of
ways, the California decisions do coincide with the general construc-
tion of Section 2-302.219 California courts require a showing of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability at the time the contract
215. See id. at 439, 441-42.
216. Equity did allow courts to consider the results of contract performance, see supra
notes 118-120 and accompanying text, but the denial of coverage in this case may well have
been outside the realm of the "harsh" results that equity sought to avoid.
217. See infra notes 415-466 and accompanying text.
218. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503,511-12,511 n.10 (Cal. 1985) (stat-
ing that adoption of § 2-302 codified established doctrine that courts may refuse enforce-
ment of unconscionable contracts), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See also
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 173 n.19 (Cal. 1981) (stating that "[t]he judicially
developed concept of unconscionability has recently become a part of our statutory law").
219. See Perdue, 702 P.2d at 511 n.9 (indicating approval of the widely used procedural
and substantive unconscionability framework even though the court in Graham had used
an alternative approach that asked first whether the contract was adhesive and second
whether the terms were unconscionable or inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of
the adhering party, stating that either analysis should lead to the same result).
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was made220 and often reject claims when an element of the doctrine
is missing, whether the claimant is a consumer 221 or a merchant.
222
Nevertheless, the California cases have marked a distinctive path
in a number of important ways. First, California courts have been un-
duly indulgent of merchant-like parties claiming unconscionability
220. See Samura v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 27-28 (Ct.
App. 1993) (presumably both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required,
but more of one will compensate for less of the other); A&M Produce v. FMC Corp., 186
Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (Ct. App. 1982) (requiring procedural and substantive elements of
unconscionability).
221. See, e.g., Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 852-54 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that a medical arbitration agreement was not unconscionable when the patient signed
under non-emergency conditions, terms were clearly laid out, there was a subsequent op-
tion to rescind, and the arbitral forum was fair); General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 628 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a comprehensive release agreement
was not unconscionable when the signing widower was represented by counsel who
cosigned release and the terms of the release were clear and not overly one-sided);
Shadoan v. World Say. & Loan Ass'n, 268 Cal. Rptr. 207,211 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
loan agreement containing both a prepayment penalty provision and a unilateral call provi-
sion was not unconscionable because consumers failed to establish that other lenders did
not offer more favorable terms and because statutory law allowed prepayment penalty
provisions); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 797 (Ct. App.
1989) (holding that a termination fee in an investment account agreement was not uncon-
scionable when plaintiff was a sophisticated investor and alternative financial institutions
offered competing investment accounts without the termination fee).
222. See, e.g., U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 544-45
(Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a disclaimer of warranty by a finance lessor was not uncon-
scionable when the merchant lessee had a choice of finance lessors, the disclaimer was
conspicuous, and a remedy was available from the supplier/manufacturer); West v. Hen-
derson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572-76 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a contractual six-month
limitations provision on claims by a commercial lessee was not unconscionable when the
lessee had the opportunity to read before signing, the lessee could have leased elsewhere,
and the imbalance in the limitations provision could be justified by the lessor's need to
avoid long pending claims on property); Markborough California, Inc. v. Superior Court,
277 Cal. Rptr. 919, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a clause limiting liability of an
engineering company to its consulting fee of $67,640 was not unconscionable even when
breach caused more than $5 million in damage because the parties were dealing at arms
length and the client had an opportunity to accept, reject, or modify the terms of the agree-
ment); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 728-31 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that a mutual waiver of liability in a contract for use of a rocket to lift
a communications satellite was not unconscionable when the satellite did not reach its de-
sired orbit, thereby rendering it useless and causing $105 million damages on $6-7 million
contract, because both parties were sophisticated businesses, the contract was not a
preprinted form but rather a negotiated instrument, the mutual waiver was required by a
government agency, the buyer could have purchased a rocket from an alternative supplier,
and requiring the buyer to cover risks through insurance was not unreasonable); Central
Bank v. Kaiperm Santa Clara Fed. Credit Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 262, 273-74 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that an indemnification clause in a money order agency contract was not
unconscionable when the merchant plaintiff had alternative sources and the risk allocation
was reasonable in light of the circumstances).
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based on unequal bargaining power.2 3 Second, the courts have
shown a tendency to examine contracts with the benefit of hindsight
rather than assessing the contract from the parties' perspective at the
time the contract was formed.224 Third, California courts have wa-
vered on the possible offensive use of the doctrine to obtain an affirm-
ative recovery.2 Fourth, the courts have taken an unrestrained
approach to price-term unconscionability by examining cases on the
elusive notion of "excessive profits," rather than the more reliable ba-
sis of comparison between contract and market prices, and by judging
fairness on the cumulative effect of many different transactions rather
than assessing individual contracts.2 6 The questionable decisions
often involve more than one of these issues.
A. Merchants and Unconscionabiity in California
A particularly troubling aspect of the recent application of the
unconscionability doctrine by California courts is their willingness to
indulge claims made by merchants. Although merchants are certainly
capable of entering into bargains that either initially or eventually ap-
pear to be one-sided, merchants generally have greater difficulty than
consumers in showing procedural unconscionability based on surprise
resulting from hidden or unintelligible terms because they are ex-
pected to possess more sophistication or business experience than
nonmerchants.2 7 Merchants are also less likely to be able to show
procedural unconscionability through oppression or the absence of
meaningful choice because they possess greater bargaining power or
access to alternative sources.2 Nevertheless, the most notorious Cal-
ifornia decisions on unconscionability involve merchants who suc-
ceeded in convincing the courts that their contracts involved not only
substantive unconscionability, but also procedural unconscionability
based on lack of meaningful choice. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 2 9
A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.,230 and the recently decided Buch-
wald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.231 compose a trilogy of alarming
California decisions in which the courts misapplied Section 2-302.
223. See infra notes 228-447.
224. See infra notes 448-494.
225. See infra notes 449-512.
226. See infra notes 513-537.
227. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
229. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
230. 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982).
231. No. C706083, 1990 WL 357611 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 1990).
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(1) Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. is the preeminent case applying the
unconscionability doctrine in California after the adoption of Section
2-302 in 1979. The Section was adopted after the cause of action arose
but before the Graham decision, and the California Supreme Court
asserted that the new statute merely enacted the preexisting, judicially
developed doctrine of unconscionability that had long been part of
California common law.232 California courts, as well as courts in other
states, have subsequently treated Graham as an authoritative con-
struction of Section 2-302.233 Although the most significant weakness
in the reasoning of the Graham decision is its discussion of procedural
unconscionability, the court's finding of substantive unconscionability
is also questionable.
The Graham case arose out of a series of concert promotion con-
tracts between Bill Graham, a prominent contemporary music pro-
moter,234 and Leon Russell, a rock musician and sole owner of
Scissor-Tail, a corporation through which Russell marketed the serv-
232. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 173 n.19 (Cal. 1981).
233. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503,511 (Cal. 1985) (citing Graham as
proper construction of unconscionability law in California), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992)
(citing Graham for analytical framework, but not finding unconscionability because arbi-
tration clause deemed beyond patient's reasonable expectations); Smith v. Idaho State
Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho 1988) (relying on Graham as establishing
framework for unconscionability decisions); Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel, 480 A.2d 218,
221-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (following Graham precisely in finding same arbi-
tration agreement to be unconscionable). See also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 11,
§ 9-40, at 407 (citing Graham as example of unconscionability through lack of meaningful
choice).
234. See Richard Harrington, Bill Graham, Lead Act at Last, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1992,
at B7. Graham's biography is an interesting one. He was born in Germany and made it
out of that country during World War II as an orphan. Graham came to New York at ten
and grew up in a foster home before eventually obtaining a college degree in business
administration. See BILL GRAHAM & ROBERT GREENFIELD, BILL GRAHAM PRESENTS:
My LIFE INSIDE ROCK AND Our 1-50 (1992) [hereinafter BILL GRAHAM PRESENTS]. Gra-
ham served in the Army during the Korean War and received both a court martial for
insubordination and a Bronze Star citation for bravery under enemy fire. Id. at 50-61.
After an attempt at acting in New York, Graham moved to the San Francisco area and
became involved with a politically active theater group. Id. at 118-19. Graham's first pro-
duction was a legal defense fundraiser for the theater group in November of 1965. Id. at
121. The success of the fundraiser led Graham to produce musical events as a business.
He quickly became a leader in that field. Id. at 122-32.
Graham died in a helicopter crash in October of 1991 and was reported to have left an
estate of $50 million. See Philip Elwood, Unauthorized Graham Biography Absorbing,
Flawed, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 27, 1994, at D7. Two biographies on Graham have been
published: JOHN GLATr, RAGE & ROLL: BILL GRAHAM AND THE SELLING OF ROCK
(1994), and BILL GRAHAM PRESENTS, supra.
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ices of his band.23 5 The contracts called for Graham to promote con-
certs in four cities beginning in July 1973.236 The contracts for the first
two concerts were signed by both parties, but after a dispute arose,
Scissor-Tail failed to execute the third and fourth contracts and ob-
tained the services of an alternative promoter for those two con-
certs.23 7 The issue in the contract dispute was whether Scissor-Tal
should bear a portion of the loss incurred from promotion of the first
concert.238 The contracts were executed on standardized forms sup-
plied by the American Federation of Musicians (A.F. of M.), the de-
fendant's union, and expressly provided for the manner in which
profits would be shared without stating how losses would be
treated.23 9
Graham initiated the legal proceedings with a breach of contract
suit against Scissor-Tail in the fall of 1973. 240 Scissor-Tail responded
with an action to compel arbitration under the terms of the contracts,
which expressly provided for arbitration by an executive board of the
A.F. of M.24 1 The trial court ordered arbitration, and an initial arbi-
tration decision was rendered in favor of Scissor-Tail without a hear-
ing.242 A joint request for a hearing was made, and the matter was
reopened.24 3 The arbitrators ruled for Scissor-Tail a second time and
held that Graham would have to absorb the full amount of the loss.244
The trial court affirmed the arbitrator's award, finding again that the
235. Graham, 623 P.2d at 167.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 167-69.
238. The first two concerts were held in California at the Ontario Motor Speedway and
the Oakland-Alameda County Stadium. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 798,
800 (Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). The Ontario concert resulted in a
net loss of $63,000. The Oakland concert generated a net profit of $98,000. Graham, 623
P.2d at 168.
239. Graham, 623 P.2d at 167-68. The contracts called for Russell to receive the
greater of "'applicable A.F. of M. scale' or 85% of the profits in three of the cities and
90% of the profits in the fourth location after the deduction of appropriate expenses. Id.
240. Id. at 169.
241. Id. Paragraph 9 of the contracts provided that all disputes would be decided by
the local board if all the musicians were members of the same local board or by the inter-
national board if the musicians belonged to different locals. Id. at 168 & n.2.
242. Id. at 169.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 169-70. Other issues concerning a challenge to some expenses claimed by
Graham and the availability of attorney's fees were decided in favor of Graham, appar-
ently because the hearing officer had no directions on those matters. Id.
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agreement to arbitrate was enforceable and there was no basis to
overturn the award favoring Scissor-Tail.245
After Graham prevailed on appeal, the case was heard by the
California Supreme Court. Graham argued that the form contract
was an unenforceable contract of adhesion to the extent that it al-
lowed the union to arbitrate a dispute arising between a union mem-
ber and a nonmember.246 The court began its analysis by citing the
definition of an adhesion contract often used in California: "The term
signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it. ' '247
In analyzing the adhesion contract issue, the court noted that
A.F. of M.'s constitution and bylaws did not permit members to sign
any contract other than the union's standardized contract that in-
cluded the clause designating the union as the arbitrator.248 The court
also found that most musicians of any significance or prominence
were union members; thus, the court concluded that Graham was
forced to adhere to the form contracts if he wanted to promote the
concerts of popular musicians.249 The court reached this conclusion
even though some terms of the contract were actually negotiable. 250
The court's determination that the contract was adhesive was
only the first step in its analysis. It emphasized that even a contract of
adhesion would generally be enforceable except in cases in which
either the contract contained terms that fell outside of the reasonable
expectations of the adhering party or some of the contract's provisions
were unconscionable. 25' The court quickly dismissed the possibility
that the arbitration provision might have fallen outside of Graham's
reasonable expectations because he admitted to previously signing
245. Earlier, in findings of fact and conclusions of law filed with the order compelling
arbitration, the trial court specifically found that Graham had not entered into the arbitra-
tion agreement under mistake and that no grounds existed to rescind or revoke the arbitra-
tion agreement. kd at 169 & n.5. The trial court incorporated and affirmed those findings
and went on to conclude that (1) there had been no misconduct by Scissor-Tail in the
process; (2) there had been no misconduct by the arbitrator in exceeding the limits of
power, bias, prejudice, or partiality; and (3) any appearance of arbitrator impartiality was
known by Graham at the time he executed the contracts. Id. at 170 & n.8.
246. Id. at 170-72.
247. Id. at 171 (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App.
1961)).
248. Id. at 172.
249. Id.
250. See infra notes 269-270 and accompanying text.
251. Graham, 623 P.2d at 172-73.
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thousands of the form contracts, including at least fifteen with Scissor-
Tail.25 2 Graham also had been a party to previous arbitration pro-
ceedings under the contracts and had even threatened Scissor-Tal that
he would file a complaint with the A.F. of M. if the dispute in question
was not resolved to his satisfaction.253
The California Supreme Court then considered whether the con-
tract should be held unconscionable.2- 4 Although Graham had
phrased his challenge in terms of a lack of due process,2 5 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reshaped the argument as being an asserfion that
the arbitration form was "so inimical to fundamental notions of fair-
ness" as to be unconscionable.256 The court began by acknowledging
that provisions of the California Arbitration Act contemplated that
parties should have "complete contractual autonomy" in choosing an
arbitrator; the parties could even agree to a nonneutral arbitrator.2 7
The court also discussed California decisions that enforced arbitration
agreements despite suggestions of a lack of complete neutrality on the
part of the arbitrator.258 This analysis of California law could have
provided enough support for enforcement of the A.F. of M. clause,
but the court did not stop the analysis there.
Going far beyond the state's statutory law and judicial precedent,
the California Supreme Court cited a New York appellate court case,
In re Cross & Brown Co.,2 9 for the proposition that a person may not
be a judge in his own case-the law presumes that such a party cannot
have the "'impartiality necessary to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity."' 260 As discussed below, use of the Cross & Brown opinion
to disqualify the A.F. of M. board as arbitrator was disingenuous for a
number of reasons. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court rea-
soned that the interests of the union, although not a party to the dis-
pute, were so closely allied with those of its members that the union
was subject to the same presumption of non-objectivity. 261 This rea-
soning was supported with language from United States Supreme
Court decisions suggesting that arbitration proceedings should have
252. Id. at 173.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1980).
256. Graham, 623 P.2d at 173-74.
257. I. at 174.
258. Id. at 174-75.
259. 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1957).
260. Graham, 623 P.2d at 175 (quoting In re Cross & Brown Co., 167 N.Y.S.2d at 575).
261. Id at 177.
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"'minimum levels of integrity."' 262 The California Supreme Court ef-
fectively reformed the contract by remanding the case and instructing
that the parties be given an opportunity to agree upon a neutral arbi-
trator and, if unsuccessful in doing so, that the trial court should ap-
point an arbitrator.26
3
Given the legislative history of Section 2-302 and its common law
precedents, the Graham case raises serious doubt about whether a so-
phisticated party, such as Bill Graham, and a contract term, such as
the A.F. of M. arbitration clause, present the circumstances that the
California Legislature intended for courts to police with Section 2-302.
More specifically, however, the facts of the case simply do not support
findings of procedural and substantive unconscionability.
First, Graham could not assert procedural unconscionability
based on unfair surprise for the same reason the court found the term
was not beyond his reasonable expectations: Graham admitted to be-
ing intimately familiar with the A.F. of M. contract, he had been party
to a multitude of the same agreements, and he had previously been
party to arbitrations thereunder. 264 Graham could not assert that he
had been victimized by a contract clause that was either hidden from
him or unintelligible to him. Graham's early threat to file a complaint
with the A.F. of M., if Scissor-Tail did not accept a proposed compro-
mise, reflects his knowledge and understanding of the clause.265
The California Supreme Court found the alternative form of pro-
cedural unconscionability: a lack of meaningful choice through gross
inequality of bargaining power. A key to the finding was the court's
determination that all artists and musicians of any prominence used
the same contract.266 The court refused to entertain the possibility,
although asserted by Scissor-Tail and amicus curiae parties, that the
objectionable clause could have been subject to negotiation by Gra-
ham, in light of his great prominence and success. 267 Graham, who
undoubtedly had access to legal counsel, could have challenged the
clause on his own or with the support of other promoters. While Gra-
262. Id. at 176 (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976)).
263. Id. at 180.
264. Id. at 173.
265. The court noted that Graham sent a telegram to Russell on August 7, 1973, shortly
after the first two concerts on July 29 and August 5. Il at 168 n.3. While the details are
not spelled out in the opinion, a reasonable guess is that Graham proposed a compromise
that would have allowed Graham to promote the last two concerts. In the absence of a
compromise, Graham threatened to file charges with the A.F. of M. Id.
266. See id. at 172.
267. Id.
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ham enjoyed the reputation of being assertive in his business deal-
ings,268 it is possible that he did not challenge the provision because he
did not object to the A.F. of M. process. The California Supreme
Court overlooked the fact that Graham's threat to initiate arbitration
against Scissor-Tail probably evidenced his confidence in, rather than
his suspicion of, the A.F. of M. arbitration process.
Although the court acknowledged that the profit-sharing percent-
age and some other terms were obviously subject to negotiation, it
also dismissed those items that were negotiable as being of "relatively
minor significance. '269 While Graham's ability to negotiate minor
terms would not undercut an argument for lack of meaningful choice,
the fact that a party was able to negotiate key pricing provisions
should have weakened, if not precluded, such a claim. The court con-
strued Scissor-Tail's determination to find a promoter amenable to its
desired apportionment of the profits as an indication that the term
was not negotiable, supporting its conclusion that the contract was one
of adhesion.270 The court failed to recognize that at the same time,
Graham also could have elected to refrain from promoting Scissor-
Tail or other groups that would not agree to his terms on price or
arbitration. It is reasonable to infer that Graham's services were valu-
able enough that someone would have paid his price.
A New York court observed in a similar case that the question of
meaningful choice or oppression through unequal bargaining power in
a transaction may be influenced by whether the contract is a business
venture or a contract for life's basic necessities. 271 The court noted
268. See Richard Harrington, Rock's Rough and Ready Promoter; Bill Graham, No-
Nonsense Pro in a Psychedelic World, WASH. PosT, Oct. 28, 1991, at D1:
[Graham] was also possessed of an ego equal to, but probably more loudly de-
claimed than, any of the rock stars he worked with. His was a volcanic temper,
and the brutally frank Graham never minced words or deleted expletives.
Whether you were a star, a manager or a fan, you never had to guess where you
stood with Graham-he'd let you know, right to your face.
See also Jane Scott, Origins of a Star-Maker; Book Chronicles Rock 'N' Roll Pioneer's Life,
PLAiN DEA.ER, Nov. 6, 1992, at 28 (describing Graham as the "world's premier concert
producer" and noting that he stood up to everyone "from Hell's Angels to tyrannical,
abusive rock group managers").
269. Graham, 623 P.2d at 172.
270. Id. The mere fact that a group was highly desirable and therefore had an advan-
tage in bargaining power does not mean that a contract was not the result of negotiation.
Cf. Glopak Corp. v. United States, 851 F.2d 334,338-39 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that even
though the United States government refused to yield and include a price adjustment
clause, the agreement was nonetheless the product of negotiation, Glopak having simply
failed to succeed in obtaining its desired contract provision).
271. Jerry Kravat Entertainment Serv., Inc. v. Cobbs, 459 N.Y.S,2d 993, 996 (Sup. Ct.
1983) (discussed infra notes 283-287 and accompanying text).
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that music promoters are always free to leave the business.272 In this
regard, the Graham case stands in contrast to contracts for medical
services, life insurance, and automobiles, which rise to a different level
of practical necessity for consumers. 273 California courts have recog-
nized the difference between business ventures and basic necessities in
analyzing contracts for unconscionability. 274
Even if the court was correct in finding procedural unconsciona-
bility in the formation of the contract, it still had to find substantive
272. Id. See also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
273. Professor Dawson has noted that German courts have been receptive to claims of
"economic necessity" relating to bargains entered into by claimants in fear of serious eco-
nomic loss, but not to claims of necessity by parties attempting to make a profit. Dawson,
supra note 36, at 62-63. Dawson reported "that [t]he prospect of gain might often produce
willingness to incur an immediate sacrifice, through a transaction in which the values ex-
changes were unequal .... free choice of the interested parties should not be interfered
with in such cases, in spite of a disproportion of values... ." l See also John P. Dawson,
Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1057-59 (1976)
(also citing German distinction between necessity based on need to preserve the life of a
going business, such as a retail store, as compared with a discrete venture aimed to produce
profit); United States v. Bedford Assocs., 657 F.2d 1300, 1313 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting a
claim of unconscionability by a lessor of real property to a federal agency in an arrange-
ment that would have produced millions of dollars of revenues but risked substantial losses
as well); Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1328 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)
(rejecting a claim of unconscionability in an exclusive distributorship contract calling for
arbitration in Italy because, although the term may have been nonnegotiable, the distribu-
tor was aware of clause and was willing to accept it in the hopes of reaping great profits
and arbitration is favored by federal and international law). The Filippi court noted that if
the distributor thought the term was too unfair it was free to walk away. Id.
274. See Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846,852 (Ct. App. 1993) (indicating that even
some medical treatment may not be deemed necessary, particularly in non-emergency cir-
cumstances); West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575 (Ct. App. 1991) (distinguishing
commercial real property lease as a business venture and not in pursuit of life's necessi-
ties); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 732-33 (Ct.
App. 1989) (observing that practical necessity relates to matters "such as medical, legal,
housing, transportation or similar services" in rejecting claim that contract for launching of
satellite involved essential services); Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 122 Cal. Rptr.
816, 821-22 (Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting claim of a former employee's widow that an em-
ployer repurchase clause in a stock option plan was adhesive or unconscionable because
the employee's participation in the plan was entirely voluntary). See also Phoenix Leasing,
Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (D. Nev. 1994) (applying California
law and noting that taking out a loan to start up a business venture does not involve a
necessity of life that would compel borrower to accept loan); Bonfield v. AAMCO Trans-
missions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 596 (E.D. IlL. 1989) (rejecting claim that nonnegotiability
of franchise agreement constituted breach of duty of good faith and noting that the fran-
chisee was free to reject the agreement because it did not involve necessities); Collins v.
Click Camera & Video, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1294, 1300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
contract for film processing did not relate to the necessaries of life and therefore customer
could have foregone contract if no seller was willing to negotiate limitation of liability).
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unconscionability.275 The Graham court considered the close align-
ment of interests between the musicians and their union to find that
the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable. The court
reasoned that because the union's mission is to seek favorable wages
and improve working conditions for its members, the union's execu-
tive board would presumptively be prevented from acting in a fair and
impartial manner in disputes involving its members.276
The California Supreme Court cited the Cross & Brown decision
for support even though the employment contract in Cross & Brown
was distinguishable.
The case involved an employment contract that called for dis-
putes between employer and employee to be arbitrated by the em-
ployer's board of directors.277 Based on those facts, the New York
court characterized the corporate employer and its board of directors
as one entity, stating, "We brush aside any metaphysical subtleties
about corporate personality and view the agreement as one in which
one of the parties is [also] named as arbitrator."278 Nevertheless, the
New York court cautioned against interpreting its holding too broadly,
stating, "By our decision herein we do not intend to limit the power of
contracting parties to designate arbitrators who, with the knowledge
of the parties, may have an interest in the dispute or who sustain some
relationship to a party which would otherwise disqualify the arbitrator
from serving." 279
The A.F. of M. arbitration clause is readily distinguished from the
arbitration clause in Cross & Brown; the musicians and their union do
not share the same relationship as the corporation and its board of
directors. In Jerry Kravat Entertainment Services, Inc. v. Cobbs,2_0 a
later New York state court decision involving the same A.F. of M.
arbitration clause at issue in Graham, the New York court expressly
declined to follow Graham and differentiated the union arbitrators
275. The California courts have required a finding of both elements of unconscionabil-
ity, but have suggested application of a sliding scale that requires less substantive uncon-
scionability with greater procedural abuse, and vice versa. Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting
Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80,83 (Ct. App. 1993) (both procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility required in a sliding scale relationship); Dean Witter Reynolds v. Superior Court, 259
Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[a] relatively larger degree of one will
compensate for a relatively smaller degree of the other"). This approach is consistent with
other jurisdictions. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
276. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 177-78 (Cal. 1981).
277. In re Cross & Brown, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (App. Div. 1957).
278. Id. at 575-76.
279. I& at 576.
280. 459 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1983).
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from the corporate board of directors.28' In contrast to the rather nar-
row characterization of the union by the California Supreme Court,
the Jerry Kravat decision emphasized that the union does not neces-
sarily share an identity with its members. The union may be at odds
with some members on occasion, may not always command the fol-
lowing of its members, or may need to take corrective action against
members for the general benefit of the organization.
282
The Jerry Kravat opinion noted that while the arbitration ar-
rangement might not present complete impartiality, it would nonethe-
less achieve the goal of speedy resolution by consensual arrangement
of the parties.283 The court also emphasized a number of other points:
the parties were sophisticated merchants, not innocent consumers
281. The court stated in part:
Under New York law, an arbitration agreement will rarely be invalidated for par-
tiality because of the relation between the parties and the arbitrators, as long as
the relationship is disclosed prior to the making of the agreement, as here ....
Matter of Cross is distinguishable from the present case. There the employer was
a party to the agreement and its board served as arbitrator. Here, however, the
Union, whose board is to serve as arbitrator is not a contracting party. Rather, it
is the individual musicians who are parties to the agreement.
Id. at 995.
282. While the union may generally gain notoriety from its efforts to obtain better
working circumstances for its members, the A.F. of M. serves a broader spectrum of mem-
bers than other unions might. The A.F. of M. represents orchestras, for example, in collec-
tive bargaining as well as a large number of independent contractors, such as Russell and
Scissor-Tail whose itinerant schedule prevents such collective action. See House Panel
Holds Hearings on Labor Law for Entertainers, BNA WASH. INSIDER, Nov. 15, 1993 (not-
ing that since 1970 live performance entertainers have been deemed independent contrac-
tors and therefore not subject to collective bargaining rights under federal law). The
bargaining power of the musicians in Graham stands in contrast to the reports of treatment
of less famous live performers who are not infrequently subject to having club owners or
promoters withhold or reduce pay or otherwise subject them to resolving disputes with the
"club bouncer." Id. A.F. of M. clearly has sanctioned members who have crossed picket
lines to work. See Conway Twitty..., UPI, Oct. 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (indicating sanctions were likely to be leveled against a number of stars and musi-
cians who defied strike of union local to perform); Travis Faces Expulsion from Union,
UPI, Sept. 7, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that well-known
performers Randy Travis, Englebert Humperdink, and David Copperfield had crossed lo-
cal union picket line). The potential for disputes between the A.F. of M. national board
and individual members or union locals was reflected in a mid-1980s battle over control of
the national leadership, see Harry Bernstein, Sour Notes Heard in the Musicians Union,
L.A. TIMEs, July 21, 1987, (Business), at 1, and the decision of the Seattle Symphony to
break away from the A.F. of M. and adopt a new bargaining agent, see Judith Michaelson,
Music Union Challenged in Seattle, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1988, (Calendar), at 6. The A.F.
of M. has faced severe financial difficulties in more recent years and has lost about one-half
of its membership since 1979. See Melinda Newman, AFM Institutes Financial Overhaul,
BILLBOARD, June 29, 1991, at 10.
283. Jerry Kravat, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
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seeking fundamental necessities; the relationship of the union and the
members was disclosed prior to the making of the contract; the pro-
moter was free to leave the business and seek other opportunities or
join with other promoters to seek a change in the union contract; and
the continued work of the promoters was evidence that the arbitration
clause was not so unfair as to make the business unprofitable for
them.284 Based on these findings, the Jerry Kravat court deemed it
inappropriate to disturb the balance of bargaining power between the
parties.
In light of the relative weakness of the claim for procedural un-
conscionability in Graham, the court should have demanded a strong
indication of substantive unconscionability, especially from a
merchant. Instead, the California Supreme Court found unfairness in
the mere prospect of partiality on the part of the arbitrator and disre-
garded specific findings that the A.F. of M. procedures would allow
the nonunion member to receive a fair hearing.285 Moreover, the
court did not find any flaw in the arbitration that took place 86 and
acknowledged that a proceeding that denied a party a fair hearing
could have been challenged in the courts.2s7 The court's willingness to
284. Id. at 995-96.
285. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 177 (Cal. 1981). The court stated:
Although our review of the record has disclosed nothing which would indicate
that A.F. of M. procedures operate to deny any party a fair opportunity to pres-
ent his position prior to decision [citing A.F. of M. constitution and bylaws], we
are of the view that the "minimum levels of integrity" ... are not achieved by an
arrangement which designates the union of one of the parties as the arbitrator.
For extensive criticism of this reasoning, see Gregory R. Kim, Comment, Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc.: Unconscionability of Presumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within
Adhesion Contracts, 70 CAi. L. REv. 1014 (1982).
286. Graham, 623 P.2d at 177. The observation that the supreme court never identified
a denial of Graham's rights is consistent with the trial court finding that there was no
impropriety in the proceedings. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. Although the
contract was not specific about which party would absorb the loss on the concert, it did
assure a minimum wage to the musicians, suggesting that the promoter might well be
deemed to have accepted the risk of a possible loss. Graham details in his autobiography
an occasion when he absorbed a loss in excess of $130,000 because of the cancellation of a
Led Zeppelin concert after a member of the band broke his leg. In his own words, Gra-
ham stated, "I couldn't sue them. Because the deal was that when they played they would
receive their money. In legalese, they were saying, 'Why charge us? We didn't do anything
wrong.' That is the risk that the promoter always takes. Which people may not be aware
of." BrLL GRAHAM PRESENTS, supra note 234, at 373-74.
287. The court stated: "If, in the course of arbitration proceedings, the resisting party
is actually denied a fair opportunity to present his position, ample means for relief are
available through a subsequent petition to vacate the award." Graham, 623 P.2d at 177
n.23. This factor has been significant for other courts. See Tate v. Saratoga Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 265 Cal. Rptr 440, 444 (Ct. App. 1989) (observing that the Graham court "made
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find fault with the arbitration arrangement in Graham stands in
marked contrast to other cases involving claims in California and
other jurisdictions that arbitration arrangements were unconscion-
able.288
Relying on these questionable bases, the California Supreme
Court rendered its first and still most prominent unconscionability de-
cision following the adoption of Section 2-302. The Graham decision
set precedent for future, equally problematic unconscionability deci-
sions in California, including A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.289 and
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures.290
little effort to tie its holding to the statutory grounds for challenging an arbitration
award").
288. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1188 (Cal. 1976) (under-
scoring that "arbitration has become a proper and usual means of resolving civil disputes"
and encouraging courts to move away from the "era of hostility toward arbitration" in
upholding a contract calling for arbitration of state employee malpractice claims against
hospital); Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 852-54 (Ct. App. 1993) (medical arbitration
agreement was not unconscionable when patient signed under non-emergency conditions,
terms were clearly laid out, there was subsequent option to rescind, and arbitral forum was
fair); Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc. 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (D. Nev.
1994) (applying California law and rejecting argument that provision for waiver of jury
trial in loan agreement between two commercial parties was unconscionable because of
lender's strong preference for trial by the court rather than by a jury, when term was clear
and conspicuous, and borrower was sophisticated business entity represented by counsel);
Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11333, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
1993) (refusing to find arbitration agreement unconscionable under federal law even
though the lender had option to avoid arbitration and the borrower did not); Broemmer v.
Otto, 821 P.2d 204, 209-10 (Ariz. App. 1991) (rejecting patient's argument that arbitration
agreement with abortion clinic requiring that any arbitrators be medical doctors licensed in
obstetrics/gynecology was unconscionable because of automatic bias), vacated in part, 840
P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1992); Delaney v. Continental Airlines, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9868, at *6
(C.D. Cal. June 22, 1993) (rejecting employee's argument that arbitration before panel of
employee's divisional supervisor, human resources senior vice president, and corporate of-
ficer chosen by employee was unconscionable because of inherent bias in favor of em-
ployer); Westinghouse v. New York City Transit Auth., 623 N.E.2d 531, 534-35 (N.Y. 1993)
(refusing to find an alternative dispute resolution agreement unconscionable even though
it allowed a personally involved employee of one of the contracting parties to render final
binding decision when contract allowed for judicial review of whether decision was arbi-
trary, capricious, or grossly erroneous). Cf. Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding unconscionability when the operation of the
arbitration clause in a consumer loan agreement executed in California was likely to result
in adjudication in Minnesota without opportunity for a hearing).
289. See infra notes 291-350.
290. See infra notes 351-414.
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(2) A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.
A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.291 followed shortly after Gra-
ham and is subject to much of the same criticisms, even though the
merchant claiming unconscionability did not have the notoriety of Bill
Graham. A&M Produce also differs from Graham in that the court
based its decision in part on the surprise form of unconscionability,
albeit on a doubtful basis. The cases are similar in that both courts
found a lack of meaningful choice and substantive unconscionability
based on questionable considerations. Together, A&M Produce and
Graham established a foundation for the application of Section 2-302
that has fostered a lack of proper restraint and consistency in the Cali-
fornia courts.
A&M Produce was a farming corporation owned by C. Alex
Abatti, a sole proprietor who had been farming all of his life.29 A&M
Produce sued the defendant farming equipment corporation for
breach of express and implied warranties.293 The trial court found a
disclaimer of warranties clause and an exclusion of consequential
damages clause to be unconscionable and ruled in favor of the plain-
tiff.2 94 While the disclaimer of warranties presented some interesting
issues,295 the key provision for the purposes of this discussion was the
exclusion of consequential damages.
296
291. 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1982).
292. Id. at 117.
293. Id. at 118.
294. Id.
295. FMC made the often heard argument that the disclaimer of warranties met the
technical requirements of U.C.C. § 2-316 and therefore could not be subject to a test of
unconscionability under § 2-302. The court properly rejected that argument. Id. at 120.
See Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62
CHI-KENwr L. Rnv. 199,222-24 (1985) (indicating that both statutory construction and case
law support application of § 2-302 to § 2-316 disclaimers). Moreover, the court noted that
the attempt by FMC to exclude any express warranties was ineffective under § 2-316(1).
A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121 n.10. Thus, even if one were to find that the implied
warranties were effectively disclaimed, an express warranty describing the capacity of the
goods would still exist. Consequently, the key question became the validity of the term
excluding consequential damages.
296. This case thus implicated § 2-719(3), which applies unconscionability specifically
to attempts to limit consequential damages. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1990). Consequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable, but the limitation of damages when the loss is com-
mercial is not. The plaintiff apparently did not raise "failure of essential purpose" under
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) as an alternative challenge to the limitation on remedies under the
contract.
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The dispute in A&M Produce arose from the purchase of a
weight-sizer, a piece of farming equipment used in harvesting toma-
toes.297 When the weight-sizer malfunctioned, most of the tomato
crop was lost.298 A&M Produce then sued for breach of warranty,
seeking to regain the portion of the price paid for the equipment and
the value of the lost crops as consequential damages.299 FMC cross-
complained, seeking the balance due on the purchase price of the
weight-sizer.300 In the course of the trial, the court ruled that it would
be unconscionable to enforce the limited remedy provision of the
agreement and further that the provision as not set out in a conspicu-
ous fashion.301 The appellate court's review focused on the issue of
unconscionability.
302
The A&M Produce court followed Graham in concluding that the
unconscionability doctrine existed in California prior to the adoption
of Section 2-302 and then proceeded to construe the doctrine as re-
quiring procedural and substantive elements.303 The court also found
procedural unconscionability based on surprise, determining that the
exclusion clause was not particularly conspicuous because it appeared
"in the middle of the back page of a long preprinted form contract"
and was never brought to A&M Produce's attention by FMC.
3°4
Likewise, the court found procedural unconscionability through a lack
of meaningful choice because of unequal bargaining power, citing
FMC's position as a large business conglomerate versus A&M Pro-
duce's position as a relatively small farming corporation with no previ-
ous experience in tomato harvesting.30 5 In addition, the court held the
297. A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
298. Id. at 118.
299. Id. at 117-18.
300. Id. at 118.
301. Id. The cited opinion is from the third trial in the case. A first trial resulted in a
hung jury, and a new trial was ordered after the second trial on grounds not specified in the
court's opinion. Id.
302. In addition to the general application of § 2-302, § 2-719(3) specifically indicates
that consequential damages may be excluded in the absence of unconscionability. U.C.C.
§ 2-719(3) (1990).
303. A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. The court thus varied from the Graham
approach, which prefaced its unconscionability analysis with a determination that the con-
tract was one of adhesion, but reasoned that the Graham approach in fact embodied the
search for both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Id. at 122-23. In Perdue v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 511 n.9 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986), the California Supreme Court described the analysis in A&M Produce as an "alter-
native analytical framework" to that offered by the supreme court in Graham that should
lead to the same result.
304. A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
305. Id. at 125.
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exclusion of consequential damages substantively unconscionable.
The lost crops were easily foreseeable in this context as an element of
consequential damages if not for the limited remedy that placed the
risk of loss on A&M Produce.3°6 Thus, the court found the exclusion
of consequential damages to be unconscionable.
The A&M Produce findings of procedural unconscionability
through surprise and unequal bargaining power are unpersuasive, in-
consistent with other decisions involving the failure of a party to read
a signed contract, and at odds with the apparent legislative intent be-
hind California's adoption of Section 2-302. The form contract in
A&M Produce was a simple one-page, two-sided form.307 On the
front side was a bold, fully-capitalized reference to the terms and con-
ditions on the back of the agreement; the front side reference was
located immediately below the typed-in names of the buyer and seller
and immediately above the typed-in quantity, description, and price
for the goods being sold.3 08 It would have been difficult for A&M
Produce to review the typed-in terms, such as the price, without seeing
the reference to the terms on the reverse side. While the reverse side
does contain sixteen somewhat lengthy provisions, the disclaimer
stands out conspicuously in fully-capitalized print that is substantially
larger than the other terms.30 9 The limitation on remedy immediately
follows the disclaimer and is also capitalized and in print size that is
somewhat larger than all provisions except for the .disclaimer.310 The
juxtaposition of the two capitalized, larger-print provisions makes
them conspicuous from the other terms. Once identified, the limita-
tion on remedy is explicit.311
In addition to the conspicuous nature of the terms, A&M Pro-
duce had a significant amount of time in which to review the form
agreement before finalizing it. Indeed, the appellate court specifically
306. Id. at 126.
307. The form is reproduced in its entirety as an appendix to the published opinion. Id
at 130-31. It is difficult to tell the exact original size of the paper and type, but the typed-in
terms indicate the paper was at least 8.5" x 11" and probably closer to 8.5" x 14", suggesting
that the print would have been larger than it appears in the reporters.
308. The form read in part: "SELLER hereby agrees to sell to BUYER, UPON AND
SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE FACE AND BACK
HEREOF, the equipment described below." Id at 130.
309. Id at 131.
310. Id
311. Id The term reads, in part, "SELLER IN NO EVENT SHALL BE LIABLE
FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
WITH THIS AGREEMENT... CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR PURPOSES
HEREOF SHALL INCLUDE, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF USE, INCOME
OR PROFIT."
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recognized that A&M had the opportunity to read the back of the
contract or seek the advice of an attorney.312 Even though these were
two commercial entities dealing at arms length, the court was per-
suaded that the obligation was on the seller to take steps to bring the
damages limitation clause to the attention of A&M. 313 Although the
overall sentiment of the opinion suggests that A&M was a quasi-con-
sumer, in fact, the court noted that Abatti had been farming all of his
life and that A&M "was conceded [to be] a large-scale farming enter-
prise by Imperial Valley standards, employing five persons on a regu-
lar basis and up to fifty seasonal employees at harvest time, and...
farming some 8,000 acres. ' 314 While courts in other jurisdictions have
resisted such temptation, the A&M Produce court treated A&M as a
nonmerchant just because it was a small operation relative to FMC.315
The case is inconsistent with decisions in California and other states
that hold parties, even actual consumers, more responsible for reading
contracts in non-emergency circumstances. 316 The situation is also less
312. Id. at 124.
313. Id. at 124-25. This particular aspect of the case is criticized extensively in Trudy
Nobles Sargent, Note, Unconscionability Redefined California Imposes New Duties on
Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1984).
314. A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
315. FMC was cited as grossing $40 million in 1974 in its agriculture machinery division
alone. Id. Cf. Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (noting
that the sophistication *of an oil company does not disprove the sophistication of dealers,
many having been in business for more than 20 years), affd, 696 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1982);
Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that the exclusion of consequential damages in a sale of herbicide from a large
manufacturer to an "experienced and knowledgeable farmer" did not involve unconsciona-
bility); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 617-18 (App.
Div. 1983) (refusing to find unconscionable a consequential damages limitation in a con-
tract for purchase of a harvester by a large, experienced corn farming operation because
the transaction was commercial, the buyer had undoubtedly purchased farm machinery
containing similar limitations, alternative sellers were available, and the allocation of risks
was not substantively unreasonable); K&C, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390,
393 (Pa. 1970) (although manufacturer of dry cleaning machines was much larger, the pur-
chaser corporation headed by attorney and experienced merchant "was hardly the sheep
keeping company with wolves").
316. See, e.g., Bolanos v. Shalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209, 211 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that patient with fifth-grade education would still be bound by medical arbitration agree-
ment she signed without reading); West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575 (Ct. App.
1991) (rejecting claim of unfair surprise based on fact the lessee did not read lease consist-
ing of 20 single-spaced pages, stating that "[p]arties to commercial contracts fail to read
them at their own peril"); Markborough California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr.
919, 927 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that failure of developer to read clause limiting liability
in standardized agreement would not serve as basis for excuse from terms); Meyers v.
Univest Home Loan, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11333, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993) (re-
jecting argument that party dealing at arms length had a duty to explain terms to consum-
ers who had opportunity to read the contracts and noting that while failure to read
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
HeinOnline -- 46 Hastings L.J. 516 1994-1995
compelling than cases where the contracts involved multi-paged docu-
ments and terms that were difficult to decipher.317
In addition to the dubious finding of "surprise" in the case, the
alternative basis for finding procedural unconscionability is also ques-
tionable. The court's finding of a lack of meaningful choice was based
on the perceived bargaining advantage of FMC and the nonnego-
tiability of the warranty terms even though the appellate court recog-
nized that A&M had received an initial bid from another seller.318
Because A&M deemed the price presented by the first seller to be too
high, it sought a bid from FMC.319 The appellate court was most
likely correct in concluding that FMC's form contract could not have
been negotiated to eliminate the exclusion of consequential damages,
but the presence of alternative sources for the equipment suggests
that A&M did have some meaningful choice. Unlike at least a few
other cases involving an apparent monopoly or oligopoly of the goods
contracts may be a common practice, there is nothing unfair about expecting parties to
read contracts before signing them); Jones v. Asgrow Seed Co., 749 F. Supp. 836,838 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (finding that seller of seed had no affirmative duty to point out clause limiting
remedies for breach to experienced farmer who purchased tomato seed with latent defect);
United Van Lines v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 283,288 (W.D. Wash.
1989) (rejecting claim of unconscionability by renter of truck who admitted to not reading
the clearly worded reverse-side terms despite a front-side reference to the reverse-side
terms); Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Campney, 357 N.W2d 613, 619 (Iowa 1984)
(refusing to impose upon lender a "quasi-fiduciary duty" to give customer notice of every
provision in mortgage that might prove disadvantageous even though contract was adhe-
sive in nature when parties had opportunity to read contract and consult lawyer before
closing). But see Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(reasoning that "before a contracting party with the immense bargaining power of the Mo-
bil Oil Corporation may limit its liability vis-a-vis an uncounseled [practically illiterate]
layman... it has an affirmative duty to obtain the voluntary, knowing assent of the other
party").
317. In John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1571 (D. Kan. 1986),
the court found that the liquidated damages clause and other terms on the back side of a
lease were in very light-colored fine print that allowed darker front-side print to show
through and rendered the back side nearly illegible. The print was so light that it could not
be photocopied, and the original was readable by the court only with the aid of a magnify-
ing glass. Id. The court also found the terms, once read, to be so complex as to suggest
that the meaning was intended to be obscure. Id. See also Frank's Maintenance & Eng'g,
Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding that the sole
front-side reference to the back-side terms was stamped over so as to render it illegible and
that the instructions otherwise addressed only the need to review the order terms on front
side).
318. A&M Produce, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117. The court disregarded FMC's contention
that the contract could be negotiated in special circumstances because A&M Produce was
not informed of the option. Id. at 125.
319. The first bidder was Decco Equipment Company, which estimated a price of
$60,000 to $68,000 for a weight-sizer and cooler. Id. FMC's ultimate price was about half
that amount, but without the cooler. Id. at 117.
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or services,320 A&M Produce involved a plaintiff that could have solic-
ited other bids until it found a transaction that it deemed
satisfactory. 321
One of the best and most thorough discussions of the effect of
alternative sources in a California case is found in Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. Superior Court.322 In Dean Witter the plaintiff was a self-
described sophisticated investor and lawyer who challenged the fee
charged by the defendant upon termination of an investment ac-
count.323 The evidence established that other financial institutions
competed with the defendant and offered investment accounts with-
out the termination fee.324 After surveying unconscionability deci-
sions from within and outside the state, the court concluded that a
showing of alternative sources would not necessarily defeat a claim of
unconscionability. 325 A claim of lack of meaningful choice, however,
would be defeated by a showing of reasonably available alternative
sources with contracts free of the terms claimed to be unconsciona-
ble.326 Given that the burden of proof is on the party claiming uncon-
320. Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (Ct. App. 1987) (claim
of unconscionability in a collision damage waiver provision survived a summary judgment
motion when it was alleged that no alternative existed to purchasing the waiver from the
car rental company); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960) (find-
ing no meaningful choice when all car manufacturers used same warranty provisions);
Art's Flower Shop v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 413 S.E.2d 670, 675 (W. Va. 1991)
(finding that telephone company had monopoly on yellow pages advertising services).
321. Cf U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 279 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that because finance lessee had discussed leasing arrangement with at least one
other finance lessor and was aware of the warranty disclaimer in contract, no procedural
unconscionability was present); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262
Cal. Rptr. 716, 728-31 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the presence of one competing sup-
plier to launch satellite into orbit and the decision of customer to select lower price con-
tract indicated meaningful choice; A&M Produce distinguished on ground that it involved
mass produced item sold by standardized agreement to relatively small party); Premier
Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 644 F. Supp. 1431, 1440 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (applying
California law and observing that apparently nonnegotiable, mutual 30-day termination
clause was not procedurally unconscionable when distributor had alternative product line
choices available and was aware of clause).
322. 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1989).
323. Id. at 791.
324. Id. at 797.
325. Id.
326. Id. See also Spinello v. Amblin Entertainment, 1994 WL 590304, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 29, 1994) (ability of screenwriter to submit script to 70 other producers and to
request changes in submission agreement precluded contract from being unconscionable);
Central Bank v. Kaiperm Santa Clara Fed. Credit Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 262,274 (Ct. App.
1987) (holding that because the money order agency business was highly competitive and
the agent had alternative sources, meaningful choice existed even though the bank would
not negotiate its indemnification clause); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 1061, 1068
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scionability,327 the plaintiff in A&M Produce should have been
required to show more to establish lack of meaningful choice. The
A&M Produce opinion focused entirely on the disparity in size of the
parties and the fionnegotiability of terms and never inquired into the
possibility of alternative sources. Furthermore, the facts give no indi-
cation that the buyer was precluded from shopping for better terms
because of a monopoly, oligopoly, or particular circumstances such as
limited economic choices, 328 emergency circumstances, 329 or overtly
misleading conduct.330
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding no lack of meaningful choice when goods financed were not
rare or much sought after and buyer alleging unconscionability failed to allege that all area
lumber yards offered substantially similar terms).
327. See, e.g., Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781,793-94 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the burden of proof is on the party asserting unconscionability to prove the
elements); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 133, 144-45
(W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that burden was on party asserting unconscionability to show
absence of alternatives including whether foregoing the transaction was a realistic option).
328. In Patterson v. T Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-66 (Ct. App.
1993), the court found that the plaintiff borrowers were people of "modest" economic
means, some self-employed and others jobless, who responded to advertisements of "guar-
anteed loans" reasonably believing they would not qualify for conventional loans. The
court therefore held that the loan agreements calling for arbitration of disputes to be held
in Minnesota were presumptively unconscionable. I& at 567. In Northwest Acceptance
Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719,720-21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), the lessee was
in danger of having paving equipment repossessed after falling behind in payments because
of the expense of making repairs on the same equipment that had been delivered in defec-
tive condition. The court held a revised lease unconscionable because it was presented
under circumstances in which the party could either sign immediately or have the equip-
ment taken away. Id,
329. In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778-79 (Ct. App. 1976), the
patient was presented with a form entitled "Conditions of Admission," while being admit-
ted to the hospital designated by his doctor. The court noted that in such cases, the patient
normally goes to the hospital selected by his doctor without a feeling that he has a choice
of institutions. Id at 786. The court also found that hospital admission is likely to be an
anxious, stressful, and frequently traumatic experience. Id. See also Germantown Mfg.
Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that a confession of
judgment against embezzler husband was unconscionable when the employer from whom
he had embezzled had wife sign the judgment without consulting an attorney, while she
was recovering from a miscarriage, and believing her signature was necessary to keep her
husband out of jail). Compare Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1185-86
(Cal. 1976), in which the court distinguished other medical arbitration cases in that the
plaintiff could have elected in advance of the particular treatment to participate in alterna-
tive medical plans that did not include the challenged arbitration provisions. Similarly, the
court in Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 853-54 (Ct. App. 1993), found no unconscio-
nability when the medical arbitration agreement was signed in a post-surgery visit under
non-emergency conditions, with forms that were clearly worded, and the patient could
have chosen a different physician for post-operative care.
330. See Bank of Indiana v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 105-06 (S.D. Miss. 1979), in
which an experienced dairy farmer with an eighth-grade education and his wife with a high
school education signed a dairy cow leasing contract. The contract was contained in a nine-
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Even assuming a degree of unfair surprise or lack of choice, the
question remains whether the provision excluding consequential dam-
ages was so one-sided as to run afoul of Section 2-302. If confronted
with sellers of farm equipment who were unwilling to accept responsi-
bility for lost crops, A&M would have the options of obtaining crop
insurance, if available, taking all possible steps to minimize the risk of
crop loss, or foregoing the transaction altogether. The decision to
purchase less complex equipment from the lower bidder indicates that
A&M was willing to accept some risk. As the court noted, the U.C.C.
does allow for exclusion of commercial consequential damages under
some circumstances; therefore such an exclusion cannot be considered
per se unconscionable.3 31 Further, much of contract law involves deci-
sions about allocation of risks, and the risk involved necessarily affects
the price that one party will pay and that the other party will demand.
When the parties have made a bargain assigning risks, other Califor-
nia courts have been reluctant to alter the agreement. 332
A &M Produce follows the Graham precedent that licenses courts
to go to great length to find unconscionability in merchants' contracts.
The succor given to A&M is out of line with the legislative intent be-
hind Section 2-302 to give primary protection to consumers333 and the
reasoning in even the most liberal of the early California cases that
protected consumers in circumstances in which they arguably did not
have a meaningful chance to protect themselves.334 The case also runs
counter to the majority of opinions from other jurisdictions enforcing
page packet, and the farmer and his wife signed while standing out in their front yard, with
the agent's assurance that the contract was a "good lease" and that the lessor would ar-
range for insurance. Id. at 106. The court noted that the contract was so complex that a
party without legal training could not have understood the disadvantages it contained. Id.
at 108. The leased cows proved to be underinsured after a tornado struck the dairy farm,
killing many cows and effectively putting the farmer out of business. Id. at 107. The court
found the contract to be unconscionable. Id. at 108.
331. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1990).
332. See Markborough California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 919, 927 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that when a party agrees to assume the risk of most of the economic
loss that might occur, either "knowingly or simply because it failed to read the contract,"
no justification exists for shifting the loss to the other party when neither agreed to assume
it nor was compensated for such assumption); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716, 731 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a mutual release leaving the
buyer to obtain private insurance in the event of rocket failure was a reasonable arrange-
ment); Central Bank v. Kaiperm Santa Clara Fed. Credit Union, 236 Cal. Rptr. 262, 274
(Ct. App. 1987) (holding that an indemnification clause in a money order agency agree-
ment placing the risk of stolen money orders on the agent was a reasonable risk allocation
in light of the agent's physical control and ability to obtain insurance against theft).
333. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 173-218 and accompanying text.
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limitations on liability for consequential damages caused by breach of
warranty, particularly with farm-related products that can be affected
by the inherent uncertainties in agricultural endeavors.3 35 Indeed,
given the variable nature inherent in farming and many other indus-
tries, it would be surprising if parties did not attempt to exclude conse-
quential damages.336
It is also hard to reconcile A&M Produce with other California
decisions, such as Nunes Turfgrass, Inc. v. Vaughan-Jacklin Seed Co.337
In Nunes Turfgrass the plaintiff was a sod grower who occasionally
also packaged and sold a retail line of seed mixes in its seven Califor-
nia stores.3 38 For almost 20 years, the plaintiff purchased seed for re-
sale and for sod production from the defendant, Vaughan-Jacklin Seed
Company, one of the largest seed companies in the world.339 The
plaintiff requested a special seed product from the defendffnt that
would yield a hardier and more drought-resistant type of sod and the
335. See e.g., Southland Farms, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 575 So. 2d 1077, 1080-81
(Ala. 1991) (exclusion of consequential damages in sale of herbicide is accepted method of
risk allocation and not unconscionable given the numerous factors affecting crop yield that
are within the control of the customer and not the manufacturer); Monsanto Agric. Prod-
ucts Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding exclusion of
consequential damages for breach of warranty in sale of herbicide); Martin Rispens & Son
v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1087 (Ind. 1993) (exclusion of consequential damages
even for latent defects in seed would not be unconscionable if parties were aware of the
risk).
336. See e.g., Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that decision of herbicide manufacturer to limit damages "would serve, in the absence of
other evidence, abundantly to fill the risk-allocation function because the uncertainties
inherent in the agricultural business are legion, and many of them, such as planting, culti-
vating, harvesting, and marketing decisions, are uniquely within the control of the
farmer"); Jim Dan, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 785 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (W.D. Pa. 1992)
(observing that limitations of damages in sale of herbicide was reasonable in light of busi-
ness uncertainties); Golden Reward Mining Co. v. Jervis B. Webb Co., 772 F. Supp. 1118,
1125 (D.S.D. 1991) (noting that in the sale of a prototypical mining machine, the failure to
exclude consequential damages would have been surprising); United Van Lines v. Hertz
Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (accepting that
truck rental companies would reasonably exclude liability for damage to property in rental
trucks to avoid open ended liability); Fox Elec. Co. v. Tone Guard Security, Inc., 861
S.W.2d 79, 83 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that considering the modest monthly service
charge, it was reasonable that a burglar alarm contract would limit liability; customer could
have obtained insurance from the company or from other sources). But see Discount
Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 422-26 (Wis. 1984)
(rejecting a claim that a telephone company's limitation of liability for breach of contract
was reasonable and not unconscionable because of alleged need to avoid open ended
claims for damages; asserting that company could absorb liability for small number of
claims from less than 1% of customers whose ads contained errors).
337. 246 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1988).
338. Id. at 825.
339. Id.
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defendant eventually developed and produced a new variety of seed
that would supposedly meet the plaintiff's needs.340 The seed was sold
to the plaintiff and was planted for sod but proved to be defective.
341
The court determined that the defendant had breached both an ex-
press warranty and an implied warranty of fitness for particular pur-
pose.342 The critical question was the enforceability of a provision in
the contract that limited liability for breach to return of the purchase
price of the seed and thereby excluded consequential damages.
343
The Nunes Turfgrass plaintiff sought to have the defendant's dis-
claimer of warranties declared unconscionable. 3 4 The trial court de-
termined that the limitation on liability was not unconscionable,
relying in large part on the fact that the plaintiff was familiar with the
damage limitation and had, in fact, included similar language in its
own co'htracts when selling its retail line of seed.345 The appellate
court underscored the observation that both parties were merchants
who should be deemed to have knowingly allocated the risk in the
manner the contract stated.346 The end result was that recovery was
limited to the purchase price of the seed.347
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 835-36.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 832-33.
345. Id. at 836.
346. Id. at 825.
347. Id. at 837. There are similar cases in which the California courts have been un-
sympathetic to merchants in the face of large losses because of breach. See U.S. Roofing,
Inc. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 279 Cal. Rptr. 533, 535, 544-45 (Ct. App. 1991) ("hell or high
water" clause disclaiming all warranties between merchant lessee and financing lessor was
not unconscionable provided the lessee had recourse against the manufacturer or supplier
for any defect in the equipment); West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574-76 (Ct. App.
1991) (finding no unconscionability for a commercial lessee when counterclaims were dis-
missed because of a six-month contractual limitations period on lessee claims because (1)
the lessee had the opportunity to read the contract and (2) the imbalance in the limitations
period could be justified by lessor's need to keep the property free of pending litigation);
Markborough California, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 277 Cal. Rptr. 919, 927 (Ct. App. 1991)
(clause limiting an engineering company's liability for breach to the greater of $50,000 or
the consulting fee of $67,640 was not unconscionable, despite more than $5 million in dam-
ages, when the parties were dealing at arm's length and the client had an opportunity to
accept, reject, or modify the terms of the agreement); Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716,728-31 (Ct. App. 1989) (mutual damage waiver clause in
a contract for use of a rocket to lift a communications satellite was not unconscionable
when satellite did not reach its desired orbit, thereby rendering it useless at a loss of $105
million on a $15 million contract because: (1) both parties were sophisticated businesses;
(2) the parties negotiated the contract rather than used a pre-printed form; (3) the parties
had previously dealt with each other involving similar clauses; and (4) the buyer could have
purchased a rocket from an alternative supplier).
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While there are cases in other jurisdictions reaching a different
result,348 Nunes Turfgrass seems to implement the goals of Section 2-
302 by not disturbing the allocation of risk based simply on some ine-
quality of bargaining power. As the court in Nunes Turfgrass under-
scored, the risk that the seeds might be defective was implicitly, if not
explicitly, on the bargaining table along with the seller's indication
that it did not wish to serve the role of insurer should the seeds prove
defective; the case might have been decided differently if the risk of
defect had been less apparent.349 The anticipated outcome of the ar-
rangement should have been that the buyer take precautions to guard
against consequential financial loss should the seeds prove defective,
perhaps by obtaining private insurance or through some other means.
While the Nunes Turfgrass court did cite A&M Produce as well, it
relied on other cases.350 The court could possibly have distinguished
Nunes Turfgrass from A&M Produce on the grounds that the buyer
was a "larger player" who had experience with the type of contracts in
question. However, the buyer in A&M Produce was also an exper-
ienced farmer of some size, and it is difficult to imagine that he did not
have experience purchasing seed and farm equipment with contracts
containing limitations similar to those in the FMC contract. Ulti-
mately, in contrast to A&M Produce, the fact that the seller was much
larger than the buyer did not induce the Nunes Turfgrass court to ig-
nore the fact that the buyer was still a merchant.
The determination of the court in A&M Produce to find uncon-
scionability in order to protect the merchant-farmer epitomizes the
concerns voiced in 1962 when the California Legislature first declined
348. See, e.g., Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988); Hanson v. Funk Seeds
Int'l, 373 N.W.2d 30 (S.D. 1985). In Hanson the South Dakota Supreme Court held that a
limitation on liability for consequential damages was unconscionable because it left the
buyer without a minimum adequate remedy for the seller's breach. Hanson, 373 N.W.2d at
35. Subsequent to Hanson, the South Dakota Legislature passed a legislative enactment
"abrogating" the Hanson decision. Schmaltz, 431 N.W.2d at 662-63 (citing Chapter 410 of
the 1986 Session Laws of the South Dakota Legislature). Despite the prior expression of
legislative intent on the issue, the South Dakota Supreme Court in Schmaltz held that the
exclusion of consequential damages was unconscionable because the cause of action arose
prior to the legislative abrogation of Hanson and no intent was apparent to apply the law
retroactively. Id. at 663. In Hanson and Schmaltz there was, of course, the remedy of
return of the seed purchase price. The South Dakota Supreme Court apparently deemed
this remedy to be inadequate.
349. Compare Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296,301 (6th Cir. 1985), in which
the seller of seed decided to discontinue a 26-year practice of treating cabbage seed for
latent fungus, buyers were unaware of the risk and could not have appreciated what the
discontinuance of the treatment would mean.
350. Nunes Turfgrass, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 833-35.
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to adopt Section 2-302. A&M Produce, in tandem with Graham, sent
California courts down an uncertain path with regard to the uncon-
scionability doctrine. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures built on these
two cases as a third and recent illustration of the capricious applica-
tion of the doctrine.
(3) Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
No unconscionability case has generated more interest in the
state of California than the recent trial court decision in Buchwald v.
Paramount Pictures Corp.351 The case drew much media attention be-
cause of the prominence of the parties involved and because it
presented a challenge to accepted Hollywood motion picture industry
practices concerning contracts and accounting. The judge, sitting
without a jury, ultimately decided that the accounting provisions in
the contracts were unconscionable. 352
While the court effectively addressed several issues in applying
the unconscionability doctrine,353 the court misapplied the doctrine in
several significant respects: the court was overprotective of merchants
in finding procedural unconscionability based on inequality of bar-
gaining power; the presence of substantive unconscionability was
questionable and inadequately addressed; the court improperly used
hindsight to assess the contract; and the ultimate remedy granted in-
volved the court's substitution of its own judgment for that of the par-
ties about the value of the exchange.
351. No. C706083 (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990) [herein-
after Buchwald (First Phase)]. The trial court issued three Statements of Decision: First
Phase on Jan. 8, 1990, which decided that the movie was based on Buchwald's treatment;
Second Phase on Dec. 21, 1990, which decided that certain terms in the net profit participa-
tion agreement were unconscionable; and Third Phase on March 16, 1992, which decided
the amount of damages due to Buchwald and Bernheim under the reformed contract. All
the decisions are reprinted in FATAL SUBnTr1cIoN, supra note 2 as appendices. One
writer has gone so far as to call Buchwald the case of the decade in Hollywood. Kathleen
Neumeyer, The Courtship of Eddie's Money, L.A. MAG., July 1992, at 66. The continued
interest in the case is reflected in the number of parties filing amicus briefs in the appeal:
the Producers Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, the Authors Guild, and the
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists on behalf of Buchwald; and the Cali-
fornia Chamber of Commerce, the California Merchants Association, the American Book
Publishers, and the Alliance of Motion Picture & Television Producers on behalf of Para-
mount. See Kathleen O'Steen, "Coming" Process Winds Down, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 5,
1994, at 5.
352. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *24.
353. The court correctly rejected the argument that a term, rather than the contract as
a whole, could not be found unconscionable, properly concluded that a price term could be
unconscionable, and adeptly addressed the issue of whether the doctrine was improperly
used in an offensive rather than defensive manner. Id. at *6-10, *13-22.
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The lead plaintiff in the case was Art Buchwald, a widely syndi-
cated columnist, author, and Pulitzer Prize winner, who has been de-
scribed as America's most popular humorist.3 54 Buchwald prepared
and eventually submitted to Paramount Pictures in March 1982 a brief
proposal for a movie ultimately entitled King for A Day.355 Buchwald
had first submitted his proposal to Alain Bernheim, a friend and
movie producer, who submitted the story to Paramount executives as
a proposed project for Paramount movie star, Eddie Murphy.
356
Buchwald had previously sold stories to Hollywood studios 357 and was
represented by his own agent.3 58 The producer, Bernheim, retained as
counsel an executive vice president of the William Morris Agency.359
In early 1983 Paramount and Bernheim entered into an agree-
ment for Bernheim to produce the movie if Paramount acquired
Buchwald's idea.360 Shortly thereafter, Paramount entered into an
agreement directly with Buchwald for an option on the story.361 After
several failed attempts to obtain an acceptable script, Paramount sur-
rendered its option on the story in April 1985, thereby giving Bern-
heim the right to offer the movie concept to other studios.
362
354. See FATAL SuBTRAcroN, supra note 2, at xxi, xxiii.
355. Buchwald's treatment was inspired by his observation of protests aimed at the
Shah of Iran during the tenure of President Jimmy Carter. It began as an eight-page treat-
ment entitled, It's a Crude, Crude World, but Buchwald reduced the treatment to two and
one-half pages and changed the principal character to a black man at the recommendation
of friends in Hollywood. Paramount changed the title to King for a Day when the treat-
ment was put into development by the studio. See Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL
357611, at *1; FATAL SUBTRAcTiON, supra note 2, at 528-29.
356. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *1.
357. See FATAL SUTR=AcrioN, supra note 2, at xxiv. Buchwald had sold a number of
story ideas to Hollywood studios that were ultimately not made into movies, and he had
sold production rights to a novel he had authored that was made into a movie. Id Buch-
wald had written about movies and movie stars and knew a good many people in the movie
business. Id As his lawyer stated, "Art Buchwald was no stranger to the world of mov-
ies." Id
358. Buchwald was represented formally by the Sterling Lord Agency in New York
City in his negotiations first with Bernheim and then with Paramount. See Petition to
Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 4, 11, Buchwald (Second Phase) (Apr. 11, 1991).
359. Bernheim was represented by Roger Davis, chair of the executive committee at
the William Morris Agency and a former entertainment lawyer. FATAL SUBTRA TiON,
supra note 2, at 53-54. Because of the relationship of the Buchwald and Berheim contracts,
Davis in effect represented both parties. At the time, the William Morris Agency was
reportedly "the most powerful literary and talent agency in the industry." Douglas Karl,
Buchwald v. Paramount: Minding Hollywood's Business, ENT. L. REP., May 1991, at 3.
360. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *1.
361. Id. Buchwald's initial contract was with Bernheim for the same terms as he later
accepted with Paramount, $65,000 plus 1 1/2% net profit. Petition to Court of Appeal for
Writ of Mandate at 13, Buchwald (Second Phase).
362. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *2-6.
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Buchwald and Bernheim succeeded in selling the idea to Warner
Brothers in 1986, but Warner Brothers abandoned the project in 1988
after it became known that Paramount and Eddie Murphy were film-
ing a movie with similarities to Buchwald's King for a Day.3 6 3 The
Paramount movie was filmed and released as Coming to America364
and eventually became one of the top grossing movies of 1988, earn-
ing more than $350 million.365
Buchwald and Bernheim sued for breach of contract on the the-
ory that the contracts required compensation if Paramount made a
movie "based on" Buchwald's story idea and that Coming to America
was based on Buchwald's invention.366 In the first phase of the pro-
ceedings, the court decided that Coming to America was indeed based
on the Buchwald idea.367 Thereafter, the focus of the court shifted to
the compensation the plaintiffs should receive under the contracts
with Paramount.368 The contracts provided for payment of up-front
fees amounting to $265,000 and percentages of net profits in the
amount of 1.5% for Buchwald and at least 17.5% for Bernheim.369
Paramount accountants calculated that the movie lost $18 million
363. Id. at *6.
364. CoMING TO AMERICA (Paramount 1988).
365. See Larry Rohter, Judge Rejects Paramount Request, But Buchwald Hasn't Won
Yet, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1991, at Cl1.
366. The plaintiffs did not proceed on a theory of copyright infringement because
Buchwald's treatment was not sufficiently developed to serve as an adequate basis for an
allegation that a "story," as opposed to an "idea," had been stolen by Paramount. FATAL
SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 18-19. Moreover, the attorneys for Buchwald concluded
that there were more dissimilarities than similarities between Buchwald's treatment and
Murphy's movie. Id.
367. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *14. The trial court noted that there
were substantial differences between King for a Day and Coming to America, but also
found many similarities between the two works, as originally written and as developed by
Paramount before abandoning the project. Id- at *11-14. The court also found significance
in the access many relevant parties had to Buchwald's idea, including Eddie Murphy and
John Landis who was considered as director of King for a Day and in fact served as direc-
tor of Coming to America. Id. at *8-9.
368. In the first phase of the case, the trial court rejected claims on various tort theo-
ries offered by Buchwald and Bernheim, including bad faith denial of contract, tortious
breach of the duty of good faith, and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at *14. Buchwald and
Bernheim apparently hoped to get punitive damages. The court determined that there was
no showing of fraud, oppression or malice, or other tortious conduct that would warrant
the award of punitive damages. Id. Thus, Paramount was granted judgment on the tort
claims leaving only the damages for breach of contract to be determined. Id.
369. FATAL SUBTRACnoN, supra note 2, at xxv. Buchwald was to get $65,000, 1 1/2%
of the net profits, and a screen credit if Paramount made the movie. Id. Bernheim was to
receive $200,000 if the film was made and a percentage of the net profits that started at
40%, but was reducible to 17.5% if actors, directors, or writers were later given a share of
the net profits. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 557 app. C, n.2.
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under the net profits formula even though the movie grossed over
$350 million.370 Accounting experts consulted by the plaintiffs veri-
fied that, because of the enormous cost of producing the movie in con-
junction with the contract definition of net profits, there were no net
profits under the contract.371 Buchwald and Bernheim then chal-
lenged the net profit agreement on a number of grounds, including the
theory that its provisions were unconscionable, with the goal of ob-
taining a share of the profits once the allegedly improper provisions
were struck from the contract.3 72
Following the Graham approach, the court first analyzed whether
the agreements between Paramount and the plaintiffs were contracts
of adhesion. 373 The court noted that the amount of up-front fees and
the percentage of net profits had been negotiated by the parties. 374
370. Petition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 11, Buchwald (Second Phase).
371. FATAL SUBTRAMCnON, supra note 2, at 358-59. The experts consulted by the plain-
tiffs' attorneys verified that because the general production and distribution costs were
extremely high (over $75 million) and because Eddie Murphy and John Landis received
relatively large "gross" profit participation agreements as the star and director, the movie
was destined to never generate any net profits under the contracts. Id See also John H.
Richardson, Paramount, Buchwald and the Profit Question; Attorneys Trade Gibes over
Studio's Figures, WASH. PosT, Mar. 26, 1990, at B1 (giving the following breakdown of the
allocation of the first $250 million box office receipts made by Coming to America: $125
million to theaters, $42.3 million standard distribution fee for studio, $36.2 million actual
deducted distribution fee, $6.4 million in interest charges, $48 million to make movie, and
$11 million in gross profit participation for the lead actor, Eddie Murphy, and the director,
John Landis, thus producing deficit of about $18 million).
372. Apart from unconscionability, other issues raised in the second phase included
allegations that Bernheim and Paramount were co-venturers, that Paramount breached its
fiduciary duty to Bernheim, that Paramount breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and that Paramount breached an express term requiring consultation with
Bernheim before granting profit participation to other parties. FATAL SUmTRACrION,
supra note 2, at 541-42 app. B. The co-venturer and fiduciary duty issues were rendered
moot by the finding that there was no tortious conduct, except that Paramount was
deemed to have a duty under the contract to render an abcounting. Id. at 554. After it had
found some key contract provisions to be unconscionable, the court deemed it unnecessary
to decide whether there was also breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or the express consultation clause because such findings would not change the rem-
edies. Id.
373. Id. at 542-43. The contracts consisted of several components: a memorandum
agreement reflecting the negotiated agreement for the up-front fees and percentage rate of
net profits as well as other standard terms, a "turnaround" agreement setting up terms for
the studio to return rights to the producer if the project should be abandoned, a document
containing "Additional Terms and Conditions," and a net profit participation agreement.
Id at 542.
374. Id. at 542. In the negotiations, Bernheim's agent started by asking for a fixed fee
of $200,000 plus 50% of net profits. Ultimately, the parties agreed to a fixed fee of
$150,000 that increased to $200,000 based upon Bernheim receiving credit as producer on
another film in the interim plus 40% of net profits, reducible to 17.5% based on shares that
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The court also noted that Paramount was willing to negotiate the man-
ner in which net profits would be calculated with a small of number of
persons in the industry who possessed the necessary "clout," but
deemed any such changes to be "cosmetic rather than substantive. '375
Ultimately, the court relied on Graham for the proposition that a con-
tract can still be adhesive even though some of the terms are
negotiable.376
The court noted that, under Graham, the finding that the con-
tracts were adhesive was just the beginning of the analysis and consid-
ered whether the contracts were also unconscionable. 377 The court
quickly acknowledged that Buchwald and Bernheim could not
demonstrate procedural unconscionability through surprise.378 The
court then raised the possibility of procedural unconscionability
through "oppression" or "absence of meaningful choice. '3
79
Although never expressly stated, the court apparently concluded that
there was a lack of meaningful choice based on the same facts and
reasoning used to determine that the contracts were adhesive.3
80
The court proceeded to consider whether the net profits formula
was substantively unconscionable. Paramount argued that the net
profits agreement should be viewed in the context of the whole con-
tract as a means of allocating revenues, taking into account the fixed
compensation received by the plaintiffs and not evaluated as a separa-
ble term.381 After asserting, quite correctly, that Section 2-302 allows
for a contract to be found unconscionable either in whole or in part,
the court chose to examine the separate terms and identified seven
might be given to others in the project. See Petition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Man-
date at 14, Buchwald (Second Phase).
375. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 543-52 app. B.
376. Id. (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172 (Cal. 1990)).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 545. In the Buchwald case, as in Graham, the doctrine of reasonable expec-
tations was of no assistance because the complaining parties were quite familiar with the
terms of the contract. See supra notes 252-253, 264-265 and accompanying text.
379. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 545 app. B.
380. The court cited A&M Produce for a definition of oppression as involving "an ine-
quality of bargaining power," "no real negotiation," and "an absence of meaningful
choice," but abruptly shifted to a discussion of substantive unconscionability without ap-
plying the standard. Id. at 546. In a later portion of the opinion, the court indicated its
view that the plaintiffs were forced to accept Paramount's terms in order to obtain the
contract although not formally stating that it constituted procedural unconscionability. Il
at 548.
381. FATAL SUBTRACrION, supra note 2, at 550 app. B.
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provisions that it deemed unconscionable. 38 The seven provisions
each granted Paramount the ability to charge, as an expense against
gross profit, items that the court deemed "overly harsh" and "one-
sided."3 83
After ruling that the contract terms were unconscionable, the
trial court announced that it would use its powers under Section 2-302
to produce an equitable result by determining an award of damages
that would be fair and reasonable for Buchwald and Bernheim.384 In
the third phase of the trial, Buchwald and Bemheim offered evidence
that the combined award for the plaintiffs should be $6.2 million.3 85
Paramount countered with evidence supporting a maximum combined
award of approximately $430,000.386 The court found Paramount's ev-
idence to be more persuasive, but declined to accept the evidence of
either party as conclusive. The court did allow the parties' estimates
to establish the "high and low" range in which an award would be
made.38 7 The court considered a number of factors in determining the
fair amount of compensation, including the inexact stipulation that the
movie had made "tens of millions of dollars," the testimony from Par-
amount's witnesses that was most favorable to Buchwald and Bern-
heim, the uniqueness of Buchwald's concept and the fact that
382. Paramount initially declined to address the issue of unconscionability of the indi-
vidual provisions on the ground that the agreement must be considered as a whole. After
the trial court's ruling on unconscionability in the second phase of the trial, Paramount
sought to challenge the court's finding that the seven provisions were unconscionable. Pe-
tition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 19, Buchwald (Second Phase). The trial
court, however, rejected the arguments made by Paramount about the seven provisions,
"saying he would not allow himself to be manipulated into reconsidering his earlier ruling
that the standard movie studio contract is inherently unfair." Rohter, supra note 365. See
also FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 482-83.
383. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 550 app. B. The seven provisions found to
be unconscionable were, briefly stated: 1) charging 15% overhead on operating expense
allowances for the lead actor's production company; 2) a flat 10% charge for advertising
overhead without relation to actual expense; 3) a flat 15% charge for overhead without
relation to actual expense; 4) charging interest based on expenses on an accrual basis while
accounting for income on a cash basis; 5) charging interest on overhead; 6) charging inter-
est on profit participation payments before the payments are actually made; and 7) charg-
ing interest rates not in proportion to the actual cost of funds. Id.
384. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 551 app. B. The court rejected a proposal
advanced by counsel for Buchwald and Bernheim that they should be given the stated
percentage of net profits after the court made allowance for Paramount's "actual" costs
plus a reasonable rate of return on its investment. Id The court rejected the proposal
because it was likely to lead to a windfall for the plaintiffs of compensation far beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. Id. at 551-52.
385. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 556 app. C.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 556-58.
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Bernheim had control of it, the compensation paid to producers on
five comparable films, and the fact that Buchwald was a nationally-
known humorist who would have brought additional media attention
to the film if he had received credit for the story.388 The court then
decided, with very little elaboration, that the appropriate compensa-
tion for the parties was $750,000 for Bernheim and $150,000 for Buch-
wald.389 Not only does the court's obscure basis for fixing the amount
of compensation cause concern, but the basic determination of uncon-
scionability also is highly questionable.
The Buchwald court followed the reasoning of Graham in finding
procedural unconscionability, concluding that the contract terms were
adhesive even though critical provisions of the agreement were nego-
tiated by the parties, such as the up-front fee and the percentage of
net profit sharing. Notably, the Buchwald court had less basis for its
decision than the court in Graham because even the net profit formula
and other key terms at issue in Buchwald were subject to negotiation
by artists with sufficient "clout," 390 whereas the arbitration clause at
issue in Graham was arguably not subject to negotiation by even the
most successful popular music promoter of the time. Nevertheless,
the Buchwald court decided that because these plaintiffs were not able
to negotiate for better terms, this portion of the agreement was proce-
durally unconscionable because of a lack of meaningful choice. In so
doing, the court lost sight of the explicit admonition in the Official
Comments to Section 2-302 that the purpose of the doctrine is to pre-
vent "oppression and unfair surprise... and not to disturb allocation
of risk because of superior bargaining power. '391 This aspect of the
Buchwald case exemplifies the danger in neglecting a fundamental
principle of the unconscionability doctrine; the mere fact that a con-
388. Id. at 557-60.
389. Id. at 558-60.
390. See Robert A. Seidenberg, More Points to Consider in Film Producer's Agreement,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 9, 1993, at 5. Seidenberg highlights a number of items in a producer's
agreement that are negotiable, including gross and net participation agreements, screen
and advertising credit, involvement in sequels, and actual level of involvement in the mak-
ing of the picture. All of these items are subject to a degree of negotiation depending on
the producer's stature, experience, and deal-making ability. Seidenberg also notes that the
studios differ in their willingness to negotiate these terms. See also Nina J. Easton,
Hollywood's Ledger Domain, L.A. TimEs, Jan. 6, 1991, (Calendar), at 5; Shahram Victory,
Pierce O'Donnell Pans "Fatal Subtraction," AM. LAW., Mar. 1991, at 43 (noting that Eddie
Murphy and John Landis together made $22 million from their gross profit sharing
agreements).
391. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
[Vol. 46
HeinOnline -- 46 Hastings L.J. 530 1994-1995
tract is more favorable to one side than the other, either as a whole or
in part, does not mean that the contract is unconscionable.3 92
The finding of procedural unconscionability also disregarded the
possibility of alternative markets for the script, evidenced by the fact
that the plaintiffs approached several studios with their proposal
before reaching an agreement with Paramount. Moreover, Warner
Brothers purchased the rights to the movie after Paramount aban-
doned the project. Undoubtedly, studios in Hollywood compete for
movie ideas and talent, partly by making different profit sharing
agreements with those possessing "clout. '393 As the court noted in
Dean Witter Reynolds, the presence of alternative options for the
weaker party undercuts an argument for lack of meaningful choice.394
The burden should have been on Buchwald and Bernheim to show
not only that they did not possess the clout to obtain concessions from
Paramount in the net profit arrangement, but also that other avenues
were foreclosed. Considering that the Buchwald case falls among
those in which the contract was not made out of necessity, but instead
involved a profit-making venture, Buchwald and Bernheim could have
refrained from entering into the contract and could have continued
shopping if they were unhappy with the Paramount offer.395
The finding of substantive unconscionability in Buchwald is also
dubious. The court essentially found that the contracts undercompen-
sated Buchwald and Bernheim in an unconscionable fashion through a
one-sided calculation of net profit.396 Given that Buchwald had mini-
mal involvement in the subsequent efforts to turn his idea into a
screenplay,397 the reasonable value of his two-and-one-half page
movie treatment is debatable, even if it had led to the most successful
movie of all time.398 A Paramount executive testified that, over a ten-
year period, the Buchwald "treatment," as opposed to a screenplay or
392. See supra note 69-71 and accompanying text.
393. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Coming to America: The End of Contracts, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 9, 1991, at A10.
394. See supra note 322-326.
395. See Crovitz, supra note 393 (commenting that with the degree of open competi-
tion for ideas that exists among film studios "no one at the negotiating table pointed a gun
at Mr. Buchwald" to force him to enter into the contract).
396. After determining that the net profit participation agreement was unconscionable,
the court clearly indicated that its task was to increase the compensation to Buchwald and
Bernheim, but without giving them a windfall. FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 550-
51 app. B.
397. See FATAL SUBTRACTiON, supra note 2, at xxv.
398. Compare the outcome in Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
in which the court noted the uncertainty in the popular music industry and the high risk of
failure of new performers in finding management contracts not unconscionable, even
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story, was the only one optioned by Paramount. 399 Similarly, the
value of services of a movie producer are subjective, especially in light
of the fact that multiple producers may be involved and their actual
contributions to the movie may vary.400 Bernheim, in fact, was to
serve as an executive producer, responsible for "bringing the right
people together, but not actually supervising production."' o Consis-
tent with these observations, one Hollywood dealmaker has suggested
that the up-front fees received by Bernheim and Buchwald were lu-
crative at the time the option was formed, indicating that those parties
had advantages over many others attempting to sell relatively meager
movie proposals in Hollywood.402
Ultimately, Paramount and other major studios40 3 have limited
the price paid for services of writers, producers, and other artists
through a skewed definition of net profits that makes such profits un-
likely in most cases.404 An arrangement to share net profits has never
meant the same thing in Hollywood that it has meant in general us-
age,40 5 and participants in the motion picture industry have long been
aware that few movies yield net profits under the scheme.406 The lack
of profit-generating movies led Eddie Murphy to describe net profits
though they were deemed by the court to be "hard bargains," reflecting the fact that new
artists had little bargaining power over fairly standard industry terms.
399. Buchwald (First Phase), 1990 WL 357611, at *3.
400. See Seidenberg, supra note 390, at 5.
401. Petition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 13-14, Buchwald (Second
Phase) (citing deposition of Roger Davis, agent for Bernheim).
402. Kari, supra note 359, at 6 n.61 (citing Peter Dekom, a longtime movie dealmaker).
403. The Buchwald court found that practically all movie studios used the very same
net profit definition agreement. FATAL SUBTRACrION, supra note 2, at 543. But cf. Sei-
denberg, supra note 390. Seidenberg specifically disagrees with the Buchwald opinion by
noting that the studios differ in their willingness to negotiate net participation terms
although substantial changes "are unusual." Id.
404. See FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 411 (quoting Mel Sattler, Hollywood
studio lawyer for more than 40 years, in explaining the development of "Hollywood ac-
counting" as a means of studios protecting themselves against losing movies in the face of
proliferating profit participation demands by actors, writers, directors, etc.); Kari, supra
note 359.
405. Mel Sattler explained at trial that the seminal profit participation agreement was
between the actor James Stewart and Universal Pictures. Even under that agreement,
however, Stewart's 50% of net profit began only after Universal had recouped twice the
movie's production costs. FATAL SUBTRAcrIoN, supra note 2, at 411. See also Richardson,
supra note 371 (quoting Brian Walton, executive director of the Screen Writers Guild, as
observing that "net profits" is a misleading term that "does not mean, in the movie busi-
ness, what it may mean in everyday usage").
406. See FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra, note 2, at 53 (quoting Helene Hahn, the attorney
who represented Paramount in negotiating the Bernheim and Buchwald contracts: "[T]he
problem is the gross points.... They gobble up the net. Everyone knows that. It's hardly a
secret."); Kari, supra note 359. See also Crovitz, supra note 393.
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participation as "monkey points" because of the widespread view that
they were seldom paid.407 At the same time, Paramount offered evi-
dence to refute the view that net profit participation was entirely
worthless; Paramount itself had paid more than $150 million of net
profits to eighty-four participants on twenty-nine movies over the pre-
ceding fifteen years.408
Buchwald and Bernheim were astute about the movie industry
and were represented by experienced talent agents. The plaintiffs
were not unrepresented novices who were surprised about the net
profit participation agreement. Thus, Buchwald and Bemheim should
have understood that the compensation for their contributions under
the contract might well be "only" $265,000 if the movie were made.409
Moreover, there is no evidence that, at the time the contracts were
made, Buchwald and Bernheim were dissatisfied with the fixed mone-
tary compensation, the gain in stature that would have come from a
successful project or the uncertain prospect of a share in net profits.410
Another weakness in the Buchwald decision is the court's use of
hindsight to evaluate the agreement; the court seemed influenced by
the eventual production and success of the movie as it affected the net
profit participation agreement. A number of uncertainties were pres-
ent at the time Buchwald and Bernheim signed their contracts, includ-
ing the possibility that the movie would be unsuccessful, even with
Eddie Murphy as the lead actor.411 The parties also could not predict
407. Easton, supra note 390, at 5.
408. See FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 548 app. B. For a list of the movies and
profits generated, see id at 410.
409. See Kari, supra note 359, at 3-4.
410. In his deposition, Roger Davis, the William Morris agent for Bernheim, stated
that if he had thought the deal was unreasonable, he would not have let his client make it.
He further explained why the deal seemed reasonable:
Mr. Bernheim was coming off two unsuccessful pictures which he had produced
or co-produced. He had nothing but a three-page outline by Mr. Buchwald, who
was a personal friend of his, and I had no credentials to go on.... The most
important thing was to make a development deal to get him some up-front money
and to get the project developed into a form where it could be made the basis of a
motion picture.
Petition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 15-16, Buchwald (Second Phase). The
deposition is also partially reprinted in FATAL SUBTRACTIoN, supra note 2, at 405.
411. A number of Eddie Murphy's movies have been considered financial flops in re-
cent years. See John Hart, "Batman" Was No. 1, But "Chocolat" Stayed Here Longer,
SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 28,1990, at Li (noting lack of profit on Murphy movie Harlem Nights
during first year of release); John Lyttie, Film/On Cinema, T-m INDEPENDENT, June 27,
1994, at 8 (attributing lack of financial success of Murphy movies Another 48 Hours,
Boomerang, and The Distinguished Gentleman to the high cost of producing his films);
Candice Russell, Dimming Stars Need Retooling; Eddie Murphy and Macaulay Culkin Ca-
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the total production cost or the eventual profit participation agree-
ments for the star and the director.412 The court's decision, almost ten
years after a contract was made, that the price was too low for a prod-
uct with such a subjective value as a movie concept is a capricious
application of the unconscionability doctrine. Paramount presented
evidence that studios spend millions of dollars annually in develop-
ment of movie ideas that are never produced and that it had, in fact,
spent more than $10 million in 1978 alone on such uncompleted
projects.413 Paramount spent over $500,000 on the King for a Day
development before apparently abandoning the project. 414 Because
the eventual success of a project is difficult to predict, the risk of in-
complete development factors into the value of a movie idea at the
time of formation of the contract.41 5 Despite the various factors listed
by the court, the damage awards seem rather randomly determined
from within the broad high and low range established by the parties.
The indeterminate nature of the court's calculation causes further con-
cern about the appropriate role of the courts in reforming agreements.
Moreover, the Buchwald decision possesses only limited potential
for impact because the studios may well avoid the profit-sharing ar-
rangements altogether or change the contract language to make it
more explicit that "net profit participation" is a. contingent form of
additional compensation beyond any flat fees paid.416 Presumably,
reers Unsettled, S.F. EXAMINER, July 9, 1994, at B7 (noting lack of financial success of
Murphy movie Beverly Hills Cop II1).
412. The lack of net profits for Buchwald and Bernheim was due not only to the terms
of the net profit agreement, but also to the fact that the movie was costly to make and
Murphy and Landis were to receive a share of the gross profits. See FATAL SUBTRACTION,
supra note 2, at 358-59. See also Richardson, supra note 371 (observing that net profits will
generally not be available in a movie when there are big stars who get gross profit partici-
pation and that in Coming to America the star and director shared a full 25% gross
participation).
413. Petition to Court of Appeal for Writ of Mandate at 33, Buchwald (Second Phase).
414. See FATAL SUBTRACTION, supra note 2, at 8-9. Warner Brothers spent $250,000
before it abandoned the project in the face of Murphy's Coming to America. Id. at 9.
415. Cf. Croce v. Kumit, 565 F. Supp. 884,893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (observing that because
of great uncertainties in music business and high risk of failure by new performers, "hard
bargain" contracts distinctly favoring music publishers were not unfair or unconscionable).
416. See Crovitz, supra note 393, at A10 (predicting that the Buchwald ruling will hurt
"little people" because studios will stop offering to them any profit sharing agreements);
Easton, supra note 390, at 5 (citing Mike Simpson, co-chair of William Morris Agency's
motion picture department for the proposition that the studios, at worst, may stop giving
net profit participation on top of fixed fees); Robert A. Welkos & Terry Pristin, Buchwald,
Partner Win $900,000 From Studio, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1992, at B1 (at one studio, lan-
guage referring to gross and net participants was eliminated; instead, the agreements refer
to "contractually defined participation points"; at other studios, net profits have been
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the courts will enforce such contracts if the parties explicitly agree to
fixed compensation only or agree to a form of profit participation that
clearly reveals the unlikelihood of receiving the additional pay.
The wisdom and significance of the decision in Buchwald has
been put in question by the more recent, but less publicized decision
of another California trial court contradicting the key holding in
Buchwald. The court in Batfilm Productions v. Warner Brothers,
Inc.,417 sitting in the same courthouse as the judge in Buchwald, de-
cided that the same net profit participation agreement was not uncon-
scionable in a lawsuit involving similar circumstances. While it is not
unusual for trial courts to disagree, in this instance the conflicting re-
sults reflect the basic difference between the unconventional approach
to merchant claims of unconscionability found in Graham, A&M Pro-
duce, and Buchwald and the more restrained approach found in most
jurisdictions.418 '
The plaintiffs in Bailm Productions were two producers who
purchased the exclusive motion picture rights to the Batman comic
book character in 1979 and then began efforts to produce a movie.
419
Unable to sell the idea to major studios, the plaintiffs entered into a
contract with Casablanca Filmworks Ltd., an influential production
company, in an effort to have the movie made.420 Subsequently, Casa-
blanca entered into an agreement with Warner Brothers to make the
Batman movie, which in turn led to the 1988 contract between the
plaintiffs and Warner Brothers.42 ' The contract provided that the
plaintiffs would receive a fixed fee as well as thirteen percent of the
renamed "net proceeds," "formula break-even points," or "contingent payments"; in some
instances, the change in language predated the Buchwald case).
417. Err. L. REP., Sept. 1994, at 3 (summarizing and reprinting in entirety the trial
court decision in Batfilm Productions v. Warner Brothers, Inc., Nos. BC051653 &
BC051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994) [hereinafter Batfilm Productions].
418. See supra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
419. See Kim Masters, Holy Lawsuit, 'Batman', WASH. POsT, Mar. 27, 1992, at B1 (re-
porting that the plaintiffs purchased the movie rights to Batman for $50,000 and formed
Batfilm Productions).
420. See id. (reporting that Casablanca was operated by Peter Guber, a major figure in
the motion picture industry who eventually produced Batman with his partner Jon Peters);
Dan Cox, 'Batman' Suit Riddled with Jokers, VARTY, Jan. 17, 1994, at 28 (reporting that
Batfilm was unsuccessful in convincing a major studio to make the movie and thus sought
the assistance of Casablanca and Peter Guber).
421. See David Robb, Warners: 'Bat' Suit 'Frivolous', HOLLYWOOD REP., May 5, 1992
(reporting that the contract between the plaintiffs and Warner Brothers was required as
condition to making the movie); Masters, supra note 419, at B1.
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net profit.422 While the parties disagreed about the total amount of
income, the Batman movie indisputably generated revenues in excess
of $285 million, more than any other movie ever made by Warner
Brothers and one of the biggest box office sellers of all times.423
Warner Brothers paid the plaintiffs a total of $400,000 in fixed-fee
compensation under the contract, but paid no fees to the plaintiffs
under the net profit participation agreement because the movie had
generated a deficit.424
In the first of several similarities with the Buchwald case, the lack
of net profits was caused by high production costs, including gross
profit participation agreements with a number of parties, and by the
unique method of accounting built into the net profit participation
agreement.425 Another parallel with the Buchwald case was the fact
that the contract with Warner Brothers was negotiated for the plain-
tiffs by a sophisticated party-a former general counsel and senior ex-
ecutive of a major motion picture studio who was intimately familiar
with the nature of net profit participation agreements. 426 Yet another
similarity was the fact that one of the plaintiffs had written a memo-
randum that first proposed the general theme of the movie as well as
422. See Batfilm Productions, reprinted in Er. L. REP., Sept. 1994, at 3 (the Warner
agreement provided that the plaintiffs would receive an initial fixed fee of $300,000 for any
Batman movie made and another fee of $100,000 once the movie reached a certain level of
receipts).
423. See Dennis McDougal, A Blockbuster Deficit, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1991, at F1
(ranking Batman as the fifth-highest grossing motion picture in history and the biggest hit
for Warner Brothers of all time); Michael Miller, Warner Sued over 'Batman' Losses,
REUTERS LTD., (Fin. Rep.), Nov. 30,1993 (Batman was alleged by plaintiffs to have made a
total of $1.2 billion in profits from ticket sales, home video sales, and global merchandis-
ing); Pair Wants of Batman's Profits, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 63 (indicating that
Warner Brothers reported $285 million in revenues while the plaintiffs alleged that receipts
were closer to $425 million).
424. Batfilm Productions, reprinted in Err. L. REP., Sept. 1994 (the plaintiffs received
$400,000 in fixed fees for the first Batman movie covered by the agreement and an addi-
tional $700,000 for two subsequent Batman movies made by Warner Brothers that were
not involved in the lawsuit). In addition to suing Warner Brothers, the plaintiffs also sued
PolyGram, the successor corporation to Casablanca, and its executive officers. See David
Robb, Warner Wins 'Total Victory' in Batman Suit, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 25, 1994.
425. See McDougal, supra note 423 (reporting that because of large actual production
cost and gross profit participation granted to actors Jack Nicholson and Michael Keaton,
producers Jon Peters and Peter Guber, and director Tim Burton, the chances of the movie
ever generating net profits were "almost nil" regardless of the gross revenues realized; the
gross profit participation fees for the other parties was estimated to be $60 million of the
first $253.4 million box office sales).
426. Batfilm Productions, reprinted in ENTr. L. REP., Sept. 1994 (plaintiff Benjamin
Melniker was an attorney who had worked for sometime at MGM (Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer) and was described by the court as knowing "all the tricks of the trade" and know-
ing "inside and out how these contracts work").
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the casting of a principal character.427 The most important similarity,
however, was the allegation by the plaintiffs in Bailm that the net
profit participation agreement was unconscionable.428
Despite the many analogous facts and issues, the court in Bafilm
reached a different conclusion about the unconscionability of the net
profit participation agreement and revealed a basic philosophical dif-
ference with the court in Buchwald. Observing that the plaintiffs had
received the proper fixed compensation under the contract and em-
phasizing that the plaintiffs should presumably have understood the
net profit participation agreement because of their negotiator's expe-
rience, the court went on to observe that for four centuries common-
law courts had neither reformed nor refused enforcement to contracts
merely because the exchange might be perceived to be unfair.429 The
court emphasized that for a contract to be unconscionable under Sec-
tion 2-302, it must be "shock the conscience" or be "harsh, oppressive,
and unduly one-sided. ' 430 Thus, the court first ruled that viewing the
contract as a whole, which the Buchwald court declined to do,431 the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the contract was unconscionable. 432
The court's conclusion embodied its view that while the plaintiffs
might be entitled to additional compensation to achieve a perfectly
"fair exchange," the unconscionability doctrine does not mandate that
all contracts be fair.433 The price of $400,000, not much more than the
fixed compensation of $265,000 for the two plaintiffs in Buchwald, was
not deemed unconscionable.
As the Buchwald court had done, the Batfilm court then pro-
ceeded to examine the individual terms of the net profit participation
427. See Robert W. Welkos, 7,vo Producers of 'Batman' Sue Warner, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
27, 1992, at Dl (reporting that plaintiff Michael Ulsan had suggested that the movie return
Batman to his original role as vigilante operating in the shadow of night as well as sug-
gesting that Jack Nicholson be cast as the villain; both ideas were incorporated into the
movie).
428. Baffilm Productions, reprinted in ETr. L. REP., Sept. 1994 (the plaintiffs dropped a
request for an accounting of the revenues and expenses on the first day of trial, leaving
unconscionability as the primary claim).
429. Id. (citing the King's Bench decision in Slade's case in 1602).
430. Id.
431. See supra notes 382-384 and accompanying text.
432. Batfilm Productions, reprinted in ENr. L. REP., Sept. 1994.
433. Id. The court reasoned that "the process making a motion picture consists of the
process of bargaining with many talented people on many different and inconsistent bases,
and making bargains with them that cannot be rationally compared one to another....
Whether a contract is fair is not the issue. A contract is not unconscionable because it is
not fair." Id,
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agreement for unconscionability, 434 but reached a contrary result. The
court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that any of the terms were
unconscionable, with the exception of the method used to compute
interest.435 The court determined that the plaintiffs had "presented
enough evidence to require Warner Brothers to defend its method of
computing interest under the contract. '436 Nevertheless, the court ul-
timately decided that Warner Brothers demonstrated that the calcula-
tion of interest was the same as in the plaintiffs' original contract with
Casablanca, was equivalent to arrangements generally available from
competitors, and was not questioned during the contract negotia-
tions.437 The court emphasized that its role was to determine what the
parties meant by the contract language and that in this case both
plaintiffs were experienced enough to understand how the interest
computation worked.438 Thus, the court concluded that the contract
was performed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the
parties and was not unconscionable.439
The Batfilm court did not allow its decision to be driven by sym-
pathy with the plaintiffs, who apparently conceived the film and strug-
gled unsuccessfully for some time to make it only to see others reap
millions of dollars while they settled for $400,000.440 In doing so, the
court also refrained from using the hindsight judgment evident in the
Buchwald decision,441 remarking that it would not be good for the
motion picture industry to allow parties to come into court after a
movie had proven successful and have the court remake the
bargain.442
Paramount has appealed the Buchwald decision, challenging the
trial court finding of unconscionability as well as the ruling that the
434. The accounting provisions challenged were essentially the same as those in Buch-
wald, see supra notes 368-372 and accompanying text, plus additional terms relating to
foreign tax credits, the royalties on videocassette sales, and costs related to reusing the




438. Id. The court again emphasized that plaintiff Melniker was an "old hand" at this
type of agreement and had once negotiated them on the other side of the table.
439. Id. The judge ultimately dismissed the case. See Robb, supra note 424.
440. News reports indicated that actor Jack Nicholson alone reaped more than $50
million for his portrayal of the villain in the movie. See Robert W. Welkos, Two Producers
of 'Batman' Sue Warner, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1992, at D1.
441. See supra notes 411-415 and accompanying text.
442. Bat/jlm Productions, reprinted in ENT. L. RaP., Sept. 1994.
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movie was "based on" Buchwald's treatment."43 An appeal is also
likely in the Bailm case.4" While the decision in Batfilm is more
consistent with the popular construction and legislative history of Sec-
tion 2-302, the Graham and A&M Produce decisions make the pros-
pects for reversal of the Buchwald doubtful.
B. Hindsight Judgment in California Unconscionability Cases
The text of Section 2-302445 and the California case law446 require
that a contract be judged for unconscionability at the time of its mak-
ing. Nevertheless, the decision in Buchwald was strongly influenced
by the way variable factors unfolded after the contract was formed.447
While similar hindsight judgment can be found in the early adhesion
cases,44 8 the use of hindsight must be considered a misapplication of
Section 2-302. Apart from Buchwald, the California case best demon-
strating the impropriety of hindsight judgment is Ellis v. McKinnon
Broadcasting Co.44 9
The plaintiff in Ellis entered into an employment contract to
work as an advertising salesperson for the defendant television sta-
tion. 450 The initial and subsequent written contracts contained a
clause providing for termination by either party with two-weeks no-
tice.451 The terms also provided that the plaintiff would receive a
twenty-percent commission on sales, but was guaranteed a minimum
443. See Dan Cox, Par[anount] Finally Files Buchwald Appeal, VARIETY, Apr. 11,
1994, at 32. Paramount originally filed notice of appeal in August 1992, but completion of
the appeal was delayed for nearly two years while the trial judge assembled the 37,000 page
trial record. Id.
444. See Robb, supra note 424 (quoting plaintiffs' attorney Tom Girardi stating that the
judge's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' case was "outrageous" and would be appealed).
445. See supra notes 118-125 and accompanying text.
446. See, &g., California Growers Ass'n v. Bank of America, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 403
(Ct. App. 1994) (noting that if the contract is fair when made, it does not become uncon-
scionable because of subsequent events); Chretian v. Donald L. Bren Co., 198 Cal. Rptr.
523, 525 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasizing that the contract should be examined prospectively
from the time it was made); Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 816, 822
(Ct. App. 1975) ("It is blackletter law that whether a contract is fair or works unconsciona-
ble hardship is determined with reference to the time when the contract was made and
cannot be resolved by hindsight by considering circumstances of which the contracting par-
ties were unaware.").
447. See supra notes 411-415 and accompanying text.
448. See supra notes 175-218 and accompanying text.
449. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80 (Ct. App. 1993).
450. ld. at 81.
451. Id. The initial contract was signed when the plaintiff began his employment in
December 1986, and a second contract was signed six months later in June 1987. Both
contracts were identical in the key provisions. Id
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monthly salary of $2,166 for at least the first three months without
regard to actual sales.452 The key provision in the dispute, however,
was one providing that the salesperson would collect commissions
only on advertising fees actually received by the station prior to termi-
nation of the salesperson's employment. 453
The plaintiff worked for the defendant for more than two years
before voluntarily deciding to leave.4 54 The employer collected nearly
$100,000 in advertising fees from the plaintiff's sales after he left,455
which meant that the plaintiff would have been entitled to approxi-
mately $20,000 in commissions had he continued his employment.
Although the plaintiff indicated in his resignation letter that he under-
stood the consequences of the clause providing that commissions
would not be paid for fees collected after his termination date,456 he
subsequently challenged the provision.45 7 The appellate court's as-
sessment of unconscionability is presaged by its classification of the
clause as a "forfeiture provision. '458 The court proceeded to find ele-
ments of procedural unconscionability, unfair surprise, and oppres-
sion, as well as substantive unconscionability. While the court's
reasoning on procedural unconscionability is subject to challenge, it is
the court's assessment of substantive unconscionability that best illus-
trates hindsight judgment.
452. While the court's opinion indicates the minimum payment was for only the first
three months, the employer's brief indicates that the plaintiff was further guaranteed a
minimum monthly income of at least $2166 throughout the length of his employment. Re-
spondent's Brief at 5, Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co.
453. The relevant provision read in part: "The Station will pay Employee commissions
only on advertising fees billed and collected.... No commissions will be paid to the Em-
ployee on advertising fees received by the Station after the Employee's final date of actual
employment." Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
454. Id. at 81-82.
455. Id. at 82, 85. The case was first heard by the Labor Commission, which found for
the plaintiff employee and awarded him damages. The superior court granted a trial de
novo and found in favor of the employer, leading to the plaintiff's appeal to the California
Court of Appeal.
456. Id. at 82. The plaintiff's termination notice read in relevant part: "I am giving you
my two weeks notice of my last working date at KUSI-TV. My last actual date of employ-
ment will be March 17, 1989. Therefore, I expect to be commissioned on all monies col-
lected through the close of business on March 17, 1989." Respondent's Brief at 2, Ellis.
457. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82. In addition to arguing unconscionability, the plaintiff
also sought to establish ambiguity based on an alleged conflict between a provision for
payments only on fees collected and another provision that provided the employee would
be entitled to commissions "earned" through the date of termination. Id. The court of
appeal decided, however, that no ambiguity existed between the terms "collected" and
"earned" and that the written agreement intended to deny the employee commissions on
fees received by the employer after the date of termination. Id. at 83.
458. Id. at 82.
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The appellate court closely followed the A&M Produce analytical
structure in considering whether the commissions provision was un-
conscionable. The court accepted as true the plaintiff's contention
that the initial contract was not presented to him until a few weeks
after he had relocated and had begun work for the defendant.459 The
court also accepted the plaintiff's representation that the contract was
presented to him without warning and as a mere formality, thus induc-
ing him to scan the documents only for the commission percentage
and minimum draw.460 The plaintiff testified that he did not read the
provision at issue until immediately prior to his resignation.461 On this
basis the court found procedural unconscionability through "unfair
surprise," concluding that the plaintiff's failure to read the contract
was "hardly surprising."462
The court's willingness to excuse the plaintiff from reading the
contract is startling and stands at odds with other California cases in
which the courts were unsympathetic to parties, even consumers, who
failed to read their contracts when they had the opportunity to do
so.463 In this regard the case is dissimilar to cases in which the courts
have found it reasonable that the consumer did not read all papers
459. Id. at 84. Although the employee's signature was not dated, the document was
dated the day the plaintiff began work, and the defendant argued that he had signed it on
that date. Additionally, the plaintiff did sign other personnel documents that bore the date
of December 1, 1986. Defendant's Trial Brief at 3 n.1, Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co.,
No. 638913 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1991).
460. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-85. During the trial, the court found that the parties
had entered into three successive agreements, an initial oral agreement and the subsequent
written agreements, all binding on the parties. Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Ellis.
461. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
462. Id. at 83-84.
463. See, e.g., Coon v. Nicola, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 854-55 (Ct. App. 1993) (failure of
patient to read medical arbitration agreement did not render it unenforceable when patient
signed under non-emergency conditions, terms were clearly laid out, and defendant had no
notice that patient might have been disoriented because of medication); Bolanos v. Khala-
tian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209,211 (Ct. App. 1991) (failure of patient to read medical arbitration
agreement did not render it unenforceable when the agreement was signed on non-emer-
gency prenatal visit despite allegation that patient had only fifth-grade education and re-
ceived no explanation of the form); West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575 (Ct. App.
1991) (commercial lessee who was presented with initial draft and final lease that she took
home before signing was not excused because she failed to read provisions; the court not-
ing that parties to commercial contracts fail to read them at their peril); Markborough
California, Inc. v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 919, 927 (Ct. App. 1991) (failure of devel-
oper to read clause limiting liability in standardized agreement of engineering company to
consulting fee of $67,640 when breach caused more than $5 million in damage did not
prove lack of bargaining power when cover letter indicated proposals for different terms
would be considered).
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signed because of emergency or similar circumstances. 464 It is difficult
to imagine that the plaintiff in Ellis could not have availed himself of
the opportunity to read the written contract; the court expressly ac-
knowledged that he could have done so.465 Nevertheless, the court
excused him from doing so, apparently giving little or no weight to the
additional factor that the plaintiff was an experienced salesperson who
should have appreciated the significance of a signed contract.466
The appellate court buttressed its finding of surprise with the
highly questionable reasoning from A&M Produce that a party
presenting a standard form agreement has the burden of showing that
the other party had knowledge of any unusual or unconscionable
term.467 The court, however, gave only negligible consideration to
whether the post-termination provision was "unusual" in the context,
summarily stating that any provision leading to the forfeiture of
$20,000 must be considered unusual. 468 The employer argued that the
provision for post-termination fees was common not only in the
broadcasting industry, but also in comparable commission agree-
ments.469 The court, however, quickly dismissed as inapposite a case
involving an automobile sales contract that upheld a denial of com-
missions after termination.470 The opinion does not reflect any in-
quiry at all into broadcasting industry practices. In light of the fact
that the plaintiff had worked for a number of years in the broadcasting
industry, an inquiry into common practices would have been appropri-
ate to the issue of unfair surprise.
464. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (Ct. App. 1976) (un-
derstandable that patient did not read form entitled "Conditions of Admission" while be-
ing admitted because in such cases the patient normally goes to the hospital selected by his
doctor without feeling that he has a choice of institutions, and the experience is likely to be
anxious, stressful, and frequently traumatic).
465. The court stated, "It is true Ellis could have read the contract more closely when it
was presented to him for signature." Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
466. The plaintiff had apparently worked at another television station in Salinas, Cali-
fornia for two years before joining the defendant's station, Defendant's Trial Brief at 1, and
before that had worked for two years with a television station in Madison, Wisconsin, Re-
spondent's Brief at 3-4.
467. Ellis, 23 Cal Rptr. 2d at 84.
468. Id.
469. Respondent's Brief at 20-21, Ellis.
470. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. The court distinguished Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dick Bullis, Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Ct. App. 1977), on the ground that it
involved automobile sales commissions and in the automobile industry a "sale" was not
deemed made until the vehicle was delivered, while in present case, the "sale" was not
viewed as contingent on collection from the customer. Id. The distinction rings rather
hollow given that under the contract in Ellis, payment would never be due the salesperson
unless the customer paid. See supra note 456 for the relevant contract provision.
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The combination of the plaintiff's business experience plus his
ample opportunity to read the agreement should have precluded the
court from finding procedural unconscionability through unfair sur-
prise. Perhaps an underlying uneasiness with its conclusion in this
area explains why the court proceeded to look for procedural uncon-
scionability through oppression.
The court also found procedural unconscionability through "'op-
pression' based on unequal bargaining power."471 The court con-
cluded that because the plaintiff was a single employee who had
moved across the state to work for the defendant and had no other job
offers at the time, he had no choice other than to accept the con-
tract.4 72 Similar to the reasoning in Graham and Buchwald, the Ellis
court was unpersuaded by the fact that a number of terms, including
the starting date, commission rate, and amount of monthly pay had in
fact been negotiated by the parties.473 The court also discounted the
fact that in certain instances, presumably when the employee was
highly desired, the employer did enter into general negotiations of
contracts because the court observed that the plaintiff "was never
made aware of that option."474
, Having concluded that the Ellis contract was procedurally uncon-
scionable, the court also found substantive unconscionability by deter-
mining that the denial of commissions after termination was
commercially unreasonable.475 The court acknowledged that ten to
fifteen percent of the work on accounts occurred after the initial
sale,476 possibly after a salesperson had left the company, and there
was no indication in the record that the post-sales servicing was op-
tional or incidental. In fact, the employer argued that customers who
did not receive post-sales servicing often became reluctant to pay their
fees.477 The employment agreement thus was structured to give incen-
tive to salespersons to follow through on all sales. Nevertheless, the
court did not consider the provision justified by the employer's
concern.
471. Ellis, 23 Cal Rptr. 2d at 84.
472. Id.
473. Id. See discussion of Graham, supra notes 272-273, and Buchwald, supra notes
376-379.
474. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
475. I. at 85.
476. The plaintiff estimated that the post-sales servicing occupied 10-20% of his time.
Petitioner's Brief at 5, Ellis. The post-sales servicing apparently included copy changes,
scheduling changes, and assisting in the collection process. Respondent's Brief at 4, Ellis.
477. Defendant's Trial Brief at 9, Ellis.
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The court also disregarded the employer's argument that it had
agreed to pay the plaintiff a minimum of more than $6,000 through
the three-month guaranteed draw without assurance that the plaintiff
would succeed in selling any advertisements.478 Ellis might well have
left the company with all fees collected, or an amount of less than
$6,000 due, if his sales had slowed before he left. Indeed, the em-
ployer represented that the plaintiff spent his last two weeks primarily
on post-sales collection.479 Moreover, there was evidence that one
reason for the relatively large amount of lost commissions was that the
plaintiff left during the middle of the month rather than delaying until
shortly after the billing and payment cycle.480 One can only presume
that the timing of departure was the free choice of the plaintiff, proba-
bly made in conjunction with his new employer and made with knowl-
edge of the potential impact on his commissions. The avoidance of
lost commissions appears to have been largely within the control of
the plaintiff under the terms of the contract. Nonetheless, the court
viewed the contract not from the range of possibilities that existed at
the time of formation, but only from the specific circumstances that
had come to pass, largely as a result of the plaintiff's conduct. The
court was obviously disturbed at the commission that the plaintiff lost
upon termination. Presumably, if the lost fees had been insubstantial,
there would not have been a finding of unconscionability. Thus, in a
blatant exercise of hindsight evaluation, the court decided the post-
termination commissions clause was substantively unconscionable. 481
The Ellis case is also troubling because it is difficult to reconcile
with the earlier California decisions in Neal v. State Farm Insurance
Co. 482 and Chretian v. Donald L. Bren Co.483 In Neal an insurance
agent executed a contract that provided for payment of commissions
based on sales in the "sixth preceding month. '484 For the first six
months of employment, the agent would be compensated based on the
478. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
479. Respondent's Brief at 6, Ellis.
480. Id.
481. The Ellis court also suggested possible reformations of the contract although it
refrained from implementing them. First, the court suggested that unearned portions of
the guaranteed salary could have been charged against sums due after employment. Ellis,
23 Cal Rptr. 2d at 85. The court further suggested that the employer might have charged a
deduction of 15% or less against any post-termination commissions to account for the fact
that post-termination servicing of accounts was necessary. Id. at 85 n.4. In essence, the
court suggested that the parties could have written a better contract.
482. 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1961).
483. 198 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Ct. App. 1984).
484. Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
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sales by his predecessor agent in the locale, but upon termination, the
agent's successor would receive the commissions for the departing
agent's last six months4s8 The plaintiff brought suit against the insur-
ance company, alleging that the provision resulted in forfeiture of his
commission on premiums sold during his last six months.486 The court
agreed that the contract was adhesive, but expressly found that the
arrangement did not amount to a forfeiture and implicitly found that
the arrangement was a reasonable one, noting that courts in other
states had reached a similar conclusion.48
7
Similarly, in the more recent case of Chretian v. Donald L. Bren
Co., a contract between a real estate salesman and employer provided
that a portion of commissions would not be paid if the salesman left
before escrow closed.488 The salesman lost a partial commission of
approximately $17,000, an amount similar to that in Ellis, by leaving
before escrow closed 89 However, the court found the commission
arrangement to be reasonable in light of the employer's great interest
not just in obtaining the sale, but also in having it completed to the
customer's satisfaction.490 Although the employers in Neal and Chre-
tian could have structured the fee arrangements to address more pre-
cisely the economic consequences of a salesperson terminating
employment before a particular sale was completed, the test of uncon-
scionability is not whether the parties could have written a better or
more reasonable contract. The proper test in these cases is whether
the bargain is so one-sided as to shock the conscience and whether
there was some bargaining impropriety resulting from surprise or op-
pression. The Neal and Chretian courts, unlike the court in Ellis, dis-
played the proper restraint and deference to agreements that were not
egregiously one-sided in the allocation of risks.
C. Affirmative Use of the Unconscionability Doctrine
As discussed earlier in this Article,491 a fallacious view exists
among many courts that the unconscionability doctrine can never be
used to obtain an affirmative recovery. For the most part the Califor-
nia courts have erred in this regard, but the Buchwald court realized
485. Id. at 785.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 784-86.
488. Chredian, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 524-25.
489. Id. at 525.
490. Id. at 526.
491. See supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.
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that the doctrine may properly pave the way for affirmative relief by
eliminating an unconscionable provision in a contract.
The first California case to address the potential use of the un-
conscionability doctrine to obtain affirmative relief was Truta v. Avis
Rent A Car System, Inc.492 The plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that the
collision-damage waiver fees charged by major car rental companies
were unconscionable and sought an injunction and restitution.493 The
trial court granted a demurrer filed by the defendants that asserted
unconscionability could be used only as a defense and not as a ground
for affirmative relief.494 The appellate court found that a cause of ac-
tion based on unconscionability was sufficiently stated to survive a de-
murrer495 and that the interaction of Section 2-302 and other state law
concerning unfair business practices could give rise to an affirmative
relief.496 While the recognition in Truta that the operation of an un-
conscionable provision could lead to affirmative recovery was a signif-
icant development, the opinion rather clearly indicates that Section 2-
302 would not be an independent basis for such recovery.
A similar reading of Section 2-302 was given by the court in Cali-
fornia Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of America.497 The appellate court over-
turned the trial court's issuance of an injunction against a bank
charging an allegedly excessive fee for returned deposited checks.
The court's decision was partly based on the grounds that unconscio-
nability has only a defensive use under Section 2-302 and that while
separate statutory authority exists for affirmative relief for consumers,
no express statute exists to grant such relief to nonconsumers. 498 The
court explicitly construed the language of Section 2-302 to mean that
the Section may be used only in a defensive manner.499 Given the
type of transaction at issue in the case, the logical consequence of the
ruling would be that Section 2-302 could be invoked by the plaintiffs
492. 238 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1987).
493. Id. at 809.
494. Id.
495. The court of appeal found sufficient allegations of excessive price as substantive
unconscionability and lack of meaningful choice as procedural unconscionability. Id. at
817-18.
496. Id. at 815-16. The court cited California Civil Code § 1770, which makes unlawful
the insertion of "an unconscionable provision in [a] contract." Id. at 815. Section 1780
provides that a consumer harmed under § 1770 may obtain actual damages, injunctive re-
lief, punitive damages, and other relief deemed proper by the court. ld
497. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 403-04 (Ct. App. 1994).
498. Id. at 405.
499. Id. The court recognized that in Truta there was additional statutory authority
that served as a basis for affirmative recovery, but indicated that the statutes were inappli-
cable to the case at hand. Id. at 404.
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only by allowing fees to become due to the bank and then having the
agility to bring a lawsuit before the fees were collected.
Yet another example of the defensive use approach is the case of
Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Ass'n.50 This case focused on the
enforceability of a prepayment penalty in a loan agreement.501 The
.plaintiff borrowers paid the penalty and then brought suit charging
that the penalty was unconscionable.5 2 Following the general rule re-
flected in Truta, the court assumed that Section 2-302 could be used
only to defend against enforcement of the penalty clause and not to
recover the payment already paid.50 3 As in Truta, the court espoused
the view that other statutory provisions would be necessary to estab-
lish a right to affirmative recovery, assuming the clause was uncon-
scionable.50 4 Thus, the plaintiffs in Shadoan would have been barred
from using Section 2-302 because they had taken the cautious ap-
proach of paying the penalty before challenging the contract. While
the Shadoan court ultimately decided that the penalty clause was not
unconscionable, the reasoning dramatizes the inequity of the view that
unconscionability can be used only to fend off a claim for compensa-
tion and not to recover an amount already paid under an unconsciona-
ble contract or term.
The Buchwald case is the one recent California case in which the
affirmative use issue was better addressed. As discussed above, Buch-
wald and Bernheim raised unconscionability as part of their claim for
a share of the profits from the movie Coming to America.505 Para-
mount asserted that the plaintiffs were attempting to make an im-
proper use of Section 2-302 to obtain an affirmative recovery.5 06 The
court in Buchwald observed that an offensive use of the doctrine was
not allowed, but described the posture of the case as one in which
Buchwald and Bernheim brought the lawsuit for breach of contract
and then used unconscionability to prevent Paramount from defend-
500. 268 Cal. Rptr. 207 (Ct. App. 1990).
501. Id. at 208. The plaintiffs also challenged a clause that allowed the lender to "uni-
laterally call" the loan by demanding payment in full with six months notice. No prepay-
ment penalty could be asserted, however, if "unilateral call" was made by the lender. Id. at
210. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the two terms combined to make the
contract unconscionable. Id at 211.
502. l at 208.
503. Id. at 208-09. See also Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 454 (Ct.
App. 1991) (stating in dictum that § 2-302 can 6nly be used defensively and not to obtain
restitution).
504. Id
505. See supra notes 369-386 and accompanying text.
506. Fatal Subtraction, supra note 2, at 543 app. B.
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ing on the basis of certain contract provisions.5 07 The decision high-
lights the superficiality of the distinction between defensive and
offensive use of the doctrine.
The broader question raised by Buchwald, Truta, and the other
California cases addressing the issue of offensive use is whether the
generally recognized distinction is meaningful and worth maintain-
ing.5 0 8 A careful analysis of the cases suggests that it is not. The "de-
fensive use only" rule is artificial, is based on a simplistic reading of
Section 2-302, and does not effectively administer the policy underly-
ing the unconscionability concept. The mere presence of an uncon-
scionable clause in a contract is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for an
affirmative recovery. An affirmative recovery should be allowed,
however, in at least two situations: when the operation of the uncon-
scionable clause has already caused a loss to the offended party at the
time of trial and justifies restitution and when striking an unconscion-
able provision gives the party an avenue for recovery based on the
remainder of the contract.
D. Price-Term Unconscionability
Early California equity cases recognized that the price term may
be an element of unconscionability.50 9 In State Finance Co. v. Smith,
the unsophisticated buyer agreed in January 1937 to pay the then-sub-
stantial amount of $300 for truck that was valuable only as scrap, rely-
ing in part on erroneous representations about the quality of the
truck.510 In Jacklich v. Baer, the unsophisticated professional boxer
ostensibly obligated himself to pay an amount substantially in excess
of $33,000 in repayment of a loan in the amount of $13,500, without
any identifiable justification for the exceptional price.51' These early
California cases are consistent with the generally accepted view that a
combination of a contract price greatly in excess of an identifiable
market price, together with actual or presumed bargaining miscon-
duct, will render the contract unenforceable. 512 Regarding the two
more difficult price-term unconscionability issues identified above, 513
there is little California law on whether procedural unconscionability
507. Id. at 544-45.
508. See supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 174-188 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 139-153 and accompanying text.
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must always be present in addition to an excessive price,514 but there
are significant and conflicting decisions addressing whether excessive
price may be determined by measuring the seller's profit on the
transaction.
Perdue v. Crocker National Bank515 was the first California case
decided after the adoption of Section 2-302 to focus on an allegation
that the contract price included too large an amount or percentage of
profits, as opposed to an allegation that the contract price unconscion-
ably exceeded the general market price. In Perdue the plaintiff argued
that the $6 fee assessed for processing "insufficient funds" checks was
excessively high because the actual cost to the bank was no more than
a dollar.516 Reviewing the trial court's decision to dismiss the case on
demurrer,51 7 the California Supreme Court concluded that the allega-
tion of profit equal to 600 percent or more raised a triable issue of
substantive unconscionability. 518 Although acknowledging that a
price set by a competitive market was unlikely to be unconscionable,
the court reasoned that even the market price might be excessive in
light of the seller's cost, the seller's inconvenience in doing business,
and the true value of the product or service.519
The appellate court in Perdue had accepted the argument that the
$6 fee was sufficiently small in an absolute sense to preclude a claim of
unconscionability, but the supreme court took the position that a
514. The court in Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Ct. App. 1991), rev. den.,
1992 Cal. LEXIS 1338 (Cal. Mar. 19, 1992), essentially held that a 200% interest rate on a
loan was an excessive price that was sufficient in itself to establish unconscionability.
Carboni involved a loan of $4000 under a fourth deed of trust with the understanding that
the loan would be repaid in a single lump sum of $6000 three months later upon the sale of
the property. Carboni, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846. The parties disputed whether the purpose of
the loan was to renovate the property or pay medical bills. Ld. The property was not sold,
defendant borrowed additional funds totaling $99,000 before defaulting, and by the time of
the trial two years later the total owed was $390,000. Id. The debtor had agreed to pay
interest at the rate of 200% that was clearly revealed in a disclosure statement. Id. at 850.
While the existence of reasonable alternatives to this loan was debatable, the court seemed
inclined to find the terms too harsh to enforce even in the absence of bargaining miscon-
duct. Id. at 848. See Darr, supra note 14, at 1843, 1854 (citing Carboni as a rare case
finding unconscionability based on the substantive term alone).
515. 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985). The United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed
the appeal in the case "for want of jurisdiction." 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
516. Perdue, 702 P.2d at 508, 513. The complaint asserted that the actual cost of
processing the checks was only $0.30 per check. l at 513.
517. Id. at 508.
518. Id. at 513. The court also noted the possible presence of procedural unconsciona-
bility both through unfair surprise because the contract was contained on a "signature
card" with extremely small print and through lack of meaningful choice because the terms
were nonnegotiable. Id at 513-14.
519. Id. at 512.
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small fee applied to a large volume of transactions might lead to a
"sizeable sum" that would raise a colorable issue of unconscionabil-
ity5 20 Because the case involved the appeal of an order to dismiss, the
Perdue court did not need to resolve the perplexing question of what
percentage of profits is excessive.521 The opinion, however, clearly en-
dorses both the view that a price may be unconscionable because it
gives a party too much profit and the novel concept that the cumula-
tive profits from many separate transactions are relevant to an indi-
vidual plaintiff's claim.522 Subsequently, the appellate court in Truta
also endorsed both these concepts in ruling that a $6 per day charge
by rental car companies for "collision damage waiver" protection
raised a triable issue of unconscionability.5 23 The Truta court held that
the charging of $6 per day for collision damage waiver protection by
car rental companies raised "a colorable claim of substantive uncon-
scionability" based on allegations that the cumulative effect was that
the companies received fees that were more than double what they
should earn in light of the protection actually provided to
customers.5
24
The same issues recently surfaced again but were treated differ-
ently in California Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of America.525 The plaintiff
challenged an alleged 100 percent markup reflected in a $3 bank
charge to depositors when the drawer of the check had insufficient
funds.526 The trial court concluded that the 100 percent markup was
too much and ordered that the bank charge no more than 15 percent
over its actual costs.527 The appellate court emphatically disagreed
and reversed, first finding that the $3 charge by the defendant was in
520. Id. at 513. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 190 Cal. Rptr. 204, 209-11 (Ct. App.
1983) (rejecting claim that $6 charge was unreasonable and holding as a matter of law that
the disparity between bank's alleged cost of 30 cents and $6 fee did not rise to level of
substantive unconscionability), vacated, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
521. Cf. Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 447 (Ct. App. 1991) (af-
firming decision that bank customers were entitled to restitution of "late payment" and
"over limit" fees charged on credit card accounts under state law concerning invalid liqui-
dated damage clauses).
522. Perdue, 702 P.2d at 513. The litigation was settled before the courts resolved the
questions. See Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation,
43 Bus. LAW. 1081, 1082 (1988) (explaining that the settlement was approved in a compan-
ion case, Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 720307 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1987)).
523. Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 817 (Ct. App. 1987) (re-
versing trial court's grant of dismissal on a general demurrer).
524. Id.
525. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (Ct. App. 1994).
526. Id. at 403.
527. Id. at 400.
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the low range of market prices charged by competing banks and then
emphatically stating that "[t]he huge volume of [fees]-and the conse-
quent cumulative profit to [the bank]-is inconsequential. 'A con-
tract, fair when entered into, does not thereafter become
unconscionable simply because a great many other persons enter into
identical contracts with defendant thereby increasing defendants'
profits.' ' 528 Thus, the California Grocers court directly disagreed with
the reasoning in Perdue and Truta that the cumulative effect of many
separate contracts may be relevant to a question of unconscionability.
Given that the Perdue and Truta courts' cumulative effect approach
has no identifiable basis in the language of Section 2-302 or the early
equity cases, the position of the California Grocers court is easily
more persuasive.
The California Grocers opinion also disagreed with Perdue and
Truta on the question whether a large profit margin in small price tag
transactions can support a determination of unconscionability. Nota-
bly, the California Grocers court expressly distinguished its facts from
the Perdue case on the grounds that there was a competitive market
among banks with regard to the fee in question and the defendant's
fee was at "the low end" of the market.529 The court also distin-
guished Perdue on the ground that the markup in that case was in the
600 percent to 2000 percent range, whereas in California Grocers the
markup was only 100 percent and still "within the range of commonly
accepted notions of fair profitability."530 Notwithstanding these fac-
tual distinctions, the California Grocers opinion gives the unmistaka-
ble impression that the appellate court simply did not find the $3 fee
to be shocking as an absolute matter.531
The ultimate difficulty with the application of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine to price term cases such as Perdue, Truta, and California
Grocers is the absence of any reliable basis for determining when
profits become so large as to be unconscionable. The inherent subjec-
528. Id. at 403 (quoting Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 698 (S.D. Fla.
1979)).
529. California Grocers, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03.
530. Id. at 403. In addition to distinguishing Perdue, the court also distinguished the
findings of unconscionability in Carboni as involving a 1000% markup and Jones v. Star
Credit, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 1969), as involving a 300% profit margin. Id. The
California Grocers court did not indicate at what point between 100% and 300% a markup
might become unconscionable.
531. After referring to many of the classic definitions of unconscionability as involving
terms that shock the conscience or confound common sense, the court stated that "more
fundamentally, the $3 fee simply is not so exorbitant as to shock the conscience." Id. at
403.
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tivity of the doctrine when applied in this manner is almost certainly
what the California legislators had in mind in initially omitting Section
2-302 from the California Commercial Code. The subjectivity of such
decisions is also reflected in the likelihood that trial and appellate
courts in Perdue, Truta, and California Grocers reached differing con-
clusions about whether the fees charged in the particular case reached
the point of being unconscionable. Moreover, if one were to accept
the Perdue approach that relatively small fees with large profit mar-
gins become unconscionable when many people enter into similar
transactions, then the possibilities for unconscionability litigation
would be endless.5 32 Other jurisdictions have generally resisted such
opportunities to regulate prices under Section 2-302 based on meas-
ures of profitability.533
532. In Hertz Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 518 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct. 1987), the court
observed that if unconscionability could be found anytime there is great disparity between
price and value as measured by the seller's cost, then even the "local seller of fruit" could
be made to answer claims of excessive prices. Id. at 709. A general browse through recent
news reports yield many other possibilities for claims that a seller is making excessive prof-
its in what otherwise are small price transactions. See, e.g., Lesley Alderman, Shopping
Around for Contact Lenses Can Be an Eye-opening Experience, DErVER POST, Sept. 18,
1994, at H12 (discussing common practice of optometrists and ophthalmologists to mark
up contact lenses at double the price charged by discount sellers); CONSUMER REPORTS,
Vol. 59, No. 8, Aug. 1994, at 490 (indicating that manufacturers of contact lenses may
markup some lenses in excess of 400% based solely on the brand name); FINTECH ELEC.
OFFicE, Feb. 17, 1993 (discussing large profit margins made in sale of computer software
generally and in European sales); Tony Kornheiser, Mini & the Moocher, WASH. POST,
Sept. 25, 1994, at F1 (discussing hotel practice of imposing excessive markups on the prices
of items included in in-room mini-refrigerators).
533. See Merrel v. Research & Data Inc., 589 P.2d 120, 123 (Kan. 1979) (holding that
fee charged by merchants for returned checks might be so large as to be unconscionable,
but that $5 fee was modest and "not even arguably unconscionable" in light of inconven-
ience to merchant in handling bad checks); Jacobs v. Citibank, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 1183 (N.Y.
1984) (summarily rejecting claim that bank's overdraft charges were unconscionable in the
absence of any proof of a lack of meaningful choice or that the charges were "unreasona-
bly favorable" to bank); Hertz, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 709-10 (rejecting claim that attorney gen-
eral had authority to investigate $2.50 per day collision damage waiver charge as possibly
unconscionable solely on allegation that charge greatly exceeded the cost to seller); Best v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Or. 1987) (rejecting claim of unconsciona-
bility for insufficient funds fee of $5 on grounds, inter alia, that the fees were relatively
small, the fees were similar to those charged by other banks, and the contract did not
include a specific fee, but merely a duty to set the fee in good faith). Cf. Wallace v. Na-
tional Commerce Bancorporation, 1993 WL 44600, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1993)
(dismissing claim of unconscionability for insufficient funds fee on ground that the doctrine
may not be used to obtain affirmative relief, but refusing to dismiss claim that the fees were
set in breach of duty of good faith).
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Conclusion
Ultimately, the California cases present four lessons to be learned
about unconscionability. First, the California decisions point to the
difficulties encountered when courts lose sight of the origins of the
unconscionability doctrine and become too solicitous of merchants
who claim lack of bargaining power. Second, the cases warn against
losing sight of the statutory dictates of Section 2-302 and second-
guessing the parties on the basis of hindsight. Third, the cases suggest
the general view that unconscionability can be used in only a defen-
sive posture should be discarded. While it is true that the mere pres-
ence of unconscionability is not in itself a basis for relief, recovery in
restitution or through enforcement of the remainder of the contract
may be appropriate. And finally, the California decisions also warn of
the problems that arise when courts become so expansive in policing
for price term unconscionability that they begin to weigh when a party
is making an excessive percentage of profit on a contract, or, worse
yet, on many separate contracts. Ideally, the lessons from California
would be instructive to its own courts, to the courts in other jurisdic-
tions, and to those who would consider the future of Section 2-302 and
the unconscionability doctrine.
The Iowa Supreme Court has stated its view of the proper appli-
cation of the unconscionability doctrine:
People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without
the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of one side
or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be
permitted to enter into contracts that actually may be unreasonable
or which lead to hardship on one side. It is only where it turns out
that one side or the other is to be penalized by the enforcement of
the terms of a contract so unconscionable that no decent, fair-
minded person would view the ensuing result without being pos-
sessed by a profound sense of injustice, that equity will deny the use
of its good offices in the enforcement of such unconscionability....
We now recognize the doctrine in law as well as equity but have
accepted its limitations.534
534. Smith v. Harrison, 325 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1982) (quoting Carlson v. Hamilton,
332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958)). See also WXON-TV, Inc. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 740 F.
Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (stating that Michigan courts are not authorized to
police contracts for mere "unreasonableness"); Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Del.
Ch. 1992) (stating that the notion that a court can and will review contracts for fairness is
dangerous because it sfibjects negotiated bargains to the loosely constrained review of the
judicial process); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho
1988) (Idaho courts possess "no roving commission" to rewrite contracts).
January 1995] UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
HeinOnline -- 46 Hastings L.J. 553 1994-1995
554 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
Similarly, Judge Posner has noted in construing Indiana law that
its courts do "not conceive it to be a proper judicial function to rewrite
commercial contracts entered into by fully adult, fully consenting,
fully competent business people" and that the state courts have "re-
sisted thus far the tug to a more paternalistic conception of the judicial
role in enforcing contracts. '535 The California courts have not consist-
ently adhered to this guiding principle that unconscionability is a doc-
trine that should be applied sparingly. The lessons to be learned from
its past unconscionability decisions hopefully will steer California to
the mainstream in exercising the unconscionability doctrine, and will
provide constructive insights to other courts as well.
535. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1986).
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